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1. Introduction – Beliefs, Boundaries, 
Culture
Background and Context
Despite the killing of over 6 million Jews in the Nazi death camps during 
World War II, there are still people throughout the world forging identities 
stemming from Nazi ideology. Recorded incidences of neo-Nazi attacks 
were increasing even before the rise of Donald Trump, and globally the 
popularity of neo-Nazi related groups was growing in a variety of forms in 
different nations. We might conclude with Primo Levi that every age has its 
own form of fascism. Historical parallels can be identified between the 1930s 
and the 1990s and beyond, however, this retrospective approach is myopic. 
Neo-Nazi belief is not limited to one nation or culture. The world and the 
media appear to be preoccupied over boundaries, with Donald Trump’s 
rhetoric pushing this even further. As Homi Bhabha puts it, ‘the boundary 
is that from which something begins its presencing’.1 The building of a wall 
between America and Mexico has many interpretations, one being it is a 
form of mask for America in a futile attempt to cling onto its descending 
identity. Nazism and neo-Nazism are concerned with boundaries, with the 
media delineating many of these boundaries, even our moral boundaries.
This book concerns Nazism and neo-Nazism and film and media, recogniz-
ing media and culture have become fused, taking an approach drawn from 
cultural and media studies. New media platforms while spreading neo-Nazi 
ideologies also form part of globalization that in general is construed as a 
threat to local identity, with the defence being to incorporate Nazi and neo-
Nazi methods. The media continually reworks conceptions of Nazism and 
neo-Nazism. This book analyses this process and exchange, recognizing the 
fluidity of the meaning of these key concepts under consideration. This open-
ing chapter offers an overview of media and culture, the second part covering 
right-wing movements in European football and white separatist movements 
in America. Neo-Nazism in the context of European football hooliganism is 
a paradoxical phenomenon where there is evidence of the media driving the 
violence. Neo-Nazism proliferates through new media technologies but their 
basic nature is to be anti-organizational. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with film and 
television and comedy, and with how Nazism and neo-Nazism are mediated 
through a variety of forms, including the novel and memoir. Issues concerning 
authenticity, history and theory, the role of new media and technology, the 
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importance of the media and neo-Nazism in the era of Donald Trump, and 
neo-Nazism and globalization are central to Chapters 4 and 5. The concluding 
chapter assesses the rise of the new right in Europe.
Our argument concerns demythologizing the reporting of neo-Nazism 
as a theatre of extremism. Such reporting involves obfuscating the reality 
that neo-Nazism is often at the centre of media, culture, and society, not its 
fringes. Despite a reported growth in neo-Nazism, this is not a teleological 
development. Traversing such a wide range of media, culture and geography 
can raise methodological questions over the level of analysis, but the depth 
of this analysis throughout is accessible. While being international in scope 
this book does not claim to be comprehensive. Scholars such as Gavriel 
D. Rosenfeld have argued that there has been a gradual normalization of 
Nazism. There is a historical trajectory concerning images of Adolph Hitler, 
from the work of Heinrich Hoffman, who documented Hitler’s oratorical 
gestures, to Internet mashups and memes, such as ‘Disco Hitler’. Rosenfeld 
has argued there was a shift at the turn of the millennia away from a mor-
alistic perspective on the Third Reich to a period of normalization. With 
the chapter in this book on comedy, it should become clear that a comical 
portrayal of Hitler and Nazism is not linear. But Rosenfeld does raise serious 
philosophical questions. Normalization of the past means no period is 
different from any other. This leads to certain assumptions around an 
abnormal past and a shift towards a desired normal past.2 Taking a cultural 
studies approach, the thesis here is that neo-Nazism has often been at the 
heart of culture, focusing on Nazism and neo-Nazism in f ilm and media, 
rather than Hitler’s evolution.
Questions about race, racism, neo-Nazism, and identity need to be for-
mulated in the context of the importance of the notions of personal identity 
being created via imitation. The contemporary media focuses primarily 
on Islamic terrorism, as with the attacks in London, 22 March 2017, always 
bracketing events in a framework as a battle with global terrorism. Acts by 
neo-Nazi white power terrorists, such as the killer of British MP Jo Cox in 
2016, are often framed by the media as just the activities of isolated, mentally 
ill people. By positioning such acts as part of a process where those who may 
be without a voice express themselves, the media damages perceptions of 
the mentally ill and misrepresents the facts. Such media framing ignores the 
international network of neo-Nazi groups that resort to violence and can be 
termed terrorists. A focus on Islam can be interpreted as legitimizing the 
escalations of certain wars. This also raises the anti-immigration rhetoric 
across the world, despite the main attacker in the March 2017 London 
example being ‘made in England’, totally born and bred.
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On 22  July 2011, the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik bombed a government 
building in Oslo, Norway, killing eight people, and shot dead 69 people in 
Utøya attending a Workers’ League youth camp. Breivik had been to the 
UK, contacting the English Defence League, and maintained he was part 
of what he termed a war in Europe against immigration, and the spread of 
Islam in particular. As these events in Norway and elsewhere indicate, there 
remains in Europe a violent undercurrent of extremist belief. As this book 
reveals, this is not limited to Europe. This belief system exists in a milieu 
which has become characterized by violent neo-fascist nationalist rhetoric 
and an increased propensity for transnational discourse. The Internet has 
shifted neo-fascist cells from local, parochial operations to an international 
platform. Breivik’s manifesto rapidly became a resource and inspiration to 
other, disparate, individuals who would otherwise have remained isolated. 
The neo-fascist racial religion of Wotanism can integrate with the Christian 
nationalism of Breivik, whilst pro-Aryan groups in Australia exchange intel-
ligence and strategies with esoteric neo-fascists in the United Kingdom. Once 
repelled by globalized culture(s), the far right has prospered on the back of 
the technology that facilitates an increased globalism, a subject addressed 
here. Where fascism may once have been seen as a reaction to modernity, 
neo-fascism can be read as postmodern extremism: globalized, inchoate, and 
immersed in incompatible narratives of arguable irrationality. Behind these 
elements are many paradoxes, but this is also the nature of postmodernism.
People def ine themselves through both difference and similarity. Our 
belonging is framed by multiple factors, such as language and land, creating 
group boundaries and identities. Before we swallow the notion of the ubiq-
uity of heterophobia, meaning all difference is wrong, other evidence needs 
considering, rather than concluding we are all potential neo-Nazis. What we 
f ind is that the acceptance of strangers and an ability to have empathy and 
be tolerant are just as prevalent in humanity as racism and prejudice.3 In this 
respect, if we concluded incorrectly that racism, especially anti-Semitism, is 
some kind of human universal, outside of time, this would be legitimizing 
racism. The history of the far right is not as straightforward or as clear-cut 
as its opponents might believe. There are overlaps between the Australian 
One Nation Party, some American groups (such as the American Party), 
and South African movements nostalgic for apartheid. Areas that have 
witnessed growing xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe, such as 
Latvia’s LNNK (For Freedom and Fatherland), and the SRS (Serbian Radical 
Party), have their origins stemming in independence movements.4
Traditional historians are concerned that the understanding of Nazism, 
particularly by young people, is now gained inaccurately only through 
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the media. This suggests history is f ixed, certain and unchanging, but the 
synergy between historical analysis, interpretation and cultural studies 
is signif icant. As Hayden White put it, histories are ambiguous, they are 
‘symbolic structures, extended metaphors’, and are situated in narratives 
we understand from literary culture.5 Holocaust survivor and author Elie 
Wiesel has explained that the problem concerns notion that mass media 
is profane and may trivialize a sacred subject but it also may inform and 
educate.6 From traditional literature, to f ilms, and multimedia, including 
videogames, all have utilized Nazi and neo-Nazi elements, and these are 
discussed here. The frenzy of the visible, as Frederic Jameson called the 
media age, could be compared to the frenzy of imagery in Nazi culture. 
These debates are ongoing, and are becoming more high prof ile in the 
Donald Trump era, but have never disappeared.
Media and culture have become intertwined, inf iltrating into the daily 
discourse of most people in the modern world, shaping identities. This is 
a broad area with regards to f ilm representations, from the traditional 
adaptation of Shakespeare’s Richard III (Richard Loncraine, 1995), to a 
controversial comedy set in a concentration camp, Life Is Beautiful (Roberto 
Benigni, 1997). History is frequently reworked in f ilm representations, often 
functioning as secondary and sometimes primary source of information 
about historical periods. Films such as The Reader (Stephen Daldry, 2008) 
have placed debates concerning Nazism and neo-Nazism at the centre 
of the media and cultural discourse. Along with this, the resurgence of 
support for real fascist movements is disturbing, and needs analysis. With 
reference to thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, a refugee from Nazi Germany, 
and Lithuanian-born Emmanuel Levinas, what does the legacy of the past 
indicate about the future?
Many films, such as American History X (Tony Kaye, 1998), This Is England 
(Shane Meadows, 2008), and I.D. (Philip Davis, 1995), have powerfully shown 
the growth in far-right movements and their influence over youth culture. 
Numerous f ilms have tackled Nazism, including Mephisto (István Szabó, 
1981), Das Boot (Wolfgang Petersen, 1981), and Heimat (Edgar Reitz, 1994). 
The Reader, staring Kate Winslet, and Valkyrie (Bryan Singer, 2008), starring 
Tom Cruise, received immense media attention between 2008 and 2009. 
Winslet, who gained an Academy Award for this role, plays an ex-Nazi 
guard, while Cruise’s character plots the death of Hitler. As with taking 
on the role of a disabled person, playing a Nazi appears to be an essential 
challenge for actors proving their worth. There have been a number of 
important f ilms, such as: The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas (Mark Herman, 
2008), The Counterfeiters (Stefan Ruzowitzky, 2007), The Pianist (Roman 
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Polanski, 2002), Downfall (Oliver Hirschbiegel, 2004), and Sophie’s Choice 
(Alan J. Pakula, 1982).
Other f ilms, particularly of the horror genre, have Nazism as a backstory 
where, for example, the children of those experimented upon in Nazi camps 
gain supernatural powers. Like child sexual abuse, Nazism becomes a device 
for encapsulating absolute evil, but this is more than a simplistic plot device. 
This movement through transgressive trauma is presented as giving both 
the victim and perpetrator abilities, and is part of a theological paradigm. 
Through enduring the greatest of evils comes the granting of the highest 
form of grace and if forgiveness is granted this bestowing of grace is even 
true for those conducting the evil.7 Further victimization can occur if there 
is ‘unproblematic identif ication’, as Dominick LaCapra calls it.8 This book 
does not claim to be comprehensive in examining f ilm and television but 
Chapter 2 explores important examples. There are countless f ilms that use 
Nazi and neo-Nazi culture in interesting, but less direct ways, including the 
Raiders of the Lost Ark (Steven Spielberg, 1981). In American Beauty (Sam 
Mendes, 1999), for example, Colonel Fitts (Chris Cooper) is a repressed 
homosexual who beats his son. The fact he collects Nazi memorabilia, which 
again has a comic aspect to it, is supposed to reveal his unstable character. 
Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993) was based on Thomas Keneally’s 
1982 novel Schindler’s Ark. This is a f ictional reworking of a true story and 
the f ilm managed to put Nazi history back on the agenda for people of 
all ages, indicating the importance of the relationship between history 
and f ilm. Chapter 2 explores f ilm and television with regards to memory, 
authenticity and representation.
The Holocaust might not be thought to be comedic, although it has been 
used successful as a context for comedy, offering a poignant juxtaposition. 
Aspect of this are discussed in Chapter 3. If comedy and religion went 
together, rather than supposedly being antithetical, then Judaism would 
be held up as the religion that has produced the most well-known and 
successful comics. Not only do we have the prolif ic comedian, actor, writer 
and director Woody Allen but numerous contemporary comedians, such as 
Adam Sandler. Mel Brooks’ The Producers (1968), which concerns the musi-
cal Springtime for Hitler, is just one example of the apparently incongruous 
blending of Nazism and comedy. His f ilm To Be or Not to Be, which led to the 
infamous ‘Hitler Rap’ (1983), showed just how influential Brooks’ comedy 
was, with The Producers going on to be adapted as a musical, winning more 
Tony Awards than any other musical in Broadway history.
The comedy Life Is Beautiful (Roberto Benigni, 1999) concerns a Jewish 
Italian man Guido Orefice (Roberto Benigni) who uses comedy with his son 
14 NazisM aNd Neo -NazisM iN  FilM aNd Media 
in a concentration camp. It was winner of the Grand Jury Prize at Cannes in 
1998, plus the 1998 Academy Awards for best music, score, foreign language 
f ilm, and actor. While some may have found the f ilm offensive, it movingly 
raises deep philosophical questions concerning humanity, survival, family, 
ethics and God. This subject of Nazism, neo-Nazism, and comedy is the 
focus of Chapter 3; does such comedy serve a useful political purpose, such 
as bringing about a form of equality, if only momentarily? Aspects of Nazi 
culture that have been used frequently in television comedy, such as the 
classic ‘don’t mention the war’ sketch in Fawlty Towers, are also examined. 
Issues concerning taste, ethics, transgression, the unmasking of authority 
and the purpose of comedy and laughter are tackled.
Another aim of this text is to take a moderate transnational approach, 
with examples drawn from mainland Europe, the UK, North and Latin 
America, Asia, Africa, and beyond. This approach f its with the dominance 
of multimedia global formats, but there is no claim that this approach is 
comprehensive. Contemporary re-workings of Nazism and the neo-Nazi 
use of media have transnational elements that deserve this approach. Along 
with the explicit need to examine Nazism and neo-Nazism in contemporary 
media, this book engages with philosophical trends. These themes include 
what we currently understand to be knowledge, history, memory, meaning, 
and truth. This is why a number of philosophers are employed here, includ-
ing Henri Bergson, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles 
Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas, and others, such as Hannah Arendt. Arendt 
came to understand the horror of totalitarianism as not having an explana-
tion stemming from psychopathology but from the servility of its agents, 
‘the real basis of its truly abject status’.9 The core concern is how Nazism and 
neo-Nazism have been mediated and refashioned since the 1980s in media. 
A crucial aspect of this book therefore concerns the construction of truth.
Ironic and non-ironic terms, such as ‘Nazi chic’, ‘Nazi camp’ (referring 
to gay culture and Holocaust glamour) are now ubiquitous. Nazism and 
neo-Nazism is continually being mediated. The novel The Kindly Ones by 
Jonathan Littell (2006), for example, created a media sensation, selling 
700,000 copies in France alone by 2007. Taking the viewpoint of an SS officer, 
the novel asks: Would we have behaved differently and could everyone be a 
Nazi under certain circumstances? Littell further inflamed media debates, 
when in an interview with Israeli newspaper Haaretz in May 2008 he ac-
cused Israel of using the Holocaust politically. He likened Israel’s behaviour 
to that of the Nazis in the build up to World War II. Sociologist Danny 
Beusch has examined gay Nazi fetishism in online groups by interviewing 
certain members. He concludes that these groups offer tangible benefits 
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for exploring non-normative desires and greater experimentation. This is 
not framed as a ‘queerized’ utopian world given the hierarchical elements, 
including exclusion, reinforcing heteronormative masculinity via (over)
conformity. For Beusch, this is not about contesting the signif iers of Nazi 
regalia, as some queer theorists maintain, but re-asserts the horrif ic his-
tory.10 There are many assumptions that still need to be addressed if we 
conclude this apparently transgressive behaviour is subversive. Further 
research is required into the constructed gendered and sexual identities 
and politics of practitioners, as well as the ways through which, ‘they frame, 
experience and understand their embodied sexual practice’.11
While anti-Semitism is well known, and popularized in the press and 
elsewhere, aspects of philo-Semitism are less discussed. Aspects of Jewish 
culture are in the public consciousness due to the media and celebrity 
culture, with the likes of singer Madonna and soccer star David Beckham 
being involved in Jewish mysticism, and over 50 serious books on the Kabala 
currently available. We also have revenge narrative f ilms, such as Inglori-
ous Basterds (Quentin Tarantino, 2009), starring Brad Pitt as Nazi hunter 
Aldo Raine, where the divide between elite and popular culture has been 
crossed. Despite the Left being continually accused of anti-Semitism, in 
post-1968 France intellectuals fell in love with Judaism. On 21 December 
1984 Libération published an influential article on the way intellectuals 
of the left of the 1970s and 1980s had made the flight from ‘Mao to Moses’. 
There were numerous examples, not least Jacques Derrida himself, who, 
along with Noam Chomsky, became an academic celebrity. Importantly, 
given the wider philosophical issues of this book, Derrida has been blamed 
for the disappearance of truth.
Highly charged debates concerning Nazism and hoaxes have made it 
into mainstream media and popular culture, influencing the discourse. In 
April 1989, German newspaper Stern published what became known as the 
‘Hitler Diaries’. Celebrated historians verif ied their authenticity, despite not 
seeing the documents, and then they were found to be forgeries with the 
forgers receiving 42 months in prison. What does such a hoax reveal about 
the desire for ‘truth’ and the demands of journalism? How can ‘experts’ 
be so easily misled, and what does this say about historians? How do such 
hoaxes damage the writing of ‘real’ Nazi and Jewish history? And how does 
this feed into the conspiracy theories of neo-Nazis?
In 1995 Binjamin Wilkomirski published Fragments: Memories of a 
Wartime Childhood, 1939-1948.12 The author claimed to have been in two 
Nazi concentration camps, and to have been experimented upon for medical 
purposes by the Nazis. Praised, feted, and compared to Anne Frank and 
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Primo Levi by numerous critics, receiving the National Jewish Book Award 
in the US, the Jewish Quarterly Literature Prize in the UK, and the Prix 
Memoire de la Shoa in France. But in 2000 it was def initively proven that 
this book was a hoax. As with child sexual abuse ‘testimony’ texts, the 
debates surrounding this book reflected wider issues beyond Nazism and 
the Holocaust, such as how autobiography, memoir, and ‘trauma literature’ 
is perceived, and used by many and developed as part of ‘history’.
From politicians to royalty, Nazism and neo-Nazism inflames the media. 
On 24 February 2006, the BBC reported Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London 
from 1981 to 1986 and again from 2000 to 2008, was to be suspended from 
off ice for one month for comparing a Jewish journalist to a Nazi concentra-
tion camp guard. He was then suspended from the Labour Party after an 
interview in April 2016 with the BBC when he apparently claimed Hitler was 
a supporter of Zionism in 1932 with the policy all Jews should be moved to 
Israel. Livingstone argued he was being attacked by the right-wing of the 
Labour Party over his support for Palestinian human rights and claimed 
he had never equated the Israeli government with the Nazis. With the 
UK’s right-wing press dominating the media, highlighting divisions in the 
opposition party was essential for the ruling Conservatives to deflect criti-
cism. The British tabloid media frequently mocks f igures in the public eye 
and anything involving a celebrity connected to Nazism and neo-Nazism 
will make the news. In January 2005 Clarence House, speaking on behalf of 
the British royal family, made an apology in the British media over Prince 
Harry wearing a Nazi armband to a fancy-dress party.
There is a long history in pop culture of Nazi imagery being employed, 
with diverse celebrity superstars, such as Michael Jackson and David Bowie 
using fascist iconography in their acts. In April 2007 Bryan Ferry, former 
lead singer with Roxy Music, apologized in the media for praising Nazi 
iconography, having called their imagery ‘amazing’. In March 2008 UK 
sensationalist (now defunct) newspaper The News of the World revealed it 
possessed video footage of Max Mosley, head of Formula One Racing and 
son of British wartime fascist leader and Nazi sympathiser Oswald Mosley, 
‘romping’ at a ‘Nazi orgy’. Mosley, a former barrister, won a legal case against 
the paper for invasion of privacy in July 2008. As with the hoax cases, this 
raised wider issues beyond Nazism and the Holocaust, given this became 
a debate about what an individual should, or should not, be allowed to do 
in private. Mr Justice Eady, the presiding judge, claimed Holocaust victims 
were not being mocked in this instance. In February 2009, Irish rockers 
U2 in their video to ‘Get on Your Boots’ overtly utilized Nazi and fascist 
iconography, with supposed postmodern intent. A number of popes have 
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negotiated Nazism in the media. Pope Benedict XVI, a former member of 
Hitler Youth, was attacked in parts of the media for not doing enough to heal 
the effects of Nazism. In 2010, prior to a trip to the UK, he claimed the Roman 
Catholic Church did more to help Jews than is commonly recognized, a 
controversial statement without historical backing or credibility.
Media images construct the myths we live by and often possess a value 
higher than truth. The desire for truth has not vanished, even if it seems 
to be harder to attain. Issues over Nazism and racism have continually 
made headlines, globally. US extremist groups have been linked to the 
British National Party (BNP). The transnational scope of neo-Nazism is 
well-founded and as an example is relevant due to its complexity. The 
BNP has parts of its origins in Britain’s far-right National Front Party, and 
gained two seats in the European Parliament in July 2009. Questions over 
censorship and free speech arise in this context. In November 2007, the 
Oxford University Students Union invited BNP leader Nick Griff in to their 
‘Free Speech Forum’, along with controversial historian and ‘Holocaust 
denier’, David Irving. Anti-fascist groups and the Oxford Jewish Society all 
protested loudly, alongside free speech groups, the resulting clash making 
international news.
Controversy was sparked again when the BBC’s premiere political debate 
programme Question Time included Griff in as a guest. The event itself 
became newsworthy, with protests in 2009 outside the BBC preventing staff 
from leaving the building. The BBC was accused of conducting a publicity 
stunt to chase ratings, but even those within Griff in’s party concluded his 
appearance on the show damaged the BNP’s reputation. The use of the 
media to address issues connected to neo-Nazism functioned to damage 
supporters of certain nationalist white separatist ideologies. Overall, it 
would be naïve to see this period as some form of decline in nationalism 
and related neo-Nazism. Since this period, BNP popularity slumped further 
but members have been joining the right-wing English Defence League, 
which has stronger links with neo-Nazism. In England, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party is in many areas the third party, beating the Liberal 
Democrats. During 2017 fascism was on the rise in Hungary, and former 
BNP leader Nick Griff in left the UK for the Hungary, a joke in the media 
being that he too would now become an immigrant.
On 13 February 2009, the BBC News Channel reported that anti-Semitic 
attacks in England during a four-week period, that included the Israeli 
attacks on Gaza, were up to 250, compared to only 27 in the previous year, for 
the same period. In Europe, perhaps the most dramatic moment in the rise 
of the far right since the turn of the century came in the French presidential 
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elections of 2002, with Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the neo-fascist Front 
National, emerging as the runner-up with 5.5 million votes. His daughter, 
Marine Le Pen, is now president of Front National, which is the third-largest 
party in France. Following the terrorist attack on London in March 2017, 
Marine Le Pen immediately used this as evidence to support her policies.
Right-wing parties have made substantial gains all over Europe. This sup-
port may have once seemed unimaginable, given the stigma and revulsion 
against fascism, extreme nationalism, and racism in the post-war period, 
but it is now clear that many of the beliefs held dear to the Nazis have not 
vanished. Russia and all the Eastern European countries have growing, ex-
treme right parties, which are ultra-nationalist, anti-Semitic, and opposed 
to liberal democracies. In the f irst three months of 2009 neo-Nazis killed 
41 people in Russia. The re-emergence of openly racist parties has complex 
causes, the degree and form of their racism and its blend with various types 
of nationalism and regionalism varying between the different countries.
Despite Donald’s Trump’s rhetoric while attempting to get elected, his 
own ideology is diff icult to pin down, which was part of his effectiveness. 
The role and power of the media is also highly complex, hence the impor-
tance of the analysis in Chapter 5. All the extreme right parties profess a 
commitment to one or other version of the ‘new racism’, with an emphasis 
on nation and culture, with biological versions of ‘race’ forming perennial 
subtexts. The immediate catalyst of the success of the revived extreme right 
in Europe was the mobilization of insecurity and disaffection stemming 
from the supposed threats to the nation, and its identity and prosperity, 
posed by immigrants from war-stricken regions.
The Italian media is of particular interest in this context. In Italy, the 
‘Roms’, the Gypsy community, have taken the brunt of racist attacks, and 
there are direct comparisons in the way Jewish people were depicted in 
1930s Germany and the way certain Gypsies are portrayed today in the 
Italian media. Hitler, writing in Mein Kampf (1933), spoke of the Jew in 
terms of the vampire, one who waits, strikes, and sullies the living ‘pure 
blood’. Similar language is found today in Italian media regarding the Gypsy 
community. The world economic crisis has added a further dimension, 
stirring a desire to restrict all forms of immigration throughout Europe, 
and this is an ongoing issue elsewhere, including America and Australia. In 
America, the rise of Donald Trump has also been primarily based around 
the theme of immigration. On both sides of the Atlantic politicians have 
been caught up in the anti-Semitism debate.
In the UK, with the ruling Conservative government facing strikes from 
doctors for the f irst time in history in 2016, the discovery of huge off-shore 
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tax avoidance schemes, multiple election fraud scandals, and a plethora of 
repeated paedophile scandals with high-profile f igures, including politi-
cians, the right-wing press in 2016 focused on anti-Semitism within the 
opposition Labour party, not for the f irst time. This was a tactical move by 
the right wing, and many Jews pointed out that questioning Israel’s position 
towards Palestine is not actually anti-Semitism. Labelling someone a neo-
Nazi is an obvious tactic in political debates, and both sides have done so.
In America, Trump has called for Muslims to be banned from entering 
America, but his rhetoric on immigration and race regarding Mexicans has 
meant other extremists have used him as their front man. What is unusual 
about America is that it is so clearly the country of immigration, and has 
prided itself in the past on this. One white supremacist with his own radio 
show, David Duke, a former Klu Klux Klan leader, has made a number of 
remarks considered to be anti-Semitic, even neo-Nazi. In 2016, the Anti-
Defamation League called on Donald Trump to respond to Duke’s remarks, 
given the latter was a follower of Trump. After Trump had taken a long time 
in f inally distancing himself from Duke, he did eventually condemn Duke’s 
rhetoric, claiming there was no place for anti-Semitism in America, and his 
mission was to unite America. Concurrently, he was using anti-immigration 
rhetoric to whip up commitment from primarily white working-class sup-
porters. During Donald Trump’s f irst press conference as president elect he 
accused the security services in America of hounding him, Nazi fashion.
Duke’s criticism of Jewish behaviour is complex, as he has condemned the 
way some Jewish backers in the elections were focusing on the support for 
Israel, calling this anti-American. On his radio show he claimed that Jewish 
supremacists controlled America, and they were the real problem and the 
reason America was not great. Trump claimed that he has familial ties to 
the Jewish community, with his son-in-law Jared Kushner being an Ortho-
dox Jew, and his daughter Ivanka converting to Judaism. Anti-Semitism 
is at the heart of white power in America, with neo-Nazism driving the 
discourse. The development of neo-Nazism via the media within European 
football culture indicates how the media generated neo-Nazi stories around 
violence. An overview of this process offers an insight into how neo-Nazi 
stories are generated by the media.
Football Hooligans
The category football hooligan is contentious, as is the grouping neo-
Nazism. The use of any form of ‘ism’ needs to contain some form of a warning 
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regarding how this term encourages generalization, removing critical clarity 
and historical awareness.13 Neo-Nazism is not something we can easily pin 
down if we want to maintain historical specif icity but there are general 
patterns that can be identif ied. When we consider the development of 
neo-Nazi belief systems it is important to consider how they are organized 
via gangs and movements in this context. During the 1970s in Britain, the 
National Front (NF) capitalized on football hooliganism. Britain gained a 
global reputation for its football violence, which is now emulated elsewhere, 
such as Russia. There was kudos to be gained by these gangs of hooligans to 
be regarded as the most extreme, given this meant they were theoretically 
the most violent and to be feared. Globally, it appears that being the most 
racist, and the most famous for being the most racist, is an aim of numerous 
related white power groups.
Despite the National Socialist name suggesting a level of altruism via 
socialism, the intensely competitive nature of these groups reveals a de-
humanizing process. In her analysis of totalitarianism Hannah Arendt 
concluded that the Nazi death camps resulted from complicity due to 
people just being a cog in the system, removing their own responsibility. Not 
everyone who took part in the Nazi death camps was positively complicit, 
with some committing suicide, some ending up with extreme psychological 
disorders.14 When voting for Hitler the German people were not complicit 
with future genocide, but did not resist this when it happened. The level 
of extremism and activities that follow on from this extremism varies, but 
this trait of competition and game playing in subcultures is a signif icant 
cultural phenomenon.
Utilizing various methods of media has been central to the dissemination 
of neo-Nazi ideas in this context. The National Front (NF) youth magazine, 
Bulldog, was sold at many football grounds openly, as well as distributed 
in schools across the UK throughout the 1970s and 1980s. At a time of mass 
unemployment and social unrest, the NF appealed to young people, feeding 
on a sense of teenage alienation, hatred and rebellion, offering a sense of 
identity and a focus for mass discontent. Racial hatred was a channel for 
deeper levels of hatred, stemming in many cases from social inequality, 
but this is not the total explanation. As with the Nazi party originally, the 
NF wanted to ‘send them back’, with the desire to rid the nation of black 
or Asian people. What the history of racism shows is the shifting levels of 
acceptance, given at periods of times Jews, the Irish, and Italians have also 
been considered like Africans, subhuman.15
Masquerading as a party with some semblance of common sense and 
traditional values, through policies such as bringing back hanging and 
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protecting the green belt, the National Front believed all non-whites should 
be repatriated and removed from Britain. Outside of the National Front, 
earlier politicians, such as the Conservative MP Enoch Powell, well known 
for his ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, delivered to a Conservative Association 
meeting in Birmingham on 20 April 1968, had promoted such policies. In 
this sense, the NF was not at the fringes of political discourse. A central 
argument of this book overall is neo-Nazism is not at the margins. The 
UK’s NF f its the thesis of this book concerning neo-Nazism actually being 
within the mainstream. The Union Jack flag waving and skinhead culture 
was innately part of the NF, indicating how tribalism was key.
In the UK, West Ham, Chelsea, Leeds United, and Millwall were all 
clubs where NF symbols were adapted within merchandise to promote the 
political movement as part of a football supporter’s way of life.16 Badges 
and symbols have always been part of football fandom and part of Nazi 
culture. Neo-Nazism carried this forward in the context of football sup-
port in various forms. There was a culture that held at its centre that a 
certain element of society was now being threatened. This element was 
perceived to be the white working or middle-class male. Hatred can have 
many outlets and the hatred of the other ‘tribe’, such as the adjacent club 
in the same city, can overlap with racial hatred. Celtic and Rangers in 
Scotland have a long-lasting religious competition that feeds into wider 
rivalries.
Groups and distinct parties that formed from the NF went on to some 
success politically, one of them being the British National Party (BNP). 
Their leaf lets were apparently found at the stadium after the Heysel 
tragedy in 1985, where a collapsed wall left 39 people dead. During the 
1995 match between England and the Republic of Ireland at Landsdowne 
Road, Dublin, it is claimed the National Socialist Alliance organized f ights 
and incidents that led to the game being stopped after half an hour, and 
the BNP and Combat 18 were also both thought to be involved.17 In 1993 in 
the UK the Campaign for Racial Equality launched the ‘Let’s Kick Racism 
Out of Football’ campaign. While the fragmentary nature of groups makes 
it diff icult for them to carry out organized activities, it also makes them 
diff icult to analyse, and limits preventing their activities. This has parallels 
with neo-Nazi groups across Europe, and with Islamic extremism, with the 
fragmentary network approach allowing for more invisibility. The emphasis 
on fans might obfuscate institutional racism in football. In August 2017 it 
emerged that in women’s football England striker Eniola Aluko, who has 
102 England caps and is a lawyer, claimed Mark Sampson, who had led 
England to the semi-f inals of the European Championships, had made 
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racist comments. Aluko had already received £80,000 from the Football 
Association after a bullying and harassment case.
After the Heysel tragedy, the University of Leuven in Belgium published 
work in 1987 that tracked right-wing fans at home and abroad. Suggestions 
that there was an organized network of neo-Nazi supporters have been 
questioned and doubted, but there is tangential evidence of a process of 
grooming and leadership by older, more experienced fans. Old and new 
media are involved. The exchange of letters between young supporters 
and more seasoned fans is not strong evidence of an organized network at 
this period. This was a period before the Internet, meaning relationships 
between neo-Nazi fans could not be strengthened online, but simultane-
ously they would be less likely to be traced and the strength of relationships 
could be overlooked.
Extreme right-wing groups connected to a number of Italian clubs, 
including Bergano, Brescia, Milan and Verano, utilized Nazi symbols, 
with this also being the case across Europe, especially in Spain, Germany, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria and France.18 In continental Europe, 
the most well-known teams with neo-Nazi aff iliations are Lazio, AC Milan, 
Paris Saint-Germaine, and Real Madrid and Espagnole. In 2016, the media 
debates in Italy concerned the future of Italian football and whether away 
fans should be allowed to travel to matches, especially following violence 
between Atlanta and Roma. The excessive security in some grounds means 
some Ultras refuse to go to stadiums. The issue concerns whether Ultras 
should be criminalized but an overall conclusion from the police and foot-
ball organizations is that particular football fans should not be excluded, 
given this can isolate and possibly escalate violence.
The media’s focus during the 1980s on the English fans has led to them 
being emulated abroad, especially by Russian fans linked to neo-Nazi ideolo-
gies. The period itself is often interpreted as a highpoint of hooliganism, so 
among fans that appreciate this form of hooliganism there is a nostalgic 
yearning and reif ication of the period. Of course, structurally, the organ-
izing of football matches during the main non-work days of the week can 
also be interpreted sociologically as one way of controlling workers, and 
preventing rioting and violence on the streets. Allowing for a frenzy of 
controlled real or simulated violence, and offering this in stadiums func-
tions as a form of theatre, and offers a form of transgression that can allow 
the reassertion of the law.
Racism has been at the core of the violence. If it was Italian and English 
fans that had the reputation for being the most violent and right-wing in 
the 1980s, Russian fans, some known as right-wing Ultras, more recently 
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gained this reputation. They were deliberately escalating violence in 2016 
against English and Welsh fans. Footage of Russian fans, moving in to attack 
English fans peacefully drinking in bars in France, causing severe injury, 
offers the evidence that this was organized violence of a scale that had not 
been seen since the 1980s. Political tensions were high in 2016, Russia having 
recently annexed the Crimea from the Ukraine, and President Putin taking 
an antagonistic stance against the West.
The British press claimed that Russia reported these attacks as a form of 
victory for the glorious Russians, but it needs to be noted that outlets such 
as Russia Today focused quite objectively on the violence. One nation’s 
media attacking another nation’s media is a way of generating news that 
concerns misinterpretations of falsities, leading us further away from the 
story and the truth. The role of the media is of signif icance, given it was 
reported that in Mexico in 1980s British newspaper reporters were offering 
money to English fans to ‘smash up hotels’, and then offering money to bail 
out fans once they had been arrested.19
Sociologists have considered the causes of the racism on the terraces, 
but some take a simplistic approach tied to the past when income levels for 
players and fans were lower. Some condemned fans as being uneducated, 
coming from low-income sectors, or being ‘witless’, tying racism to sexism 
and white men in general.20 This denies the level of wealth generated by 
the game, including the wealth of the fans. Others, especially psychologists, 
have attempted to deal with racism on the terraces by stressing improve-
ments in the conditions for the fans and involving them in the running 
of the clubs by promoting the links between clubs and the heritage of the 
community. In May 1989, there were 220 arrests at football matches in one 
weekend, one month after Hillsborough, leading some academics to swallow 
the story of the police and the press that the tragedy of Hillsborough had 
been caused by evil fans.21 In the UK, the government struggled to know how 
to deal with hooliganism post-Hillsborough, without the later revelation 
that all the blame put on the fans was invented.
A number of ‘f irms’, like the Chelsea Head Hunters, have been linked 
to racist groups, such as Combat 18 and the National Front, and even with 
paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Defence Association. These groups 
have been popularized in f iction, such as The Football Factory by John King, 
f irst published in 1996 and released as a f ilm in 2004 directed by Nick Love. 
The back-cover blurb from the Glasgow Herald claims it is, ‘a chronicle of a 
lost tribe – the white, Anglo-Saxon, heterosexual who is fed up with being 
told he is crap’.22 Whiteness is constructed as an absent centre, and within 
European history this stems from a denial of imperialism. It is assumed 
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in European culture to be without def inition, boundary, and formed from 
comparisons between itself and others.23 Jason Marriner, a former leader of 
the Headhunters, claimed that the BBC set him up, depicting him as a racist 
neo-Nazi with wider connections. According to Marriner on his website and 
in various documentaries, convictions happened without corroborating 
footage. Fiction has blurred with reality, with Marriner and Danny Dyer, the 
lead role in the f iction f ilm The Football Factory (Nick Love, 2004), touring 
the country as ‘The Real Football Factory’.
The Headhunters have not disappeared, and were involved in distur-
bances in Paris before a UEFA Champions League quarter f inal between 
Paris Saint-Germain and Chelsea on 2 April 2014. Around 300 hooligans 
were involved in pre-planned violence around the city, with hardcore 
hooligans having avoided police detection by entering France via Belgium. 
The National Front is still active, with David MacDonald, the leader of the 
organization, winning a seat on Aberdeen’s Garthdee community council, 
after securing eighteen votes. The fact that this small success was news 
indicates that the NF is not a signif icant party in and of itself, but we can 
see its main tenets have shifted even further into the mainstream with 
UKIP. MacDonald apparently left the British National Party because he did 
not believe it was right wing enough. Drawing on Judith Duffy’s report on 
31 January 2017 in The Herald, the world media, including Reuters and Russia 
Today, reported that the NF had started a recruitment campaign, distribut-
ing Bulldog outside schools in Aberdeen. Thankfully, they had received 
‘disappointing’ feedback, most young people, according to MacDonald, 
were not interested.
The NF were going to do the same in Glasgow and Dundee, and head 
teachers took action, forewarning parents, with the NF only approaching 
those aged sixteen and above. The Aberdeen Anti-Fascist Alliance branded 
this as a throwback to the 1970s, claiming the NF was an ‘embarrassment’, 
with no real support. The publication Bulldog, aimed at a youth audience, 
was re-launched in 2015. Interestingly, the NF’s tactics of trying to engage 
with ‘disaffected’ youth can be paralleled with the tactics employed by 
Islamic State (IS), in their radicalization of young people. In the mid-1990s 
jihadi groups were permitted to distribute literature openly, in public areas 
such as outside shopping centres in major cities like Manchester. By 2016 if IS 
was to carry out similar activities, such as this by the NF, it would generate 
even more protest, and police action.
The nostalgia for the 1970s is a theme that unites many football hooligans 
and the neo-Nazi right, and the outward face of right-wing politics like UKIP, 
with neo-Nazi groups throughout the world believing the present is tainted. 
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Leicester, the home of 2016 Premiere League champions Leicester City FC, 
has been regarded as the most multicultural city in England. But in the 1976 
UK local elections, the NF gained 20 per cent of the vote in Leicester’s local 
elections, f ielding 48 candidates, this being their high point. In April 2013, 
the NF intended to f ield 35 candidates in local elections nationally, their 
highest number for 30 years. One of their original policies was to leave the 
European Community; hence the EU referendum of June 2016 resurrected 
interest in the party.
During the 1970s the NF attempted an international agenda, through 
working with commonwealth countries, including establishing the New 
Zealand National Front, South African National Front, and National Front of 
Australia, f inding it harder in Canada to formalize an NF sister organization. 
The gains of UKIP need to be looked at via the lens of the demise of various 
forms of the NF. Many examples can be given, such as councillor Victoria 
Ayling, who allegedly attended NF rallies, and who is recorded as stating her 
basic policy is to ‘send people back’, a central NF tenant. The mainstream 
British media, such as The Sun, has attempted to condemn movements 
like the NF and Britain First, separating them out from UKIP, and even the 
BNP. An examination of their beliefs and membership often makes such 
differentiation diff icult to establish.
Members of the banned neo-Nazi group Combat 18, certain followers of 
the English Defence League, plus different members of the British National 
Party, are all part of this melting pot of fascism, with party allegiances 
not being as important as they once were. An ‘ism’ might be generic and 
non-historical, but it is undeniable that there are overlaps between these 
various groups. Britain First has received the greatest amount of media 
attention, given its controversial and confrontational style and its use of 
social media. Staging events, such as bursting into Muslim-owned shops 
and declaring the owners to be supporting terrorism, and then posting this 
on Facebook is one tactic. Overall, it is pointless calculating the level of 
virtual or real followers from this activity, given the number of views can be 
manipulated, as can the number of followers. What can be concluded is that 
support for Britain to leave the EU united followers of all these fragmented 
groups behind a single cause.
American Separatists
Levels of violence in America are notably higher when we consider neo-Nazi 
subcultures in an American context. On 25 June 2016, for example, a mass 
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stabbing took place at a neo-Nazi rally in Sacramento, California. Numbers 
vary, with estimates that 40 people took part in white power protest and 
were confronted with 400 in a counter-demonstration. There was believed 
to be nine men and one woman stabbed, ages ranging from 19 to 58 years old. 
The Southern Poverty Law Center, with a global reputation for investigat-
ing American extremist groups, maintained that the rally was held by a 
white nationalist extremist group, the Traditionalist Worker Party. They 
had called the demonstration to protest against the anti-Trump violence 
that had broken out at rallies held for Donald Trump. This presidential 
candidate’s inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric had been part of the 
discourse that is centred on threats and violence. As with this, counter-
demonstrations globally against anti-Nazis are often more supported than 
those by any groups with neo-Nazi sympathies. The violence at various 
Trump rallies appears to have been committed by white nationalists, with 
there being clear footage of the party’s chairman, Matthew Heimbach, 
attacking a woman at a Trump rally. Online support came from the Golden 
State Skinheads.
This followed on from four people being stabbed at a Klu Klux Klan 
rally in Anaheim, California. With Trump taking an anti-ethnic stance 
from his platform, along with Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), stirring up hatred towards immigrants in the 
UK during the EU referendum, it is unsurprising that people began to act 
out their racist beliefs. They were now publicly being legitimized by their 
leaders. People born in the UK from an ethnic origin began to be on the 
receiving end of racist abuse. On 29 June 2016 BBC Midlands Today reported 
Trish Adudu was racially abused in Coventry. Importantly, she was not going 
to report this to the police, because she was in shock, but through discussing 
the incident on social media she was persuaded to report it to the police. 
This reveals another interesting impact of social media, because even those 
we do not actually know can persuade us to take action. She had not been 
alone, and had initially witnessed people abusing others. UKIP’s leader at 
the time, Nigel Farage, mistakenly claimed that his Leave the EU campaign 
had been victorious, ‘without f iring a single bullet’. This was ignoring the 
fact that Labour Party politician Jo Cox, who had campaigned for Britain 
to remain in the EU, had been shot and stabbed to death on 16 June 2016 
by a white separatist. It is believed that following the Vote Leave victory 
in the EU referendum there was an increase in racist violence in the UK. 
Across Europe the intense hatred of immigrants repeated by the popular 
press was leading to some very real violent acts that could be interpreted 
as neo-Nazi behaviour.
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To claim that in America specif ically there has been an increase in 
neo-Nazism does not allow for any nuances concerning the term. The 
relationship between neo-Nazism and celebrity is signif icant. One f igure 
in the movement, Craig Cobb, personally has celebrated himself as one 
of the most famous racists in the world, gaining global media attention. 
Whether Cobb became such a virulent racist in order to become famous is 
an interesting question. This overlaps with the notion that Donald Trump 
only says extremely offensive comments to attract attention. A similar 
question arises concerning white separatist terrorism activity. In the age of 
social media, fascist groups globally have seized the opportunity to promote 
their ideologies and achieve notoriety.
Those who may have remained previously on the fringes of society, within 
their own subcultures, without access to the wider population, have been 
given the opportunity to enter the mainstream through social media. People 
can still operate from the fringes, but shifting ideologies with some core 
beliefs have become popularized. With the blurring of the private and the 
public, these ideologies have used these methods to intimidate those who 
may resist them. Cobb’s specif ic aim has been to take over small towns by 
purchasing cheap plots of land, then moving fellow white supremacists 
into towns to create a majority for those supporting his extremist ideology. 
From these actions, the intention is then to take over town councils and 
local leadership groups, and gain power.
This behaviour is in tune with that stipulated by the National Alliance 
(NA), as portrayed by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). According to 
the National Alliance website, the aim is to establish new societies based on 
Aryan values. Explicitly, this dictates what type of culture is allowed. There 
is even an element of the regimes of Oliver Cromwell and the Taliban about 
this, which appears ludicrous. For example, specific culture is banned, while 
other forms are promoted: literally, no Barry Manilow and no art galleries 
containing Marc Chagall. Basically, no jazz and no rock are permitted, but 
polkas, waltzes, reels and jigs are allowed. This ignoring of contemporary 
culture and reifying traditional culture promotes the view that there is a 
certain ‘pure’ way of being reaching back to an original past.
In such a community, the outside world becomes a threat, any evil 
positioned on those who are not part of the inside group, allowing the 
group to then unite in its hatred of outsiders. The ongoing paradox is that 
contemporary methods through all forms of new media are employed in 
an attempt to draw people back to a mythological past, a fantasy nostalgia 
land devoid of all apparent threat from the other. The same tactics can be 
seen to be used by the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) and 
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its sympathizers and vote leave backers, who hark back nostalgically to 
a mythic time, that never actually existed, always blaming ‘the other’ for 
anything wrong. This shift in the use of new media is signif icant in the 
history of allied movements.
When the American Nazi Party (ANP), formed by George Lincoln 
Rockwell in 1958, began vociferously attacking Jews, it was part of a wider 
discourse over the rights of black Americans. Conspiracy theories were 
spread that it was Jews who were encouraging black Americans to rape 
white women. The high point of Rockwell’s success was in the summer of 
1966 when for 22 days ANP activists gained huge publicity by disrupting 
Martin Luther King Jr’s desegregation marches in Chicago. Over 1,000 
residents attacked the marchers, shouting ‘White Power!’24 Then, in an 
attempt to broaden the appeal of the party, Rockwell changed its name to 
the National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP). Rockwell’s assassina-
tion on 25 August 1967 is still cloaked in a complex mystery surrounding 
power struggles within his movement, and allegations concerning the 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Elements of this history are relevant today, 
revealing the way related movements have always carried some public sup-
port, even in the mainstream, and how this consistently includes calls for a 
form of Armageddon. The Book of Revelation in the Bible is the most-written 
about text in Christianity, and America has consistently been at the cliff 
face of the apocalypse, according to its propagandists. This promotion of the 
concept of the end of the world also is situated in the context of cleansing 
the earth of all that is impure.
The neo-Nazi text The Turner Diaries is a case in point. This apocalyptic 
novel concerns a race war and, in 1971, years before it was published, its 
author, William Pierce, called for a revolution via urban warfare and politi-
cal assassinations. The novel, f irst published in 1978 under the pseudonym 
Andrew Macdonald, described a future race war, where Jews and members 
of other reviled groups are slaughtered. Following a similar pattern to gen-
eral white supremacist discourse, here the white population is depicted as 
persecuted and now on the margins, their rights being relinquished. Set in 
1991, an underground movement goes to war against ‘the System’, after the 
Cohen Act outlaws private gun ownership, with 800,000 people arrested due 
to this law. Written on the cusp of the invention of the Internet, what is of 
note concerning the media is f irstly how right-wing publishers and websites 
since, such as Counter Currents, have continued to critically promote the 
book, and how in the novel the Organization f ights against the System by 
becoming more systematized and organized, and less f luid, as if in the 
future no new methods of communication exist.
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The author was a scientist and the text is not multilayered, in many ways 
ignoring much of the more interesting developments in literary style over 
the twentieth century. This latter interpretation of the text, from a literary 
criticism and a creative writing perspective, could just indicate a lack of 
imagination on the part of the author, but from a political perspective it 
indicates a desire for a more traditional form of society, in every respect. 
African Americans are dismissed as lazy, a by-product of equality laws, 
protecting everyone’s rights, including the right to do very little, while 
women’s groups are thought to be dominated by Jewish women. There is 
an overt element of envy towards the Jewish population for their level of 
success and for feeling so at home in America. With victory at home, they 
have a total victory globally against the Chinese, and all ‘others’ resistant 
to the Organization. This comes in the close of the novel in the penultimate 
paragraph, through a process of chemical, biological, and radiological 
warfare over four years, ‘sterilizing’ 16 million square miles, creating the 
‘Great Eastern Waste’.
The authoritarian nature of the Organization is obvious, and this is far 
away from Louise Michel’s notion of evil where, in the eyes of the anarchist 
at least, it is not about certain types of governments but the very idea of 
government that is evil. For the anarchist, the principle of authority is evil. 
This is to some degree its antithesis, and the form of this uninteresting novel 
is revealing, given it follows an authoritarian and traditional structure. 
For the neo-Nazi, absolute authority is absolute good, with a deif ication 
of the leader to the level of a god. The beauty of religion is that authority 
ultimately remains beyond the human, but once godlike authority is given 
to men all manner of fascist evils can result. One can almost view this as a 
post-apocalyptic novel, indicating a desire on the founder of the National 
Alliance for an absolute destruction of large parts of the world, in the name 
of white power, worshipping a new order based on Hitler.
Steve Bannon, a political activist, media executive and former Senior 
Counselor to President Trump, lifted his propaganda straight from this ear-
lier context. After leaving the White House in August 2017, Bannon returned 
to Breitbart News, the right-wing website he had called the platform for the 
alt-right. Behind his 2011 f ilm Generation Zero is a form of conspiricism. 
One main area is the bankers, thought to be Jewish. ‘Conspiricism blames 
individualized and subjective forces for political, economic, and social 
problems rather than analyzing conflict in terms of systems, institutions, 
and structures of power.’25 Pierce’s associate Willis Carto in his newspaper 
Spotlight repeatedly claimed the ills of America and the world were down 
to international bankers. While Drabble claims support for white power 
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movements has declined since the 1970s, many more groups have sprung 
up, including the Aryan Nations, the White Aryan Resistance, the National 
Alliance (NA), and the Mountain Church. These all worship Hitler and 
Rockwell.26
There is an overlap here with the American militia movement. The 
numbers who are members of this movement are diff icult to establish, 
with estimates ranging from 20,000 to 10 million in militias.27 These self-
declared Christian patriots celebrate violence as central to their ideology 
and believe it to be admirable, which overlaps with elements of Trump’s 
rhetoric at his 2016 rallies. Developing from the ANP, the NA was formed out 
of the National Youth Alliance that developed out of the Youth for Wallace 
organization, which backed Governor George Wallace’s 1968 presidential 
campaign, running on a pro-segregationist platform. The NA’s Pacific North-
west coordinator broke away to form a terrorist group called The Order 
(Silent Brotherhood, or Bruders Schwiegen) patterned on The Organization 
as detailed in The Turner Diaries, arguably the most important piece of 
extremist literature ever produced in America.
A decade after the main part of the novel The Turner Diaries is set, Pierce 
died in 2002 and the NA fell apart. A ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada 
on 9 June 2016 meant the NA did not receive a bequest of $220,000 from 
the estate of Robert McCorkill, which may have been a crucial f inancial 
lifeline to resurrect the movement. The court also ordered the Canadian 
Association for Free Expression (CAFE), which backed the bequest to the 
NA, to pay the estimated $9,000 court costs of those who had tried to halt 
the bequest. According to Mark Potok of the SPLC, at its peak the NA had 
1,400 members, but this was now a few dozen.28 In a wider context, Richard 
Cohen, president of the SPLC, commenting on this case, claimed that the 
radical right is larger than it has been in years, hence the importance of 
this case. McCorkill’s sister Isabelle was joined by the Centre for Israel and 
Jewish Affairs and the attorney general of New Brunswick in the action, 
arguing successfully that allowing this bequest to go to a neo-Nazi group 
was contrary to both Canadian criminal law and public policy. Interestingly, 
this would not have happened in America, where freedom of speech and 
association protections are stronger, with Canadian law having a much 
fuller sense of the concept of the public good. The group is now battling 
within itself, and has splintered into the National Alliance Reform and 
Restoration Group, attempting to remove the directors of the NA, and seize 
its assets, including the headquarters, a compound based in West Virginia.
Despite a panic over neo-Nazism, often fuelled by the media, infighting 
seems to prevail for neo-Nazi groups, while its opposition appears to be more 
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organized. An antagonistic striving for power and dominance within groups 
that emphasize survival of the f ittest at all costs can only be expected, but 
this also reflects on how assumptions about an organized network need to 
be questioned. Cobb’s actions re-ignited groups such as Anti-Racist Action to 
protest against this ‘exterminationist’ philosophy, where anyone not f itting 
Cobb’s idea of a ‘pure’ European American should be killed. The resistance 
to such an ideology is strong and it unites disparate groups. In the American 
context, this includes the African-American communities, the non-extremist 
white communities, and the Native American communities. These combined 
latter groups are in the majority, and believe in equality and rights for all. 
This in itself has, however, created antagonisms, both in America with the 
rise of Donald Trump, and in Europe with the popularity of groups who 
believe the systematic implementation of a human rights agenda is akin to 
being dictated to. The latter has been one of the main arguments of UKIP.
Associates of Cobb’s are members of the National Socialist Movement 
who, as with the Nazis, often portray themselves as victims who believe they 
are now in a minority and are persecuted. Within this ideology all systems 
are dominated by an evil source, normally Zionist in origin. The switching 
of the victimhood role here is telling, and the extent the media is utilized 
noteworthy. Throughout all of this activity, Cobb was courting the media, 
and using the Internet prolif ically for nefarious purposes, such as posting 
the personal details of any neighbour or potential enemy. The revealing of 
personal details might not appear that problematic, given anyone spending 
time on the Internet can normally f ind specif ic details on most people, 
if they choose. This was, however, to highlight certain people who could 
then be perceived as enemies of Cobb’s associates within the white power 
movement, and once you were on his list then you were in danger from a 
wide range of extremists. More importantly, in this context, it is the extent 
of this use that is most revealing.
Cobb’s use of the Internet is signif icant, with him spending sometimes 
20 hours a day online, this being what can be considered a central weapon 
of his arsenal. In an age when the Internet dominates, this level of use may 
not appear strange or extreme but it indicates how this form of technology 
has absorbed leaders within extremist neo-Nazi movements. The original 
utopianism concerning much discourse on this technology needs to be 
more balanced. While it is important to avoid generalizations and clichés, 
Cobb’s claim that he may have some form of Asperger’s links to this asocial 
behaviour, and his obsessive use of computers. He personally promotes the 
view that his knowledge and use of the Internet is somehow supernatural, 
and this gives him mystical powers.
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The only way to retaliate was for groups who were demonized by Cobb, 
including his white neighbours who had never encountered such racist 
groups before or even knew such groups existed, to similarly engage with 
complex media and surveillance techniques. In some instances, this was 
of a professional standard. This included recording all signif icant activities 
and movements of known neo-Nazis and self-confessed National Socialists, 
including events and incidents at town meetings, and any activity that 
could be conceived as threatening. A central reason to create such tensions, 
one can only assume, was to drive those antithetical to Cobb’s views from 
the town they called home. The main town that Cobb attempted to seize 
was Leith in North Dakota which, from a 2010 census, had a population of 
just sixteen, and theoretically could offer little resistance to an influx of 
white supremacists. Those who may have moved to Leith to live a quiet 
unobserved life, outside the mainstream, were now under close and intense 
scrutiny, and were then driven to utilizing similar observational techniques 
in their defence.
The clear dream of many of the inhabitants had been to live a life of free-
dom, sacrif icing the benefits of modern life for the benefits of living away 
from any metropolis. There is no autonomy under observation, so in this 
remote area residents were now in a prison-like environment, constantly 
observed, without any freedoms. On top of this, residents believed their 
children were under threat, as Cobb and his associates used threats and 
menacing behaviour to intimate people, in what only can be construed as 
an attempt to encourage people to move. The extent of the dominance from 
white power followers is debatable, but their overt and blatant promotion 
of their beliefs cannot be overlooked. In such circumstances, the quality 
of life of the residents was exponentially diminished. A town of people 
that, perhaps naively, trusted other people’s good intentions was forced 
into acknowledging any stranger may have an antagonistic purpose, which 
could be life-threatening to others. What could not have been predicted 
was how extreme the new neighbours’ beliefs were.
At f irst, local residents thought Cobb was just a lonely eccentric man who 
was a self-contained introvert. They respected him for this, and then al-
lowed him to become a quiet member of their community without realizing 
he would go on to threaten them and their children with guns and attempt 
to establish a white supremacist neo-Nazi community. Interestingly, in 
some respects Cobb’s group had gone even further than the Nazis in their 
beliefs. These were kept on the fringes of fantasy and the imagination, and 
not especially acted out in reality, but they did have an international impact, 
reflecting on the wider attraction and promotion of neo-Nazism through 
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a variety of methods. Despite the small-town nature of these activities, 
as exemplif ied in the 2015 Netflix documentary Welcome to Leith, which 
focused on the subject, and predominantly on the character of Cobb, the 
global reach of this phenomenon, through the media of course, is worth 
considering. We have already seen how National Socialism in a variety 
of forms has an international element, especially in areas of Russia, as 
exemplif ied by the stated beliefs of certain football fans. Cobb himself 
became a global media phenomenon, which may have been his original 
intention, given his desire to be the most famous racist in the world.
At town meetings, where Cobb attempted to gain a majority, and tried 
to take over governance, the British media, such as Sarah Collins from The 
Mail Online, were present. Cobb often comes across as mentally ill, or at 
least pretending to be insane, rushing around the town hall with a lap top, 
thrusting it into people’s faces, in an attempt to intimidate people. The 
central focus of the global media questioning was over how people were 
now living in fear, after living an apparently quiet life. The subtext is that 
this phenomenon can appear from apparently nowhere, and people need 
to be more vigilant. Some residents had deliberately moved to Leith to 
perhaps escape and start a new life, such as one man whose daughter had 
been murdered. Cobb and his associates hounded and threatened these 
people intensely, using their previous history and new media technology 
against them. Cobb even appeared on the British chat show Trisha, in front 
of a mainly black audience with a black host, where the results of his DNA 
test revealed he is actually 14 per cent African. That such a known racist 
and hater of black people should be part-African was paradoxical, and 
Trisha and others on the show found this highly amusing. ‘See, you got the 
black man in you,’ was repeated at him with laughter, and Cobb appeared 
to sense the paradox and the humour in this.
Eventually, Cobb and an associate were charged in November 2013 of 
three counts of terrorism. After threatening the people of Leith with guns, 
he was banned for life from holding f irearms and from contacting those he 
had been harassing through any methods. Luckily, the legal system in this 
case had caught up with the technological age and recognized the use of the 
Internet for hate crimes. The residents believed that justice was not served 
and they had been duped, given Cobb offered a plea bargain, apologized, 
and was released from prison, having served his time waiting for the court 
case. As soon as he was released, on camera during the making of Welcome 
to Leith, Cobb stated that they must regret releasing him, given he was still 
peddling a race hatred ideology, promoting the white power doctrine. Cobb’s 
behaviour may appear eccentric, but it gained him further publicity, and 
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it does touch on other forms of racist belief that have been growing rapidly 
during an age of mass migration, globalization, and the Internet.
Cobb and his associates claimed that it was the white people that were 
being persecuted and were now in the minority. This is not a particularly 
uncommon view. For example, in the debates over whether Britain should 
leave the European Union, it has been claimed that in some schools, espe-
cially in urban areas like London, English is not the f irst language and that 
white people are in the minority. First the National Front, then the British 
National Party, and now the United Kingdom Independence Party and 
English Defence League, all utilized the term ‘white flight’ to promote the 
view that places were being ‘invaded’ by other races and an indigenous way 
of life was being destroyed. This can lead to the notion that the white race is 
the victim, ignoring a whole history of racism, colonization, and oppression.
Cobb portrayed himself as a victim, suggesting that his ‘weird’ behaviour, 
as he put it, came from his military upbringing and from his mild Asperger’s. 
Not everyone with this type of background becomes a high profile, danger-
ous neo-Nazi, leading a group of people who maintain all ‘others’ need to 
be murdered. According to the Southern Poverty Law Centre there are 
hundreds of thousands of Americans with these beliefs, part of the Creator 
movement, believing Aryan men are god, literally worshipping themselves. 
The political rise of Donald Trump in 2015 can be considered in this context, 
every racist comment bringing him more support from audiences across 
America. This, for some like documentary maker and political agitator 
Michael Moore, is merely the ‘last roar of the dinosaurs’, but such a view 
ignores the popularity of Trump, which reveals the ideals of the American 
dream have not succeeded. What was supposed to be a melting pot has 
turned into a standoff between so-called whites and so-called ‘others’. Since 
the attack on the Twin Towers on 9/11 the focus of American government 
funding went to attempting to reduce Islamic extremism, shifting funding 
away from white extremists, but earlier related incidents need to be briefly 
considered.
The accusation of child sexual abuse was made against David Koresh, 
leader of the Branch Davidian sect. An accepted story is that after the FBI 
killed 76 members of the group, including 27 children, at the culmination 
of the Waco siege on 19 April 1993. Timothy McVeigh took it into his own 
hands to seek revenge for these murders, although he claimed personally 
this was not the cause of his actions. Like Cobb, McVeigh had a military 
background, but he was viewed also as a war hero. Unlike Cobb, McVeigh 
denied working with others and claimed personal responsibility for all his 
actions.29 As Gore Vidal has shown, the members of the Davidian Church 
iNtroduc tioN – BelieFs, BouNdaries, culture 35
put on trial for ‘conspiracy to commit murder’ after being attacked by federal 
agents, were found to be innocent of this charge, but eight innocent people 
were still sentenced to up to 40 years for lesser charges. Vidal was one of 
only a few people to try to ascertain exactly why McVeigh carried out the 
19 April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, containing the FBI, which killed 168 people, and injured over 800. Wild, 
media-driven discourse attempted to personify McVeigh as the epitome of 
evil, monstrousness incarnate.
Neo-Nazi material, such as The Turner Diaries, were found in McVeigh’s 
possession, or at least this is the line that was actively promoted by govern-
ment agencies and the media, desperate to f ind a cause behind this act. In 
a letter to Vidal, McVeigh explains his actions were not revenge over Waco 
at all. The Turner Diaries was more of a sideshow in this narrative, and 
taken a step further it might be suggested they were planted. Vidal pointed 
out that McVeigh’s obsession was with the militia and with guns, not with 
hatred of Jews. What is of signif icance is how, for Vidal, McVeigh functioned 
antithetically to the American idea that all behaviour is out of self-interest. 
Furthermore, doctors had proclaimed him not deranged but serious, with 
the conclusion being he had an exaggerated view of justice, his bomb just 
part of a war going on, equivalent to America bombing Iraq.30 McVeigh’s 
views, if held by a non-American, may not appear that extreme. Millions 
of people globally believed and still believe that America’s and the West’s 
policy in the Middle East and elsewhere is essentially wrong.
There are clear parallels to be drawn. Anti-government militia move-
ments increased from 220 in 1995 to more than 850 by 1996, according to 
Vidal, with the rumour being spread that the government had planted the 
bomb to justify anti-terrorism legislation.31 With any atrocity a simplistic 
argument is to blame the government. Vidal notes that while The New York 
Times made mileage of skinhead neo-Nazi militias enhancing their base 
in such a climate, no parallel was made between the burning down of the 
Reichstag in 1933, which allowed Hitler to enforce the Enabling Act giving 
him dictatorial powers. Cries of a neo-Nazi conspiracy are often offset by 
cries of further conspiracies. Vidal, quoting Adam Parfrey, notes that this 
bombing can be seen as no different from pseudo Viet Cong units that 
raped and murdered Vietnamese to discredit the National Liberation Front, 
fake ‘f inds’ of Communist weapons in El Salvador and so on. Parts of the 
conspiracy overlap with those concerning 9/11. For example, no one from 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), a federal 
law enforcement organization within the US Department of Justice, located 
on the ninth floor of the building, suffered casualties. Many ATF agents 
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were not at work on the day of the attack, raising the question whether the 
ATF had advance warning.
Thorough forensic work on the building was not carried out, with 
evidence quickly destroyed, according to these theorists. This then led to 
President Bill Clinton signing the Anti-Terrorism Act, curtailing freedoms. 
Vidal’s work is convincing, especially when he outlines that the FBI did not 
follow up on evidence, how they withheld evidence from the defence teams, 
and through his own investigations he f inds people involved in the case the 
FBI ignored. For Vidal, the fact the case makes no sense makes it the ‘perfect’ 
crime. Vidal appears to have sympathy with the conspiracy theorists. For 
example, he quotes military generals who witnessed the carnage who 
confirmed it could only have been carried out by bombs strapped to the 
building and detonators, in an organized fashion way beyond McVeigh’s 
means. This is also a view attached to the attack on the Twin Towers.
Stressing the role of mediated and mediatized activism, Rikke Alberg 
Peters has explored the neo-fascist network The Immortals (Die Unster-
blichen), who have utilized a variety of new media platforms, including 
YouTube. Through doing so, Peters emphasizes ethno-nationalism as the 
wider paradigm to understand these movements. On 1 May 2011 people 
gathered dressed in black cloaks in Bautzen, Germany, for a march carrying 
torches and launching a campaign known as ‘Become Immortal!’ (Werde 
unsterblich!). Like Cobb, this protest was linked to the belief that there was a 
threat to the people, in this case the German people, and this was a rejection 
of liberal democracy. As Peters shows, mediated social and political protest 
often refer mainly to left-wing movements. These are known for focusing 
on environmental issues and anti-globalization efforts, for example. It is 
only natural that right-wing groups would also utilize these methods, so 
this is not a revelation, but some important areas need to be highlighted. 
One might think that this new tool would help to unify movements, but:
Although their self-representations on different social media platforms 
such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and Flickr would suggest that this is 
a well-established nationalist far right organization their subcultural and 
heterotopic form indicate that this is rather a form of collective action 
or a protest phenomenon than an actual organized group lest a political 
or social movement.32
This is a reaction against organized politics, and is more a deliberate protest 
against what is seen as the elite. In this sense, organization that is overt is 
against the principles of the movement. Government forces have a vested 
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interested in highlighting excessive and organized home-grown extremism, 
as well as foreign and external extremism, given that it enables them to 
implement strong powers to include populations. Simply, it allows a blame 
culture to emerge. There is, however, an overlap between these movements 
across Europe and beyond. With Cobb, there is the promotion of an ‘ethno-
nationalist myth of a golden past’.33 The desire for a cleansing is high on the 
agenda, but this belief has been with human nature throughout history, as 
evidenced by certain parts of the Old Testament where tribes not part of 
the chosen race, a form of the immortals, are anathema.
Manipulation is central to these developments; for example, in terms 
of the actual making of the content, rallies appear much larger than they 
are and soundtracks are employed to bolster their dramatic impact on 
the audience.34 Engaging with the zeitgeist, this move from biological and 
cultural racism to ethno-nationalism has proven to be highly successful. 
What ‘mediated mobilization’ means is that new media is not merely a 
form of communication but it is now in itself, ‘constitutive of action and 
physically manifests the political ideas’.35 While standard neo-Nazi rallies 
were formulated along very traditional hierarchical lines, the looseness of 
organization here means greater participation, through a do-it-yourself 
ethic. Combining virtual and street protest, without violence and bullying, 
it can be suggested that this has a deeper, long-term impact. Interestingly, 
it is the multifaceted nature that is also a key element of the success, given 
people can join protests through physical or virtual actions, but they do 
not have to abandon other allegiances. Ontologically, this may be a more 
authentic way of being because paradoxically it tunes into the multifaceted 
aspect of human nature.
Today we are all producers, and in this fascist movement and many other 
neo-Nazi movements, this level of engagement means people are f inding a 
purpose and a way of exploring and communicating their identities through 
complex and overlapping methods. Time and place may not be as central 
now. The phrase ‘may be more authentic’ is stressed, given the ability to hide 
via new media, which could actually be inauthentic. What is signif icant is 
that there is now a blurring between producers and receivers, and activists 
and followers, and this means that the audience may be much wider. You 
do not have to sign up to far-right ideologies to become involved, as you 
might just have an interest in being anti-elite, using new media to provoke 
change. The use of the address ‘you’ here is appropriate, given this is exactly 
how The Immortals address their audience through their different methods, 
again to encourage personal activism away from the mainstream. Analysis 
of blogs and forums, for example, used by the North Belgian post-fascist 
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movement reveal how these new forms allow networking that transcends 
boundaries of time and space, and the clips on YouTube allow for a certain 
form of ‘immortality’.36
This opening chapter has outlined the parameters of this book with 
regards to Nazism, neo-Nazism, f ilm and media, explaining the importance 
of identity formation and the transnational perspective. An essential 
paradigm proposed here is that neo-Nazi discourse has become part of 
the mainstream. Questions were raised over the use of the term ‘Nazi’ and 
the popularizing of Nazi chic. European football hooliganism, the media 
and neo-Nazism has been explored, moving onto the American context 
and white separatism. It has been noted how the media invented and exag-
gerated aspects of football violence with the neo-Nazism in football both 
a real and imagined phenomenon. We have seen how the science f iction 
book The Turner Diaries has been a seminal text in the development of 
American neo-Nazism and the early development of neo-Nazism in America 
has been outlined. The complexities around conspiracy theory have been 
explained, especially concerning the white separatist Timothy McVeigh. 
The potential of new media to promote neo-Nazi ideas has been delineated. 
At the start of this chapter a variety of f ilms and television programmes 
were introduced. The following chapter deals with this subject in greater 
depth, asking whether they do offer a greater understanding, as Holocaust 
survivor Elie Wiesel hopes.37
2. Film and Television
Memory and Representation
We shall now explore how Nazism and neo-Nazism have been imagined 
on screen, beginning with Nazisploitation f ilms, and then moving on to 
mainstream films and television. In the logic of the Nazisploitation f ilm, all 
Germans are Nazis and all Nazis are members of the SS with all members 
of the SS being war criminals, medical experimenters and sexual sadists.1 
These f ilms need positioning in a wider context of other exploitation f ilms 
that became popular in the 1970s, including Blaxploitation, nunsploitation, 
Mexploitation, ‘mondo’ f ilm, and women-in-prison movies. The term itself 
stems from moving beyond the common practice for promotion. Germany 
went through a particular type of sexual freedom from 1918 to 1933, during 
the Weimar Republic, but this freedom was at the cost of curbing a minority. 
Historians of the Nazi era such as Gerhard Ritter wrongly blamed so-called 
sexual immorality in the Weimar period for its collapse, spreading ‘cultural 
decay’ (Kulturverfall) paving the way for the Nazis.2 This link was popular-
ized in f ilms, such as Cabaret (Bob Fosse, 1972).
For Nazisploitation, the f ilms’ sexually provocative marketing ruled. 
This took precedent over any notion of aesthetic quality. Posters contained 
leather-clad women with large breasts and films, such as found in the poster 
for Ilsa: She Wolf of the SS (Don Edmonds, 1974), which deliberately set out to 
look like a sex f ilm. Oozing authority, with her hands on her hips, Dyanne 
Thorne as Ilsa in the f ilm’s poster is dominant. A gun holster hangs from a 
belt around her waist, she grips a riding crop in her hand, and she is wearing 
erotic leather gloves. A group scene of naked women, situated near her feet, 
adds a narrative, with the tag line, ‘The most dreaded Nazi of them all’. 
Even better than this is the line, ‘She committed crimes so terrible … even 
the SS feared her!’ The poster contained a warning: ‘Some members of the 
public may f ind certain scenes in this f ilm offensive and shocking.’ But the 
f ilm actually only contains f ive sex scenes, compared to 44 of violence and 
torture, leading to the conclusion that the f ilm and those like it are more 
akin to slasher f ilms than pornography.3
These f ilms are positioned as utilizing Nazi themes in many respects 
for titillation, but also are signif icant for traversing across boundaries and 
exploring transgressive themes. The Holocaust is frequently situated as the 
f inal taboo. Any f ilm that wishes to create controversy will break such a 
taboo to attract attention. It is easy to dismiss such f ilms, or concur with 
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mainstream critics and censors that these f ilms are just trash, but new 
work on the subject has revealed how it as important to consider what some 
believe are just the ‘surfaces’.4 Many questions arise when analyzing these 
f ilms, including the ethical question concerning the use of the Holocaust 
in this context at all. On a wider historical level, the interest in these f ilms 
did not just cease with the end of the 1970s, so in this sense they can offer 
up an understanding of society and culture beyond their context.
Later f ilms build on the 1970s. This has been dubbed the Nazisploitation 
renaissance, with provocative f ilms such as Quentin Tarantino’s Inglorious 
Basterds (2009), plus the large-budget Marvel Productions and Paramount 
Pictures blockbuster Captain America: The First Avenger (Joe Johnston, 2011), 
where a Nazi off icer close to Hitler is a super villain and is the face of the 
Third Reich. There is also the low-budget neo-Nazisploitation film Blitzkrieg: 
Escape from Stalag 69 (Keith J. Crocker, 2008), amongst others. There is the 
whole genre of Nazi zombie f ilms, including the American Horrors of War 
(Peter John Ross and John Whitney, 2006), the British f ilm Outpost (Steve 
Barker, 2007), which messes with philosophy and metaphysics, and the 
Norwegian f ilm Dead Snow (Tommy Wirkola, 2009). Of course, gaming has 
utilized these narratives. The popular Call of Duty: World at War has a ‘Nazi 
Zombie Mode’, where you can kill and re-kill Nazis. Recent games such as 
Wolfenstein allow the player to enter the Holocaust and attempt to save 
Jews, much of the debate on gaming still revolving around the question of 
whether it is art or not, an area returned to in Chapter 5.
Nazisploitation can become a lens and we can start seeing it everywhere. 
For Daniel H. Magilow even the Bernard Schlink adaptation The Reader has a 
Nazisploitation plot, because it concerns a former concentration camp guard 
seducing the f ifteen-year-old Michael Berg (David Kross/Ralph Fiennes). 
The f ilm then is not about the Jews at all. ‘Nazi’ has entered the popular 
lexicon, including ‘Grammar Nazi’, meaning those pedantic about grammar, 
and ‘Nazi Tourette’s’, which is a comment on those who appear unable to 
control their use of Hitler and the Nazis in analogies.5 Kidult cartoons such 
as Family Guy have used Nazi iconography, such as in one episode (season 
7, episode 3, broadcast in the USA on 19 October 2008) where characters 
wore SS uniforms with ‘McCain-Palin’ campaign buttons. Observed in 2017 
this is even more darkly comic, given both McCain and Palin have stood 
up to Donald Trump. Just because this is often called lowbrow humour, 
it needs to be considered how and if this is any different to Shakespeare 
adaptations, such as Richard III appropriating Nazi iconography. Where the 
difference lies overall in all of this reworking of Nazi and neo-Nazi tropes 
is that Ilsa: She Wolf of the SS begins with the claim that what we are seeing 
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is based upon documented fact. The focus is on ‘medical experiments’, 
which occurred in concentration camps throughout Hitler’s Third Reich. 
The comment at the start from the producer, Herman Traeger, is that these 
characters are composites of real characters that did exist.
The point is made that the events of crimes against humanity are histori-
cally accurate, but for dramatic purposes this has been condensed into one 
locality. ‘We dedicate this f ilm with the hope that these heinous crimes will 
never occur again.’ This is an interesting way of putting it, and is not the 
same as saying, ‘to the memory of the victims of the camps’. While these 
words are the focus of the opening, Hitler’s speech echoes out, cutting to 
Ilsa having sex, and her lover is then taken away by Ilsa’s guards. Ilsa works 
with other women, dismembering her victims, and her torturing of others is 
framed within a medical environment. This appears as a punishment, with 
Ilsa fetishizing her torture tools, loving the weapons she utilizes, reflecting 
on her power. New women arrive at the camp and then they must parade 
naked in front of the commandant, with some female prisoners appearing 
to resent being addressed by a female doctor. Gender politics feed the power 
of the camp. Her male associate is unattractive, coughing, and the epitome 
of the unhealthy human, emphasizing her superior status further. There is 
a focus on the prisoners’ pubic hairs, which are then removed by shaving, 
one prisoner resisting this process. With Ilsa: She Wolf of the SS, the basic 
premise asks: ‘Are women better able to stand pain than men?’
While questions can be raised over voyeurism and real and assumed 
pain in Nazi sexploitation f ilms, questions also need to be asked over the 
pornography of Nazi memorabilia. This is an example of the pervasive 
usage of terms like ‘pornography’ and ‘Nazi’, but postmodern critical theory 
has unearthed the pornography of everyday culture, which is splattered 
with Nazi iconography. Similarly, in academic discourse at least, there are 
numerous conferences on trauma, memory, the history of the Holocaust, 
re-interpreting and re-branding the Holocaust, through f ilm and other 
forms of visual art. The aestheticizing of the Holocaust is not new, but the 
amount of imagery constantly reworked, through the History Channel 
and other platforms, such as YouTube, around the clock makes it possible 
to conclude that what we have here is Nazi pornography, using the term 
‘pornography’ not to denote the actual depictions of sexual acts as much 
as to indicate the depiction of sensational events in order to arouse intense 
emotional reactions in the viewers.
As Dagmar Herzog has noted, the conflicts over sexual mores become 
‘an important site for managing the memory of Nazism and Holocaust and 
coming to terms with their inheritance’.6 Nazisploitation f ilms stray so 
42 NazisM aNd Neo -NazisM iN  FilM aNd Media 
far away from aesthetics and narrative we can conclude they actually do 
a service to the period in history. They are enabling audiences to not just 
distance themselves from the events, but continually engage them with the 
obvious view that all history is reconstructed. However much a f ilm such 
as Son of Saul (László Nemes, 2015) may appear authentic, it is a singular 
depiction regarding a specific period in history, which has been constructed 
as the embodiment of evil. What the writing on these f ilms fails to point 
out is how the Nazis constructed their fantasies, which were then used 
and re-interpreted by f ilm-makers. Susan Sontag explains that uniforms, 
for example, are not the same thing as photographs of the uniforms, and it 
is the latter that take on an erotic element, full of powerful sexual fantasy. 
Uniforms are ripe for fantasy, being concerned with legitimizing authority 
and violence. Nazi uniforms embody this most completely given aesthetic 
standards, brutality and eff iciency are combined. There is a sexual element 
to Nazi leadership, with Hitler believing leadership was sexual mastery of 
the ‘feminine’ masses.7 Sexual elements come in to play in f ilm, from Mahler 
(Ken Russell, 1974), to Pink Floyd: The Wall (Alan Parker, 1981), to Richard III 
(1995), to Starship Troopers (Paul Verhoeven, 1997), which all use some form 
of Nazi-related iconography.
On one level, it is not the f ilms themselves that are watched and un-
derstood. In analysis of ‘media’ rather than f ilm, it is the related material, 
be it the trailers, clips, posters, and conventions. The Night Porter (Liliana 
Cavani, 1974) is a signif icant f ilm in this context. Here a Holocaust victim 
Lucia (Charlotte Rampling) re-unites with an SS man Max (Dirk Bogarde). 
This premise is profound, raising questions about the ongoing impact of 
the Holocaust on all concerned, victim and perpetrator. The plot is of note, 
given the two are then hunted down by SS veterans, who want to destroy 
the past. While the camp memories are not realistically produced, they 
hint not only at the stage elements of the theatre, but also at emptiness. An 
approach similar to this is taken at the Jewish Museum Berlin, where certain 
spaces are voids, indicating the erasure of the extensive Jewish culture and 
society in Berlin. This is the quintessence of a philosophical movement, 
existentialism, borne out of a number of philosophers, including the Nazi 
sympathizer Heidegger, and the French resistance member Sartre. Using 
a media of nothing to represent something is questionable, but at least it 
does not dictate a banal prescribed interpretation.
Condemned in The New Yorker as being a ‘slab of opulent claptrap’, re-
views found it hard to move beyond their distaste for sadomasochism.8 The 
Night Porter contains a reversal of sorts. Maximilian Theo Aldorfer has been 
posing in concentration camps as a doctor in order to take photographs. 
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Here he met Lucia Atherton, but it is unclear whether he protected her. 
The notion that the Nazis and the Jews, even in camps, were never having 
any sexual relationships is still accepted. The fact that this was anathema 
is taken as evidence that these relationships did not take place but needs 
questioning. Along with having two British stars in the lead, Liliana Cavani 
was the most well-known Italian female director outside Italy and had 
made a four-hour documentary on the Third Reich for Italian television; 
others included Lina Wertmuller, Elda Tattoli, and Dacia Marraini. The 
f ilm’s controversial themes framed the debates on Nazis’ relationships with 
prisoners. Nazism is prevalent less directly in Italian cinema. In Pier Paolo 
Pasolini’s version of the work of Marquis de Sade, 120 Days of Sodom (1975), 
he claims the environment in the f ilm is a version of the concentration 
camp system.
Levels of authenticity become more absurd, with the notion of true 
‘sadiconazista’, including The Gestapo’s Last Orgy (Casare Canevari, 1977), 
and Nazi Love Camp 27 (Mario Caiano, 1977). All claims of resemblance to 
Nazi iconography, regardless of their veracity, need further questioning, 
given that Nazi iconography did not appear from nowhere. The Nazis were 
not the f irst system to exploit certain dress codes, the colours black and red, 
and mass extermination. Any fictional representations following World War 
II that have even oblique references to these elements might be branded as 
having been influenced by the Nazis, but could this be termed inevitable? 
The problem with such generalizing is that it removes the complexities 
of influence. There is within this an emphasis on ‘morbid decadence and 
sadomasochism as the hallmarks of both Italian and German fascism’.9
Through the use of music and iconography, Richard Loncraine utilizes 
Nazi elements in his 1995 version of Richard III, but Ian McKellen, both star 
and screenwriter, plays Richard as an early 1930s evil bounder and cad, 
rather than as a Hitler f igure. This reflects on the British aristocratic flirta-
tion with Nazism. The ‘action takes place in a dystopian-Mosleyite version 
of abdication Britain’, with Peter Bradshaw comparing the ruined locations 
to Kubrick.10 There is the overt theme that paranoia and condemnation of 
the other, whoever the other may be, lead to isolation – but this may be 
the only way to power. With brief monologues and asides to the audience, 
we are drawn into his duplicity. The question is, which side would we go 
along with in a situation in which power seemingly always wins? In this 
sense, he is not a lone madman or even a genius, but Richard is acting out 
the fundamental desire of the people. Just prior to the sequence of total 
devastation, when he falls into a f ire, Richard has had a haunting dream 
in which his own demons attack him. The core paradox is that a man who 
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wants to rule and be loved must abandon all real relationships. This is the 
route to power, indicating that this form of power is power over and through 
nothing. This is the real existential lesson from Hitler. An off icer comforts 
him in the night, but his true fear is that he will die alone. This personal 
psychology is juxtaposed with his victor’s healthy marriage bed. Isolation, 
in every respect, is demonized. As the tag line puts it, ‘I can smile … and 
murder while I smile.’
The f ilm reveals the way in which military camps often resembled 
concentration camps, confronting us with the question over the status of 
the solider, in their own isolation. Who, exactly, is the victim? Despite the 
promises Richard makes, many of those working with him know they are 
doomed, their children slaughtered. Richard is deformed from birth. Like 
Hitler’s abnormal testicle, mythical or otherwise, the physical abnormality 
is supposed to reflect on a psychological and spiritual abnormality, and his 
speeches about protecting ‘our women’ from being raped ring deeply hollow. 
We already know there is no real point pursuing relationships or contact 
in Richard’s life, making everything all the more meaningless. As with the 
Holocaust, a key question is why do so many people fall into that trap of 
following evil, and does this simply come down to fear for their own safety.
A museum on the site of the former SS headquarters in Berlin, the 
Topography of Terror, constructs this very narrative. Within this story, 
people joined the Nazis and did not resist them because they feared their 
own persecution. A question that this story contained in the Topography 
of Terror does not especially raise is around people joining the Nazi Party 
willingly, as a choice. The Jews have been persecuted ever since their ar-
rival in the German region, during Roman times and in some instances 
burnt to death, as they were in the UK. For hundreds of years non-Jews 
had encouraged or ignored this. From the position of this ideology, fostered 
over hundreds, if not thousands of years, the Nazis’ behaviour was only to 
systematize via technology what was actually already normalized.
General skinhead f ilms that include Nazi and neo-Nazi references are a 
genre in themselves, and widely available on YouTube. They contain a num-
ber of similar themes, regardless of the nation producing them or where they 
are set, ranging from the extremely bizarre to the obvious. For example, Neo 
Ned (Van Fischer, 2008) concerns an African-American in a mental hospital 
who believes they have Hitler inside them. There is also The Believer (Henry 
Bean, 2001) where a Jew is a member of a neo-Nazi group. Heart of a Lion 
(Dome Karukoski, 2013) is a Finnish f ilm that follows a familiar plot line. 
Here, a neo-Nazi has an affair with a woman with a black son. All of these 
f ilms concern the premise what if your beliefs contradict your assumed 
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real identity. They offer an ontological crisis as a form of plot device. In the 
same vein, some f ilms reveal how anyone can become a neo-Nazi, making 
the important point that this behaviour could be carried out by anyone. No 
one is born a Nazi or neo-Nazi. In Skinning (Steven Filipovic, 2010) a Serbian 
mathematician joins a Nazi gang. Some very simple points are made about 
how joining a group like this offers an outsider some form of identity. There 
is a level of extremism that is startling, such as the killing of a man who 
is Roma. The f ilm highlights how quickly even apparently normal people 
can be caught up in acting out the most extreme forms of violence, in the 
name of neo-Nazism. A deeper underlying question is whether this is latent 
within everyone anyway.
In Imperium (Daniel Ragussis, 2016) an FBI agent (Daniel Radcliffe) goes 
undercover, joining a neo-Nazi gang. More interestingly, the British f ilm I.D. 
(Philip Davis, 1995) concerns a British policeman (Reece Dinsdale) going 
undercover, and joining a gang of football hooligans, the Chadwell Army. He 
‘turns native’, getting so involved with the gang he literally loses his previous 
identity, and chooses to form a new identity as part of his new gang. The film 
ends with the protagonist marching down the road doing a Hitler salute to 
the police, now a total convert to neo-Nazism. None of these films especially 
glamorize such beliefs. Viewed now via various online formats they also 
work as period pieces, reflecting on the politics of the time within which 
they were made. The advertising for I.D. has the line, ‘When you go under 
cover, remember who you are’, the f ilm implying there is no f ixed identity.
Anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists have held the view that there is a 
Jewish predominance in the media and across the creative and cultural 
industries. This has been seized on by neo-Nazis. Long before f ilm-makers 
of any nationality began their attempts to offer f ictionalized drama about 
the Holocaust, Jean-Luc Godard made a famous statement: If ever a f ilm 
is to be made about Auschwitz, it will have to be from the point of view 
of the guards.11 In 2010 Godard received an honorary Oscar. There was a 
backlash from many in Hollywood who saw him as anti-Zionist and even 
anti-Jewish, given his lifelong commitment to the fate of the Palestinians. It 
was for this that he was seen as crossing into anti-Semitism.12 Godard per-
sonally criticized f ilms about the Holocaust, like Schindler’s List and Shoah 
(Claude Lanzmann, 1985), on artistic grounds. Off-the-cuff remarks have 
been interpreted as evidence of his anti-Semitism, including a comment 
about the image of the Central European Jew as being part of Hollywood’s 
problem with being caught up in debt. Organizations such as B’nai B’rith 
International have condemned the awarding of Godard with this honour. 
Danish director Lars von Trier has also been accused of being anti-Semitic 
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by saying that he understands Hitler and in 2011 issued an apology for any 
offence caused at the behest of the organizers of the Cannes Film Festival.
The f ilm The Reader is not really from the point of view of a guard, as it is 
primarily about the experiences of the guard’s lover, and overall works as a 
metaphor for German guilt. A scathing review in The New Yorker claims the 
f ilm is fatuous, outrageously turning Hanna the Nazi into a victim, and is 
just an excuse to view Kate Winslet ‘deflowering’ a boy.13 When the guard 
is also a Jewish prisoner, as in 2015’s Son of Saul, Godard’s point takes on a 
deeper resonance. The reason The Reader made a strong global impression 
was it opened a new f ield of inquiry, because so much had been hidden and 
repressed around this subject.14 There is the popular myth that it had taken 
a long time for the suffering of Jews in the European concentration camps 
of the 1930s and 1940s to reach deep into public consciousness, although 
this might be overlooking the facts. Images were in circulation even during 
the war. The artist Francis Bacon, arguably Britain’s most important painter 
since the war, possessed two images from The People’s Verdict: A Full Report 
of the Proceedings at the Krasnodar and Kharkov German Atrocity Trials, 
published in 1944, documenting the mass extermination of the Jews in the 
Ukraine. Early footage included the Pathé News footage of Belsen, screened 
at the Rialto Cinema near Leicester Square. It was not just artists who 
were aware of what had happened in Nazi Germany, but also the general 
public. Just following the end of the war, there was the popular display of 
photographs of the camps in Trafalgar Square by the Daily Express, with 
the motto, ‘SEEING IS BELIEVING.’15
It would be wrong to assume that the story of camps like Belsen, Buchen-
wald and Auschwitz was unknown. What this story meant or was used for 
is another question. At the same time, in the 20 years immediately after the 
end of the war there was an understandable reluctance among survivors 
to describe in any detail what they had been through. This is not just the 
case for those experiencing survivors’ guilt, but for anyone who had truly 
experienced horror during the war. Following murder on such a grand 
scale it is understandable why there would be a reluctance to speak about 
these atrocities, at f irst believed to be beyond imagination. In Israel in 
particular the resolve to build a new country meant that older people were 
not encouraged to talk about the past. Often people felt ashamed of being 
alive when so many of their families and fellow inmates had been killed. 
When Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man was f irst published soon after the war 
most of the 2,500 copies printed remained unsold in an Italian warehouse, 
people not wanting to recognize the past as there was no public appetite 
for this topic.
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The appearance and conviction of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 
brought about a shift in public understanding in Israel, while the Auschwitz 
trials in Frankfurt between 1963 and 1965 had a comparable impact in Ger-
many.16 Thirty years after those trials lawyer Bernhard Schlink constructed 
a f ictional narrative concerning arguably the biggest crime in history. How 
does a succeeding generation deal with the transgressions of their parents, 
how do they f ind a way of living anything like a normal life? The Reader is 
not simply a novel specif ic to the post-war German experience. As David 
Hare maintains, it is also a more far-reaching exploration of the diff icult 
processes we all now know under the name of truth and reconciliation.17 
This goes beyond German borders and the Jewish faith to the heart of what 
it means to be human.
The novel The Reader at f irst seems simple. In a German provincial town 
in the mid-1950s f ifteen-year-old Michael Berg is given a sexual initiation by 
an older woman, Hanna Schmitz, whom he has met when he has fallen ill 
on the way home from school. He reads aloud to her, and they have a short 
summer romance which impacts on the whole of his life. Even at the time, 
and with so little experience, Michael can feel that the relationship has 
an undertow that is not wholly usual, taking him away from the life of his 
peers, but allowing him to enter a complex psychic world. Without warning, 
Hanna then disappears from his life. As an undergraduate studying law 
Michael attends a war crimes trial in Heidelberg discovering that one of 
the defendants is Hanna, who worked as a guard in a concentration camp. 
On the subsequent death marches she locked Jewish women and children 
in a church so they burnt to death. Michael realizes he is in possession of 
evidence about her that would serve at least to mitigate Hanna’s sentence. 
Can he bring himself to help someone whom he has loved, but whom he 
feels has betrayed him? What duty does he have towards someone who has 
done so many terrible things?
Questions over the forgiveness that is never fully found or given make 
the novel and f ilm more complex than they might f irst appear, making it 
a good case study. The Reader (Stephen Daldry, 2008) begins traditionally, 
examining the notion that heroes have weaknesses. This is nothing unusual 
and part of what many teachers on screenwriting have considered, often 
called the hero’s journey, stemming from Joseph Campbell’s now classic 
work on myth, which Christopher Vogler adapted into his twelve-stage 
hero’s journey. Michael (as a young man played by David Kross) learns to 
forgive himself, on many levels. He eventually explains to his daughter 
the whole history of his relationship with Hanna. The fallout from this 
relationship has blighted his whole life and his daughter’s, as she blamed 
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herself for his inability to trust anyone. This reveals that there is hope for the 
next generation, given they have a great opportunity of fully understanding 
the past. Whether this is a choice or not is a diff icult question, given it may 
come as a necessity for survival. The issue of German guilt threads itself 
throughout the narrative, with the young people coming to terms with the 
past so they can have a future.
In this aspect, the film is pure genre filmmaking, but this is not a negative 
criticism. There is a clear teleology and strong narrative drive which, along 
with the star status of Kate Winslet playing Hanna and Ralph Fiennes playing 
the older Michael, meant the f ilm gained a wide global audience. The media 
attention this created highlighted the importance of examining the Nazi 
legacy once again. Debates around the f ilm became part of a wider media 
discourse about the Holocaust and contemporary neo-Nazism. The questions 
raised by any ‘Holocaust f ilm’ always include: How could this happen and, 
more relevant now than ever, could this happen again? This is Michael’s 
f ilm, taking us through his early sexual relationship with the former Nazi 
prison guard Hanna, an initiation process into adulthood, which actually 
keeps him stuck in the past, moving to his time at college, and to current-day 
philandering, and then his attempt to reconcile himself with his daughter 
and the past. The hope of the f ilm is in these attempts; whether this actually 
works or not is immaterial. There is no point denying this potential, outlined 
in the narrative, claiming there is no hope in the f ilm in an unconvincing 
attempt at making the f ilm sound radically more ambitious.
Hanna claims she was following orders, as many Nazis said they were 
doing, and following this logic she should be commended, not prosecuted. 
She never truly understands her culpability, but this could be due to basic 
unwitting ignorance. Whether the f ilm itself fully promotes this myth of 
her lack of culpability is questionable, given we are asked to doubt this. 
Michael is aware she cannot read, and this fact could have prevented her 
from going to prison for the murder of hundreds of Jews in a burning church. 
In court, she explains she joined the SS in 1943, after working at a factory, 
and being offered promotion. Her illiteracy always means she must move 
on before being discovered. She is then asked whether she knew what kind 
of work she would be expected to do, and narrates how she went to work at 
Auschwitz. The camp system was ‘the site where the Nazi German world 
was most unreservedly, most unabashedly being created’.18 The camp was 
the emblematic institution of Germany, revealing the essence of Germany, 
so Hanna is the symbol of Germany. Her illiteracy is therefore problematic, 
implying she did not fully understand what she was doing, and therefore 
was not free in her choices.
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Under further questioning, she admits she was part of the selection 
process of those chosen to die. Being questioned in court, to ascertain 
whether she joined as a guard out of her own free will, she states she heard 
there were jobs in the SS, and that was that. The complexity of this moment 
is easy to gloss over, asking us to question our own free will. While free will 
might be limited to humans and higher animals, so is rationality, conscious-
ness and understanding.19 All four attributes are part of Nazism, despite 
its condemnation as being irrational. In her innocence, she also convicts 
the other guards with her, who then declare she was the leader to lighten 
their sentences. Given we already know she is illiterate, she is portrayed as 
naïve, but not evil. Could this be an exception to the rule: a good Nazi? A 
law student watching the trial with Michael claims it is exciting, because for 
him it is justice, but he is soon disillusioned. This is exposed the following 
day, along with the shallowness of the people seeking both justice and 
revenge. The relevance of the Holocaust and the Jews seems irrelevant, as 
Michael’s peer points out. This could be a criticism of the f ilm, and those 
like it, that use Nazism as a backdrop. The focus on a few individuals, which 
is the main emphasis of all popular narrative f ilm, removes the audience in 
many ways away from the collective, which is even the case in the f ilm Son 
of Saul, feted for being so authentic. Is the conclusion that there is just too 
much horror, and humans by nature relate to the story of one individual?
The memory of a single man may represent Germany itself, as he is 
looking back on his childhood, memories dictating the present. After a 
scene revealing Michael as an adult, nonchalantly dismissing a lover in 
the morning, revealing he is unable to have true relationships, Michael 
stares out of a window in Berlin as an adult, where he sees his younger 
self on a tram in Neustadt. We then enter this period of his adolescence, 
with Hanna the conductor helping him after he has vomited. The boy’s 
weaknesses are juxtaposed with the woman’s strength, given she has helped 
him when he is ill, and asks him whether he has always been weak. This is a 
strange question, and later in court it is revealed she has a fondness for weak 
children, who she made read to her in the Nazi camp. Indeed, Michael at 
f irst cannot even cope with her just staring at him, when she is pulling up 
her stockings, and must run away. In court, Michael relives every moment 
of this only then realizing she is illiterate and its consequences. She has 
kept both secrets from him, and he feels betrayed.
What is signif icant is how class is often raised up as a key factor in 
determining neo-Nazi beliefs and actions, and how this is tied to free will. 
In Britain, neo-fascist groups such as Britain First are described as formed 
from the disenchanted and disenfranchised working classes, uneducated 
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and alienated from the London-based, high-income politicians. Ideology 
and politics are not determined by the economy mechanistically. An ap-
proach that emphasizes the primacy of class structures is appropriate. This 
concerns relating their functional relationship to the capitalist mode of 
production, with knowledge of the social world achieved through theoreti-
cal practice, in Marxist terms known as ‘science’, not observation.20 Class is 
an element at work in the relationship between Michael, from a traditional 
upper-class background, and Hanna, who is illiterate, making her backstory 
strangely irrelevant. Hanna may appear genuine, authentic and raw in a 
physical sense, but she is the one who is hiding her past. His literacy writes 
her into existence.
Class is also tied to gender. The masculine concerns the dangerous 
pretence that it contains powers of discrimination and the criteria for 
pronouncing the truth and with femininity there is a contestation of the 
manner in which desire has been reduced literally or metaphorically to 
anatomy.21 Our centre of gravity is displaced towards a libidinal economy, 
to machine-like functioning, reflected in the Nazi system. Here there are 
echoes of the way Hanna clicks the tickets on the tram, and shuts the door 
to the church, forcing hundreds of Jewish women and children to burn 
to death, plus the manner in which she slams her f ist on the desk in the 
courtroom. These can be construed as mechanical involuntary actions, 
where free will has been momentarily subverted and humanity dissolved. 
Her machismo contrasts with Michael’s femininity, as if they have swapped 
traditional roles. Popular culture has emphasized and normalized the older 
man being involved in a relationship with the younger woman with the 
Lolita myth, but here this is also reversed.
Michael’s f ifteen-year-old body is fetishized, the camera focusing on his 
naked torso in the bath, when he returns to Hanna’s. Sex strengthens him, 
and his desire to see Hanna helps him recover. In this sense, this process 
is Nietzschean, the nineteenth-century philosopher who worshipped the 
spirit of Dionysian creativity and who was wrongly associated with the 
Nazis. In 1934 Hitler visited Nietzsche’s sister Elizabeth, who had edited 
his f inal unfinished manuscript and made the text more sympathetic to 
Nazi ideology. Elizabeth gifted Hitler her brother’s walking stick, a symbolic 
and totemic object, the latter then using elements of Nietzsche’s texts in 
his own propaganda. Nietzsche was vocally opposed to anti-Semitism but 
he generated the background that established that these were the times 
of the last men who needed to turn their backs on banal existence, the 
notion of the will of the most powerful being perfect for Nazi propaganda. 
Splitting God up into good and evil is wrong and unnatural for Nietzsche. 
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The Nazis attempted to destroy all darkness, including that in themselves, 
by destroying the Jews, unable to fully recognize the darkness within.
There is also the tension concerning history. Should a country or an 
individual delve into and relive the past continually, as Michael is doing 
here, or should the unhistorical and even supra-historical reign, as Nietzsche 
maintains, to overcome the malady of history.22 Psychologically, existential 
psychoanalysts, such as R.D. Laing, maintained that forgetting was better 
than remaining, although the essential story here is based on the premise 
of haunting and memory. The central tenet is that we believe what we need 
to believe in order to live, even if this includes accepting a lie. Truth and 
authenticity are irrelevant. People do anything to survive, even if it means 
living a deadened life. Levinas has made the origin of language, meaning, 
and difference consist in terms of the relation to the inf initely other.23 
After they make love for the third time, Michael asks Hanna her name, 
formalizing their relationship with specif ic language. There is a suggestion 
that she is still in many ways on the run, but eventually she tells him, which 
is the true moment of intimacy after the sex. A quick cut from this scene, 
to a lecture Michael is having on literature, reveals a parallel between his 
mental, formal, education, and that with Hanna. Discussing Goethe, it is 
maintained that character is all about the revealing of the secret, with 
stories always concerning either the perverse or morally sound elements of 
this secret.24 Michael appears to be living the perfect German adolescence 
and yet there is a void in his life, represented by the repression in his family 
caused, we assume, by their collective guilt over the war. It takes Hanna’s 
insistence that he read to her for him to realize he is good at something. 
Like Hanna, he is an actor, adept at concealing his true self and wearing a 
mask, this in itself being his core ontological essence.
She eventually insists that the reading must come f irst, and then the sex, 
both allowing for transcendence. Once they get into a pattern of reading 
Michael becomes the equivalent of a rent boy, as she insists he read to her 
f irst before they make love, as if the reading is a payment. When she says 
he is ‘good at it’, meaning reading, he thinks she means making love. In 
this sense, he wants her to mean he is good at this physical act, rather than 
the mental one, although they fuse. He reads a whole series of books and 
cartoons to her, from Homer to D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, 
which Hanna believes is disgusting, and that he should be ashamed. While 
Hanna teaches Michael about the ways of the body, Michael teaches Hanna 
about the ways of mind, but overall this binary opposition is too simplistic. 
The f irst half of the f ilm is to underline Hanna’s humaneness and Michael’s 
love for her, and to emphasize his loss when she soon disappears from his 
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life. Following 45 minutes of mainly narrating the past, the f ilm shifts 
to Michael (now an adult) reading the poem he wrote for Hanna when 
they were on a cycling holiday. Stepping into his car as an adult, he is still 
listening to the music she was mesmerized by in a church on their holiday. 
His entire life has been tainted by this affair, preventing him from being 
open with anyone. Paradoxically, this has protected him, the initial hurt 
from the loss of Hanna keeping him from future pain. At Heidelberg Law 
School in 1966 their special seminar begins with a reading list, specif ically 
Karl Jaspers, and the question of German guilt. This essentially is the core of 
the f ilm philosophically: How culpable are we? For Jaspers, whose wife was 
Jewish and who hid Jews from the authorities, there are a number of types 
of guilt: criminal guilt, political guilt, moral guilt, and the more complex 
metaphysical guilt relating to guilt by association.25
The Holocaust as spectacle is a major theme, constructed as haunting 
everything, not just Michael’s sexuality. When the accused Nazi guards are 
brought to the courtroom Michael stands in the street, hoping to catch a 
glimpse of the criminals, unaware Hanna is inside. Is he guilty by associa-
tion? The love of his life has murdered hundreds of Jews. As Michael’s peer 
puts it, it truly is a circus, with numerous photographers inside the court as 
well as outside. This is already a reflection on the ‘Holocaust industry’, which 
commentators such as the Auschwitz survivor and Nobel Prize winner Elie 
Wiesel have maintained is deeply disturbing.26 Hanna was born 21 October 
1922 and is now 43. Michael is disturbed by seeing Hanna again and he is 
unable to take part in any of the university students’ social activities, given 
he is paralyzed by the past. The total absurdity of the way states operate in 
the modern world is underscored by what occurs during Michael’s higher 
education. Questions are raised over the nature of civilization itself.
In his next seminar, the professor (Bruno Ganz) claims societies do not 
operate by morality but by law, giving the simple facts: 8,000 people worked 
at Auschwitz, but you are not guilty if you just worked at Auschwitz; to prove 
murder you have to prove intent and only nineteen of the 8,000 so far have 
been convicted and, of these, only six for murder. You have to be convicted 
by the laws of the time and intention is everything. The following scene is 
an attempt to ascertain Hanna’s intentions; did she actually intend to kill 
so many innocent people? The court scenes accentuate Hannah Arendt’s 
notion of the banality of evil, which could be re-phrased as the absurdity 
or comedy of evil, some of the defendants sitting knitting, with the law 
students chatting, smiling and flirting.
This is no circus where the carnivalesque takes place in a Bakhtinian 
sense, or a moment of transgression followed by a reasserting of the law, but 
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a blend between a doctor’s waiting room and a school. In dramatic terms, 
this is more Samuel Beckett than Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson. 
During these moments, it is clear that no one is concerned about the suf-
fering of the Jews. They are more concerned about exonerating themselves 
and Germany, so they can continue their distractions. The relationship 
between the judge and Hanna is that of headmaster and naïve, unwittingly 
mischievous, schoolgirl. The central drama unfolds from their conflict. 
From this perspective, a diff icult question is: Does the truth of the events 
matter, or is it more the way the narrative is constructed so the court can 
create some sense of justice? This obvious question is at the heart of the 
narrative and the theatre of justice that is played out for everyone’s benefit, 
especially the law students. Telling a story that offers the veneer of justice 
takes precedent over truth.
For novelist William Burroughs, language was an evil virus possessing 
him, which he had to exorcise through writing. What we f ind here with 
Hanna is not the antithesis of this view, but what can be considered to be 
the deeper horror, one that Burroughs is only implying. That is, the horror 
of the gap that can exist without language. Adorno stated the problem of 
poetry existing after Auschwitz. This is often taken out of context, and 
without the caveat that in his later work Adorno changed his mind. In 
Negative Dialetics he revised this point, claiming that suffering has as much 
right to expression as the tortured, and so the real question is: Can one 
go on living after Auschwitz? For Hanna, the answer is no, although how 
this relates to the Jewish experience is complex. Adorno points out that 
for the Jew who should have been killed survival depends on coldness, the 
basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, and without this there would have 
been no Auschwitz at all. The guilt of the survivor is immense: ‘[H]e will 
be plagued by dreams such as that he is no longer living at all, that he was 
sent to ovens in 1944 and his whole existence since has been imaginary, 
an emancipation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier.’27
The judge discusses a book by a Holocaust survivor with Hanna in an 
attempt to provoke a sense of guilt and create a fuller understanding beyond 
her rationalizations. In Burroughs’ sense of meaning, she cannot be pos-
sessed by language or strive through writing to free herself. Hanna could 
never be human, making fully conscious decisions, because she never truly 
learned language. The people she oppressed had this privilege, being able 
to explain who they were. The other defendants have denied their part, 
only the educated knowing how to lie. As the professor has maintained, 
this is not about morality but law. Unaware of what justice really is, a form 
of drama that f its a certain narrative, Hanna thinks she is there to tell the 
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truth. Hanna’s absence of education makes her brutally honest: ‘The old 
ones had to make way for the new ones.’ Asked whether she did what she 
did because she feared for her own life, her response is intelligent and ends 
the discussion: ‘What would you have done?’
The complexity of Hanna’s trial has resonances concerning the many 
myths propounded by contemporary neo-Nazi groups. Some of these in-
clude: this was a just war; the Germans were just doing their duty; the guards 
were only obeying orders (so can anyone be blamed for acting on orders 
made by those higher up?); and, ultimately, the underlying belief that this 
process was doing the world a service, removing the ‘vermin’ of the Jewish 
people. The more extreme of these myths are essentially shied away from, 
in both the novel and the f ilm. All that can be done is to reinterpret history 
from the contemporary period but the status of this f ilm and its influence 
should not be understated. We might be forgiven for thinking the central 
message is that those who carried out these atrocities were basically just 
ignorant and the role of victim is reversed.
Paradoxically, f inding a handful of guards guilty exonerates the many. 
This process is not about f inding justice for the Jews, but a way of reconciling 
Germans to their past, which is still pressingly and disturbingly with them. 
This can be illustrated by contemporary references to industry. In 2011 Sie-
mans had plans to register the trademark Zyklon, the same name as Zyklon 
B poison gas used in Nazi camps. Bosch Siemans Hausgeraete (BSH) f iled 
two applications for the name Zyklon across a range of products, including 
gas ovens. Jewish groups condemned Siemans, who then apologized. As 
recently as 2012, Umbro apologized for naming a new model of its training 
shoes Zyklon. The name, meaning cyclone, may have actually been used 
innocently, but the influence of the media is of note. It was only when the 
BBC News queried BSH about the plans for the range that they withdrew the 
trademark application. By 2012 Siemans, which used slave labour during 
the Holocaust, were involved in attempts to compensate victims, with the 
German government still working on ways to distribute about £3.5 billion 
in compensation.
When a Jewish witness points out those guards involved, she reveals 
how Hanna worked with the girls. She selected people, normally young 
girls, and they imagined something sexual would take place. Instead she 
would make them read to her. At f irst they thought she was more humane, 
selecting the weak to be with her, but then she would dispatch them: ‘Is 
that kinder?’ asks the witness. This parallels Michael’s life. Back at their 
university the student who at f irst said it was exciting reveals the central 
true point: the trial is a distraction. Why put these six guards on trial, just 
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because one person wrote a book? The question of the Jews is being left 
out. As he puts it, everyone knew: ‘our parents, teachers’. The student goes 
on, directly addressing Michael’s professor with the question: ‘How could 
you let this happen … why didn’t you kill yourself when you found out?’
As Michael explains to his professor, Hanna has a choice to explain 
that she is illiterate, if she can. This is her choice, in this instance, not his. 
His choice to tell the courts would undermine her choice to not choose 
to tell them. The judge is primarily concerned with whether she chose to 
not unlock the church. Survivors are included in the court scenes, but the 
central focus is on the German guilt and the German denial. When Michael 
f inally visits Hanna in prison, he interrogates her over whether she has 
spent a lot of time thinking about the past. She thinks he means their past 
together. The f ilm suggests he is obsessed with their earlier relationship, 
and it dominates his later life. Following Burroughs’ logic, her being is the 
language that is the virus that he cannot exorcise. But he is judging her now. 
‘The dead are still dead,’ she confirms. And then Hanna, with a perfect irony, 
uses her books to gain the height to commit suicide by hanging. Literacy 
literally kills her.
At every stage and at every level, it is the signif icance of literature that 
is of importance, including the memoir the witness has written. This is 
crucial not only in regards to Hanna, but to civilization. As Derrida points 
out in his discussion of Edmond Jabès and the question of the book, there 
is the common root of Judaism in writing. There is no history without this 
reflection and this furrow is the Jew. There is an interface here between 
the Jew and writing, a convocation (as Derrida puts it). There is a deeper 
conceptualizing of choice, where the question is given: What difference is 
there between choosing and being chosen, when we can do nothing but 
submit to choose? The writer is in the same position being bound to lan-
guage and delivered from it by a speech that they are the master of.28 There 
is the continual process of unearthing the secret that is never arrived at. If 
we gain freedom by becoming aware of our ties, The Reader is a traditional 
narrative that allows for this development. Michael is a lawyer, as well as 
being the reader. To every question the Jew answers with a question, and 
the ‘Law then becomes a Question and the right to speech coincides with 
the duty to interrogate’.29
Fact is woven into The Reader just as memoirs of historical events contain 
records of how people ignore the facts. The Reader concerns memory and loss, 
memory being at the heart of Elie Wiesel’s work. This work is also relevant 
when we come on to discuss the f ilm Son of Saul with regards to theology, 
veracity and authenticity. Wiesel was born in Sighet, Transylvania, and was 
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taken in 1944 to Auschwitz concentration camp and then Buchenwald. In 
his most famous work, Night, Wiesel reveals how no one wanted to believe 
the truth, as this was too horrif ic, including Jews in his town. Everyone 
wanted to trust the Germans. During British war commemorations, often 
turned into illustrious patriotic media events to celebrate nationhood, the 
position of the Jews is seldom mentioned. In this sense, there is still denial. 
All that is stressed is the heroic valour of men who under orders marched 
to their deaths. As Wiesel shows, in the Jewish community, for at least two 
decades after the war, no one wanted to listen to any of the stories of the 
atrocities, for fear of being told they were just seeking pity and the notion 
that it would traumatize young people.
Night reveals specif ically there had already been warnings in Wiesel’s 
Hungarian town about what would happen but these were not heeded. 
Deportees had been taken off, never to return, but somehow people forgot 
about this, living in hope. No one wanted to accept or face the truth. In the 
spring of 1944 the Fascist party gained power in Hungary, and still people 
were in denial, believing the German troops would remain in Budapest but 
within three days they were in his streets. Even when they had arrived, the 
Jewish communities were dismissing the idea that the Germans meant them 
actual harm, living in denial. Off icers treated them with respect, buying 
ladies chocolates and, as Wiesel puts it, the Jews of Sighet were smiling. 
Even his father tried to be happy about wearing the yellow star, claiming 
it was not lethal, and some thought the barbed wire fences protecting their 
areas encouraged peace.
Weeks later, old people and babies were battered and slaughtered and 
people sent to the camps. Even when on the train, they believed they 
were staying in Hungary to work in a brick factory. The level of denial 
might seem astonishing, but this could be the only way to maintain hope. 
When at Auschwitz Wiesel maintains young men still had knives on them, 
despite having all possessions removed and were ready to revolt but the 
older religious men still had some vague hope that they might be rescued 
by God and told them to put these blades away. Wiesel did not absolutely 
deny God’s existence but he did doubt his absolute justice. Others, such 
as Akiba Drumer, claimed that God was testing them, seeing if they could 
overcome their propensity to despair, and that any form of punishment is 
a form of love.30 This extreme belief is disturbing.
What is seldom discussed is that the altruism of some guards towards 
young children was down to their paedophilia.31 Drumer claimed that 
he had discovered a verse from the Bible which, when translated into 
numbers, ‘made it possible for him to predict Redemption in the weeks 
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to come’.32 These were Jews who, in the main, believed the messiah was 
returning, so in this sense the more severe the hardships the greater 
evidence there was for this return. In a wider context of altruism and 
love, this is diff icult to fathom, but the greater the punishment within this 
theology the more tangible God’s love. When Wiesel is in the inf irmary 
at Buna, the man in the next bed explains: ‘I have more faith in Hitler 
than anyone else. He alone has kept his promises, all his promises, to the 
Jewish people.’33 This is the position of someone who believes he is totally 
abandoned.
When the camp is being evacuated, Wiesel has a choice; to remain in the 
inf irmary or leave with most of the rest of the camp – he chooses to do the 
latter. If he had stayed, he would have been part of the liberation three days 
later, but he also would have had to endure further hardships. They leave 
running like machines, Wiesel behaving like an automaton.
We were the masters of nature, the masters of the world. We had 
transcended everything – death, fatigue, our natural needs. We were 
stronger than cold and hunger, stronger than the guns and the desire to 
die, doomed and rootless, nothing but numbers, we were the only men 
on earth.34
Wiesel does not shy away from the moral choices people were making at 
every turn. Should you stay with the sick and lame, and limit your chances, 
even if this means death, or do you abandon people, even your father, if 
this means the possibility of survival? After days of starvation on a trek, 
after leaving the camp, one man hides some bread in his shirt, only to be 
beaten to death by another man, who turns out to be his son.35 The son is 
then beaten to death by other starving men who want the bread.
The narrative is a father and son story and here the moral choices remain 
stark. Wiesel is advised by a doctor to eat his father’s rations just so he will 
survive with his having been beaten by fellow inmates. In the original 
version, published in 1958, Wiesel comments on how within just ten years 
since the end of the war, those who were Nazis are once again in power 
in Germany, and that in many respects silence reigns. Plus, anti-Semites 
throughout Germany, France, and the United States, are claiming that 
the assassination of 6 million Jews is just a hoax. According to Wiesel, if 
there is anything we can learn from Auschwitz it is responsibility. In 1978, 
Wiesel maintained that all his work was about inventing and reinventing 
characters from his childhood in Sighet. Even after the success of Night, 
Wiesel is not sure that writing it was the correct thing because the Holocaust 
58 NazisM aNd Neo -NazisM iN  FilM aNd Media 
is, in his words, a fashionable subject. This he believes is more offensive 
than ignorance of the subject, although he is compelled to write about 
the Holocaust, and for him there is no choice. Night came from a 900-page 
manuscript, which in 1978 he claimed he may publish one day as a whole, 
as it does not belong to him. Wiesel’s claim to not own his manuscript is 
not unusual in the arts overall, with many writers and painters believing 
they are the vessels and transmitters of discourse.
Wiesel’s text had a major impact internationally and is a nuanced 
approached both theologically and with regards to the transmission of 
memory and the notion of authenticity a theme addressed next. Feted 
for its apparent authenticity, László Nemes’ 2015 f ilm Son of Saul set in 
Auschwitz in 1944 concerns a man who f inds the body of the boy he thinks 
is his son who he wants to give a proper burial. A doctor allows him f ive 
minutes at night to take the dead boy away. In 2016, the director Nemes 
found writings by the crematorium workers in the camps and her had 
relatives who died in the war in 1944. He was told about these deaths in 
his family at the age of f ive, with his mother not sparing him any of the 
details. There is then an attempt at authenticity. For Nemes, the history 
of the camps is about death. This might seem obvious, but globally their 
history appears to be more about annihilation, a step beyond death, where 
death is not recognized.
Popular culture has this as a central paradox, appearing obsessed with 
death but in general in denial.36 Fiction f ilms had been primarily about 
survival, but the camps were about death, so this in itself has been about 
rewriting history through f ilm. What might be conceived to be the ‘unim-
aginable’ needs to be imagined and the skill for any artist is to suggest it, so 
the imagination of the viewer can construct what they need to. The point 
for Nemes is not showing or telling too much, which is the case for all good 
creative work. After many attempts to f ind funding, only the Hungarian 
Film Fund agreed to f inance Son of Saul, suggesting it is still diff icult to 
make art about this diff icult topic. (A Tale of Love and Darkness, a f ilm in 
Hebrew about the birth of Israel after the Holocaust directed by Natalie 
Portman and based on the memoir of novelist Amos Oz, was released in 
the same year.)
The protagonist is a Hungarian who only arrived at Auschwitz-Birkenau 
in 1944, at which point the Soviet Army was thought to be approaching, so 
the murder was accelerated.37 The majority of critics stated the f ilm was 
an immediate classic, as it claimed to be speaking about the unspeakable 
from a new viewpoint. There is some truth in this, but it is overstated. The 
f ilm begins with randomness and chaos, which can be considered to be 
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authentic. The handheld camera is always over the shoulder or behind the 
protagonist, inviting us to construe his presence within the midst of the 
camp. Are we supposed to conceive of ourselves as some form of conscience, 
or consciousness, of Saul (Géza Rőrig) as we become one with the camera 
following him around over his shoulder? Here we are brought into Saul’s 
world, sitting on his shoulder with the camera, like a devil in hell, or like a 
God who cannot or chooses not to intervene.
Half way through the f ilm a child does hold a camera to take photo-
graphs as evidence, but the camera making the f ilm being positioned 
from predominantly behind the protagonist is problematic. The deception 
and denial of all those involved is portrayed nonchalantly. And then we 
have the shower-gassing scene. Nothing is shown, but the indication of 
the horror of their death is gathered from the screams of the victims and 
the banging of those being murdered. If the director wants to leave a lot 
to the imagination of the viewer, then this includes the most diff icult 
sequences, such as this. Is it that such horrors are too much to convey 
or that, ultimately, at the time at least, this was supposed to be kept a 
secret? As with all major narrative f ilms, the focus on the individual 
means we do begin to relate to that individual, but this also means we 
might neglect the collective and the group. There is the implied view 
that anyone would do the same as Saul, working for the Nazis, just to 
stay alive a few months longer. There are other f ilms that attempt to 
tackle diff icult issues, such as the end of the world, but focus on more 
than just one singular protagonist, offering a glimpse at the collective 
and social organization.
This focus on the individual includes those who have just been murdered, 
given one boy has survived is quickly murdered by the hands of the Nazi who 
wants an autopsy to f ind out why. Another name for Saul’s kind is ‘bearer 
of secrets’. There is the potential of hope here, given anything can happen 
if one is given a stay of execution. Once Saul believes he has found his dead 
son he approaches a rabbi who is shot due to Saul’s encounter with him. 
Are we supposed to accept that someone would do anything to enable the 
religious burial of their son or is this psychosis? It might be concluded that 
this is actually an attack on the futility of religion that places the position 
in the afterlife as more important than the real world. Even if value in the 
afterlife brings value in the current real world, Saul’s action have meant 
one man has died in vain, unwittingly punished for not carrying out his 
rabbinical duties. The paradox is that within Judaism the afterlife is not 
emphasized anyway, but it is the burial process that is important. This is a 
statement against the carnage around him.
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Childhood and Adolescence
While not a f ilm especially aimed at a younger audience, Schindler’s List 
(Steven Spielberg, 1993), given its impact and global audience, needs men-
tioning. In many respects, this f ilm has come to exemplify the Holocaust. 
The f ilm has decisive facts about the Holocaust prior to the closing credits, 
such as 6 million Jews died, and there are only 4,000 left in Poland, but 
globally there are 6,000 Schindler Jews. Even with dead and alive naked 
bodies in camps, the f ilm explores humanity within with the horror of 
this experience. Women prick their f ingers to extract blood and then make 
their faces rosy, to appear healthy, and carry out other activities to keep 
alive. This strong focus on the living offers hope. Ralph Fiennes plays Nazi 
off icer Amon Goeth who is in love with a Jewish servant and unleashing 
his anger on random Jews.
At one point, when his gun gets stuck, he is laughable. Should we take him 
as epitomizing the German Nazi state, or does this focus on one individual 
allow the audience to conclude that it is his personal psychology, not Nazi 
propaganda, that allows for such extreme behaviour? Despite this, Schindler 
(Liam Neeson) manages to change Amon’s psychology. Schindler’s philoso-
phy is there is more power in forgiving people. An important aspect is that 
the f ilm is shot in black and white, which many people campaigned against, 
believing it would stylize the Holocaust. Spielberg had only experienced the 
Holocaust through testimonies and archival footage, in black and white. 
In this sense, the f ilm is a dramatization of Spielberg’s research, but it 
ends with the Schindler survivors and their relatives. For this reason, it is 
a statement against neo-Nazi propaganda.
Inglorious Basterds (Quentin Tarantino, 2009) is a form of reverse West-
ern, also with a focus on hope. While not aimed at adolescent audiences, 
the Tarantino brand and oeuvre originally appealed to youth culture, which 
is not tied to chronological age. Brad Pitt’s gang of American soldiers goes 
hunting German Nazi scalps. Pitt’s character, Lieutenant Aldo Raine, 
has a trace of ‘American Indian’ blood in him, and there is comedy in his 
ruthlessness. While Pitt’s gang hunts Nazis, this is paralleled with Nazis 
hunting Jews. The wider context, given the period of the f ilm’s release, is 
Islamophobia, and the attack on anyone ‘other’, including those f ighting 
against paedophiles. Tarantino employs a typical revenge narrative, which 
leads to the question: Is the context important at all? Paradoxically, while 
Tarantino has been attacked for changing history, his f ictions address 
topics that history has overlooked. The uncanny malevolence of the Nazis, 
while not overtly celebrated, is depicted. As with other culture about the 
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Nazis, neo-Nazis may use the f ilm as a form of celebration, despite the f ilm 
focusing in the main on the anti-Nazi team, but this is not the essence of 
the f ilm. The f ilm celebrates the individual over the state, mocking those 
who operate out of ‘national pride’, such as Frederick Zoller played by Daniel 
Brühl. The f ilm does raise neo-Nazi issues. For example, What exactly 
is anti-Semitism? Was the aim of Nazism to have one language and one 
dominant culture, globally?
Key experts on the Holocaust, such as Elie Wiesel, often place some of the 
outcomes of the Holocaust on Jewish theology and the Jewish promotion 
of suffering as a virtue. This denies the resistance and rebellions that took 
place, such as those organized by Jewish prisoners in Treblinka, Sobibor and 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. Tarantino’s f iction f ilm accentuates this resistance 
further, to incorporate the notion of Jewish vengeance. Whether this is 
authentic or accurate or not is irrelevant here. Raising the issue of Jew-
ish vengeance is important, because it has been signif icantly overlooked 
historically, and theologically, despite the Old Testament God being one of 
vengeance. At Le Gamaar Cinema in 1944, Reich Minister of Propaganda Jo-
seph Goebbels (Sylvester Groth) is screening Nation’s Pride for the Nazi elite, 
including Hitler (Martin Wuttke). The cinema is discussed like a church, 
with the broadcasting of the ultimate Nazi propaganda f ilm to venerate the 
new Reich. Shosanna Dreyfus, the owner of the cinema (Mélanie Laurent), 
a clandestine Jew who has escaped from the Nazi Jew hunter in the opening 
scene, intends to kill all the elite through a f ire in the cinema, splicing 
herself into the f ilm as ‘the face of Jewish vengeance’. Tarantino invites 
us to question whether authenticity is attainable or actually necessary. 
The fact the f ilm is diff icult to place, genre wise, challenges the audience. 
Setting, language, and period are all correct, with the attention to detail 
offering a beautiful verisimilitude, but characterization is exaggerated, not 
to the extent of parody but almost. Rather than denounce the director’s use 
of violence, it is important to understand how Tarantino’s use of violence 
as a director is, ironically, actually authentic in its very postmodernism.
Moving to a genre aimed specially at adolescents, it would be excessive 
to state that The Hunger Games f ilm series takes its iconography, everything 
from its fashion aesthetic to set design, from the Nazis, or even the Nazi era. 
But a quick glance at even just a trailer for any f ilm in the series indicates 
what has been absorbed from the Third Reich and fascism in general. Take 
the rebel salute, for example. This seems more like an Italian fascist salute, 
rather than a German, but it is still a fascist salute. The Italians used this 
form of salute in the 1920s, which was then adopted by the Germans in 
the 1930s, but there is no clear agreement on whether this practice was 
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ever employed in ancient Roman culture. Evidence from sculptures hardly 
points to a standardized salute. Here, in the main, it referred to specif ic 
victories in battles.
The f ilm series is based on a trilogy of books for young adults by novel-
ist Suzanne Collins. In the f ilm The Hunger Games: Mockingjay – Part 2 
(Francis Lawrence, 2015), the rebel attire consists of jump suits. This is 
commented on self-consciously by Eff ie Trinket (Elizabeth Banks), a stylist 
from the Capitol who is now with the rebels. She does everything she can 
to point out how dreadful life with the rebels is. She is there for comic 
continuity, but concurrently she indicates that everything worn can be 
reborn and worn again. This adds to an unsubtle attack on capitalism, which 
thrives on a disposable culture, both in products and people, a theme Star 
Wars: Episode VII – The Force Awakens (J.J. Abrams, 2015) also plays with, 
having the central protagonist surviving as a scavenger. The Holocaust is 
the extreme form of disposable culture, where those not f it for work and 
production are murdered.
Where this f ilm in the Hunger Games series really becomes part of a Nazi 
legacy is in the f ilming of District 12. At f irst the heroine, Katniss Everdeen 
(Jennifer Lawrence), wants to go back to see what has happened to her 
district, and witness the true devastation, promoting the notion of affect 
that things must be experienced in the flesh. This is also a device on behalf 
of the rebel high command, to jolt her into action, and make her become 
their f igurehead. Of this, she is oblivious. A further tactic is to use her to 
make propaganda movies, to show to all the districts and broadcast these 
to the Capitol. The f ilm questions how women are used and manipulated 
as pinups. She returns to District 12 with a f ilm crew who want to capture 
her authenticity. The Nazis made propaganda of this sort an art form, hence 
in this regard the f ilm can be read as taking its cue from the Nazi era.
Paradoxically, the postmodern era appears to be concerned with the term 
‘authenticity’. To understand the world as play circumvents extremism and 
neo-Nazism, given in the latter there is a lack of healthy doubt in doctrines. 
Katniss has tried speaking her lines on camera in a studio, with an artif icial 
backdrop and this has been disastrous. People realize her strength is in her 
genuine, heartfelt reactions to situations. Both sequences use the same 
framing of the burnt bodies in a war zone, the people escaping being burnt 
alive. The destroyed District 8 and District 12 obviously resemble bombed 
out areas of Germany. When there is an air raid and a hit down below in 
the vaults of District 13, it is diff icult to not compare the arrangements of 
the bed bunks to the Nazi camps. The postmodern repetition of war footage 
on television channels, such as the History Channel and Yesterday, adds 
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to the influence of the World War II aesthetic. The ability of the viewer to 
channel surf and intersperse viewing with selected viewing on various 
playback formats does not detract from the deep level of ingrained viewing 
via these other channels, where footage is fetishized. In many ways, the 
footage becomes a series of images outside of time and history, despite 
the voice-over narration and positioning of the images within the wider 
narrative.
The world in The Hunger Games, especially the Capitol of Panem, has a 
Nazi aspect to it with its work ethic, but so has capitalism itself. Accord-
ing to this ideology, as with Auschwitz, work will set you free. When the 
leader, President Snow (Donald Sutherland), addresses Panem, he claims 
the rebels’ actions will damage the peace, which is only achieved with 
everyone doing their collective share. Ideologically, this sounds like National 
Socialism. These citizens have a contract, which includes the yearly human 
tribute they give from each district for the games. Like Aztec sacrif ice, it is 
embedded by the hierarchy that the only way for the whole of Panem and 
the districts to survive is for each district to offer up a human being each 
year to f ight in the Hunger Games. This blood sacrif ice is payment, and also 
works ritualistically and is a form of religious rite of passage for all involved.
The difference with Nazism is the aim of Nazism was to rid the earth 
of the Jewish race, whereas here the sacrif ice is an intrinsic aspect of an 
imperial domination, based on class not race. This was the key specif ic 
aim of the war for the Nazis overall, with world domination secondary to 
this mission, but inevitably both went hand in hand. The extermination of 
the Jews was not a side issue for the Nazis or for Germany in general. The 
industrial process by which this was carried out was intrinsic to the Nazi 
war machine. We need to be careful in claiming this was an industrial 
process. As Richard Evans has shown, this suggests an automated process, 
away from the humans involved, plus the process was not an eff icient 
one.38 The ritual of the game, satisfying Thanatos, or the death wish, has a 
religious trait. This is a future world, where traditional religion seems to 
have vanished, and where the unity that may have come through rituals 
and sacraments in the past comes through this bloodshed.
Using multimedia in all its forms, the broadcasting of the games keeps 
everyone enthralled, just as multiple channels today, be the content real 
or imagined, past and present, keep everyone ‘entertained’. The plethora 
of images, in an image-dominated world, has led to the conclusion that 
images have a higher value than truth. Regardless of the desire, a return 
to the real is still yet to be achieved. Richard Wolin in The Seduction of 
Unreason condemns thinkers such as Nietzsche as being ‘glib’.39 He f inds it 
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offensive when Baudrillard writes that we have ‘dreamt’ of September 11, 
2001, forgetting that this terrorist attack was not a single event that came 
out of nowhere, situating events of this nature in a vacuum and denying any 
causality in any direction. As noted with reference to Badiou, the real horror 
is when all thinking is cut off and all we are left with is an incontestable 
Truth. This nostalgia for the days where everything was apparently solid 
and unquestionable deif ies the past and history, making it impossible to 
understand.
In The Hunger Games the mediated ‘games’ keep people away from 
protesting about their own conditions in the districts, which are of a far 
lower standard than those of the Capitol. The state centre keep informing 
the Districts they are lucky to be there at all, and this is the only way to 
keep the peace. In terms of science f iction, here we have the traditional 
dystopian and utopian paradigm, combining aspects of George Orwell’s 
1984 and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. Analogies to the contemporary 
situation regarding terrorism are overt. Globally, governments perpetually 
develop an enemy, instilling fear and complicity in the populace, allowing 
them to be subjugated and the dominating regime to remain in power. 
There is a complex relationship between the government and the press in 
enabling such a power relationship. In a popular trilogy of books adapted 
into four f ilms, the complexities might not be nuanced, and yet the message 
is strikingly familiar. Katniss herself is no revolutionary and does not believe 
in any new ideology propounded by the revolution, but seeing District 
8 destroyed compels her to makes propaganda movies that generate the 
popular message: ‘If we are going to burn, you are burning with us.’ Call this 
a nihilistic, or even a punk ethic; far from generating nihilism it generates 
activism. In this sense, it demonstrates the exact opposite of what Wolin 
f inds in the Nietzschean ethic, and is refreshingly life-aff irming.
Often it is diff icult to see that questioning all forms of the construction 
of reality is benign, but this is inevitable when questioning challenges 
power. Those locked into the establishment (those whom Wolin defends), 
will try and resist any change to the status quo, be this in critical theory 
or in reality. Importantly, protest movements generated by students, and 
by those who have had enough of austerity across Europe, occurred at 
the same time as this f ilm’s release. The rebel against the system is what 
makes these f ilms so popular to the teenage audience. In this sense, it 
does possess a certain level of veracity and, like all good science f iction, 
mirrors the contemporary. How far we take this analogy into real politics 
is a good question. Here the hunters of animals, like Katniss, become the 
hunted.
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Many may believe the Nazis were innately evil, while others conclude 
that their actions were evil, or even monstrous, or they were actual 
monsters. With Nazism and neo-Nazism, metaphors often get blurred in 
popular culture. Miss Peregrine’s Home for Peculiar Children (Tim Burton, 
2016), based on the novel by Ransom Riggs, refers to Nazis as monsters 
and here there are real monsters. Jake Portman (Asa Butterf ield) and his 
grandfather Abe Portman (Terence Stamp) have a peculiarity for seeing 
monsters, called Hollows. There is never anything explicitly mentioned, 
other than by Jake, but it is assumed that the children in Miss Peregrine’s 
home are not only talented but are what today would be termed ‘special 
needs’. They are stuck in a loop, 3 September 1943, when a Nazi bomb was 
dropped on their home in Wales, and they repeatedly relive the same day. 
We know that Jake’s grandfather had to leave Poland and enter this home 
because ‘he was special’. When Jake confronts his grandfather about the 
peculiar talents of the children he suggests the term ‘special needs’, only 
because his classmates have been mocking him for believing the stories, 
such as the existence of a boy who could make himself invisible.
For Geoffrey Macnab, the monsters look as if they have stepped out 
of a Francis Bacon painting.40 Bacon was influenced by the Nazis, so this 
comment is appropriate. In this f ilm, the Bacon Nazi aesthetic comes 
through in the form of the monsters that only the main protagonist can 
see. Unfortunately, critics like Macnab and Lenika Cruz, writing in The 
Atlantic, appear to have only watched the f ilm once, and then blame their 
lack of understanding on the plot not making sense, or the f ilm not even 
having one.41 Cruz wants the f ilm to continue its seriousness, with its early 
references to the Holocaust, while at the same time saying it does not have 
a heart. A f ilm largely set in 1943 must make references to the Holocaust in 
some way. The ethics of how we portray elements of the Holocaust can be 
questioned but to state that f ilm narratives should stick to being serious is 
didactic. As with Tarantino’s aesthetic, Burton here transgresses the limits 
of genre by producing an original children’s f ilm that tackles a diff icult 
subject. More signif icant is the manner in which Abe tells stories and what 
is left unsaid, suggesting that the larger gaps in history cannot be resolved 
easily. Abe is demonized as monstrous by his own family, and is thought to 
have dementia, apparently making up stories to tell the young Jake. When 
asked follow up questions, he does not want to talk about it, and this is 
assumed to relate to the traumas around the Holocaust, which he may have 
witnessed but escaped.
The Hollywood Reporter attacks the scriptwriter Jane Goldman (co-
writer of two X-Men and two Kingsman f ilms) for the third act, claiming 
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the comic villain Barron (Samuel L. Jackson) is moving us away from the 
Michael Powell-style romance, which would create a more poignant f ilm if 
sustained.42 This is suggesting that a f ilm should only remain in one genre, 
and ignores decades of recent cinema. Jackson is a well-known actor, often 
appearing in Tarantino f ilms, and Barron’s funny one-liners make direct 
reference to Tarantino movies. The skeleton action sequence on Blackpool 
pier is not the f irst reference in the f ilm to Don Chaffey’s 1963 f ilm Jason 
and the Argonauts. Enoch’s peculiar power is to bring things back to life, 
the f ilm offering a precursor to the third act, when Enoch shows Jake his 
skills, inserting hearts in scraps of animals and dolls and getting them to 
f ight for fun. The odd thing about these peculiar talents is that they appear 
so natural. There is a questioning of bifurcated thinking, allowing us to 
go beyond the narrow stereotypes. Despite all the references, the Nazis 
remain explicitly anonymous, as if they can never be caught, reversing 
Tarantino’s scenario. Fundamentally, the f ilm makes the observation that 
history cannot, and should not, be escaped.
X-Television
The overlapping debates concerning Nazism and neo-Nazism on screen 
were played out in 1997 when Roberto Benigni was awarded a best actor 
Oscar for Life Is Beautiful (Roberto Benigni, 1997), set in a concentration 
camp and in the same year Ed Norton was nominated for playing the re-
deemed neo-Nazi Derek Vinyard in American History X (Tony Kaye, 1997). 
Norton took control of the f ilm, and a battle commenced with Kaye f iling 
a $200 million lawsuit to have his name changed to Humpty Dumpty on 
the credits. Named in the global market after the Norton f ilm, Netflix’s 
television series NSU German History X (Christian Schwochow, Züli Aladag, 
Florian Micoud Cossen) examines the rise and fall of Nationalist Socialist 
Underground (NSU), an actual neo-Nazi terrorist organization in German. 
Historically, NSU was responsible for a series of crimes, including: killing 
eight Turkish German citizens and one Greek immigrant between 2000 and 
2006, known as the Bosphorus serial murders; murdering a policewoman 
and attempting to kill her colleague; the 2001 and 2004 Cologne Bombings; 
and fourteen bank robberies.
The f irst episode begins by claiming this is not based on actual events, 
despite the names of the characters being those in the real NSU. The three-
part series merges with documentary, using real footage.43 The movement 
was based in East Germany and was dedicated to creating a new fascist 
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state based on Nazi principles. Over the entire period they were operational 
there was a shift to the right across Europe, with an increase in the number 
of racist attacks. From this perspective, right-wing groups are protected by 
the centre and this is exactly what happened in Germany, and elsewhere. 
The white terrorist group killing German citizens were allowed to carry 
on their atrocities with the police blaming the very groups who were being 
murdered. Beate Zschäpe (played here by Anna Maria Mühe) was commit-
ted to trial on 31 January 2013 for ten counts of murder. She broke her two 
and a half years of silence in December 2015 and made a statement, saying 
she had known NSU members but had not been a member herself. She 
blamed Uwe Mundlos (played here by Albrecht Schuch) and Uwe Bőhnhardt 
(played here by Sebastian Urzendowsky), and issued an apology, claiming 
she could do nothing to stop them.
The character arc in NSU German History X reveals the central character 
Beate as a shy girl with a diff icult home life establishing an identity in this 
neo-Nazi group. Falling in love with a neo-Nazi, she needs to prove herself 
to the group and to him, doing so by robbing an immigrant, f iring a fake 
gun, and calling for real violence. Despite the orders coming from Berlin 
regarding clearing immigrants from their town, the show is clear that Beate 
planned a systematic form of violence that galvanizes the group. She is to 
blame, despite being the one at f irst easily led. Before she joins the gang 
and becomes its catalyst, the group is mainly a bunch of thugs, dancing 
to neo-Nazi music. In a subtle sense, the f irst episode indicates this is her 
survival mechanism. She is getting nowhere in her former life; joining this 
neo-Nazi group is the way she can save herself and stay alive.
All sides can use violence. When her neo-Nazi gang attacks a group 
of young people she protects her former friend Sandra (Nina Gummich), 
revealing this neo-Nazi identity is not her ontological core. Beate goes to the 
job centre, where Sandra is working unaware of Beate’s current behaviour, 
but still carrying a scar from the previous attack. Beate appears turned on 
and excited by violence, kissing Ribby passionately after he attacks a man 
with a glass. Her behaviour, however, appears inauthentic. Uwe joins the 
army and is asked to be an informant on right-wing actions, but he tells 
them this is treason. Similarly, someone from the government approaches 
Beate when she is reading a travel brochure about Romania, saying they 
are looking for informants on right-wingers. The plot reveals how close the 
authorities were to all of their activities, allowing these activities to continue 
for their own purposes. This can be framed as state-sponsored terrorism.
We are asked to question our own complicity. One of their most disturb-
ing activities is when Beate orders a woman with a baby to state repeatedly, 
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‘I will not traipse on the lawn’, causing the baby to wail. The simplistic 
enjoyment of power is portrayed expertly. While it is not made clear that the 
woman is an immigrant, or Jewish, Beate looks at the camera for the f irst 
time, breaking the fourth wall. This is a form of challenge to the audience: 
‘You think this is bad?’ It also suggests nothing will stop them, that nothing 
is sacred. And it is a way of questioning the audience’s enjoyment. Ethically, 
what should we be participating in, as an audience? With her look at the 
camera, there is recognition that in some senses we are also complicit in 
the violence.
Beate reveals her love for children via her friendship with Sandra, but also 
revels in a nursery being part of the Oklahoma bombing. Killing children 
is seen in this mindset as enjoyable and entertainment, not just part of 
their mission. NSU German History X directly shows how the neo-Nazis in 
Germany mimicked white separatists in the USA. Watching the news of the 
Oklahoma bombing on 19 April 1995, when 168 people were killed, including 
nineteen children, gives Beate the idea of carrying out an explosion. The 
text they follow is not Mein Kampf but an American text, The Turner Diaries. 
The frustration amongst the youth appears to be with the older generation, 
who will do nothing to stop their supposed oppression by the ‘other’. While 
Beate physically f ights her mother, Uwe screams at his father that he would 
‘turn up the gas chamber myself’. He sees it is disgusting that his mother 
works for low wages, and his professor father is also poor with, in his words, 
‘their salaries being dictated by Jews from Bonn’. When his father calmly 
tells him there are no Jews left he dismisses this.
Could this form of programme actually promote neo-Nazism with a 
young audience who may not have been aware of the movement at all? While 
Beate and her young friends are repugnant, the adult world appears to be 
totally anodyne, non-committed and conformist, revealing the gap which 
neo-Nazism can f ill, and almost suggesting there is no choice. The adult 
world is the world of the zombie, their brains having been removed by being 
slaves to the state. The neo-Nazi youth culture is in many ways resistance 
to the adult world, living in a post-war malaise. It is not so much the glories 
of a victorious Third Reich, looking backwards, that the neo-Nazis want to 
recreate, but a future. Beate has no job, with no real opportunity for getting 
one. These circumstances do not automatically lead people into becoming 
neo-Nazis, but it is the circumstances that are offered here as a part of the 
subtext of her trajectory towards fascism.
In a secret location, before they get the idea to plant a bomb, the gang 
listens to a neo-Nazi folk singer’s lyrics about causing explosions under 
parliament. Subcultures, group pressure and propaganda are all revealed 
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as relevant to instilling neo-Nazi ideology. Interviews for Leo Regan’s 
documentary British Neo-Nazis, with ex-neo-Nazis, reveal that the prom-
ises of neo-Nazi groups are where they manage to win their following. For 
one disillusioned man, he became a neo-Nazi because he believed their 
propaganda, thinking that a Fourth Reich was on its way to create a place 
where there would be no gay men, men in dresses, smashed bottles, or drug 
addiction. Published on YouTube on 22 October 2013, this had generated 
1,630 comments, including, ‘This is not National Socialism. These people 
are not National Socialists. They are themselves subhuman genetic trash.’ 
This gained sixteen likes. There is also resistance to this racism online 
with another comment: ‘The true skinhead is apolitical and anti-racist, my 
homeland is my neighbourhood.’
In the music scene in NSU German History X the folk singer at one point 
uses the word ‘magic’, stating that this is about transformation. Without 
the dress, the music, and the collective rituals there is no ‘magic’, just the 
boredom of their parents. This is not a movement that is attempting to 
change people’s minds and behaviour. They move towards violence via 
imitation and are neo-Nazis in this sense by aff iliation, not by action. 
Indeed, as they become extreme, moving underground, they paradoxically 
become more part of the mainstream, their existence enabling mainstream 
society to function. The third part of the series focuses on this theme, with 
the police destroying evidence, and being part of the neo-Nazi group, with 
ties to Blood and Honour, a group banned in Germany since 2000.
While the politics is a game, the violence does have consequences. When 
playing a neo-Nazi board game, Beate once again looks at the camera provoca-
tively, as if the viewer is her mother, who might correct her. This glancing is 
not sneering, and works as an invitation to share in her excitement, to become 
part of the action. Behind this is the notion that despite this being overtly 
about neo-Nazi belief, covertly this is about anarchism, and the rejection 
of the status quo. The skinhead culture that arose after punk in 1976 was 
formed in a period when there were few opportunities for young people. The 
neo-Nazis tapped their need for order and a created a framework to galvanize 
the energy of the young. The physical training adds a military side to the gang, 
Uwe the leader despising those skinheads who get drunk and waste their 
lives. Beate documents the events through photographs, indicating that this 
is her telling her story and mapping their lives. Uwe has become educated in 
the army and at college, translating the f irst ten pages of an American text, 
The Turner Diaries, into German, believing this is their future.
Their f irst choice for planting the bomb is Buchenwald. For the NSU, 
Buchenwald is worshipped as a sacred site for the wrong reasons, and it 
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should be destroyed. The f irst episode ends with the gang’s car being blown 
up. Their violence can be construed as revenge, or at least reveals their 
own incompetence, asking us to question whether this is one of their own 
explosives going off. They have planned planting a bomb but at this stage 
they have not reverted to violence. On-screen text explains the true events 
behind the series: there is a f irst victim and then nine more, and states 
that a number of the scenes with Beate are f ictional because no one really 
knows what happened. With legal procedures running, the f ilm-makers 
are not prepared to overtly connect Beate with some activities concerning 
the neo-Nazi violent activities, as she denies her culpability, especially 
concerning the garage and bomb making.
Twice she is the instigator of extreme violence constructed in a gender-
specif ic way. The young men need to prove their virility in front of Beate, 
by taking on these violent tasks.
While the f irst episode focuses on the gang within a gang, the second 
focuses on what we assume are their victims, the Turkish community, and 
the wider complicity of Germany. The f irst episode has long sequences 
where often nothing more occurs than young people drinking. Aesthetically 
and narratologically, the second episode is superior, moving backwards and 
forwards in time and space, making better use of prolepses and analepses. 
The murdered man’s origin is visually signif icant and the cinematography 
more expansive. The action moves back to the present, his shifting con-
sciousness on his deathbed compounding our awareness of his life, and 
that of his daughter. The neo-Nazi forum www.stormfront.org, which has 
the stated aim of promoting white pride worldwide, has in its comments 
section on the programme that this is all propaganda anyway, although the 
‘f irst part is worth watching’.
Neo-Nazis enjoy seeing themselves on screen, in any form, so it seems, 
even if their actions are random and moronic, but are unable to see the 
value in the second episode where the Muslim point of view is depicted. The 
second episode makes it clear that neo-Nazi beliefs are not at the fringes of 
society, nor are they in any way extreme in this context, but they are at the 
heart of the German system. This raises the question, if we position this 
belief as belonging to the outsider, do we then remove any ability to confront 
them. This show explicitly states this is the case, given the complicity of the 
police, as revealed in the third episode, where members of NSU are protected 
as informants. But if these beliefs are at the very heart of society, intrinsic to 
society’s functioning, is there any possibility of resisting or subverting them?
‘Anything is possible in that environment,’ states the police chief. It is 
immediately assumed that the killer must be a fellow Muslim, as the police 
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believe they are savages. The second episode immediately reveals the racism 
of the police, and their complicity with neo-Nazi behaviour, but the third 
episode is focused on the police behaviour. The Turkish family is aware 
of the blatant racism in Germany, and the endemic Nazi beliefs, but the 
police will not tolerate any suggestion of this. One investigator at the home 
of the dead man states, ‘there will be no mention of swastikas or Nazis’, 
despite the dead man’s cousin having his restaurant in Berlin burnt down 
by neo-Nazis. The level of denial is severe. At no time do the police consider 
this murder was caused by someone outside the Muslim community. The 
violence, according to the police, is caused by this racial group themselves, 
with even the murdered man’s wife becoming a suspect.
Obvious parallels exist. As with the neo-Nazis in the f irst episode, who 
scream at their parents for just sitting back and accepting the oppression 
of the system, the daughter wants her mother to f ight back. The mother’s 
compliance stems from her having been saving money without paying 
taxes. Once this is discovered, this is additional evidence to the police of 
her husband’s murder being carried out by someone who knew him. One of 
the investigators states this was more like an execution than a killing, but 
there is no hard evidence that this is killing driven by neo-Nazi hate. Retro-
spectively, treatment of the family can be conceived as being racist, and is 
constructed as asinine, but they are attempting to f ind the killer following 
traditional detective work. They have a family vehicle wire-tapped, only to 
learn comically that the wife of the victim is concerned the police have not 
eaten enough. Muslims are depicted as the new Jews, the contemporary 
German state in part neo-Nazi. We have a neo-Nazi attack followed by 
neo-Nazi-style investigators interrogating the new victims, the neo-Jews. 
This comparison is more complex than initially appears. The wife of the 
murdered man openly prays in the police station, not hiding her religion as 
a persecuted Jew might do. The neo-Nazis are anti-law and order, and not 
on the side of the police. Indeed, they soon kill and maim police off icers. 
Their philosophy is to overturn the state, which they believe has catered 
too much for immigrants, the praying in the police station right by a desk, 
whether realistic or not, being indicative of this.
Conclusions
Racism as a general term was originally spawned out of Hitler’s construction 
of the Jews, as a ‘race’ to face genocide. There have been periods when the 
Irish and Italians were considered ‘black’, and a lower race, but through 
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time they became ‘one of us’. Through an exploration of works for f ilm and 
television the tensions between how Islam is perceived within Nazi and 
neo-Nazi discourse has been elaborated on. Writing in The Jewish Chronicle, 
Julie Burchill vehemently denounced the view that Muslims are the new Jews. 
Burchill claimed these comparisons were wrong because Muslim immigrants 
are mainly men, unlike those of the Kindertransport, and that immigration 
caused sex attacks in Cologne. She writes that Chinese and Indian people, 
along with Jewish, are innately industrious, yoked to the capitalist work ethic, 
and, unlike Muslims, do not have self-pity. In terms borrowed from Max 
Weber, all Jews, Sikhs, and other Asians, are secret Protestants, incorporated 
within the European model and obsessed with work.44
The white bourgeoisie ideal in this position glorif ies work within the 
European paradigm as the def ining ontology, dividing humans into cat-
egories. Those outside this paradigm are seen as sub-humans, a view that 
reinforces the collective identity of the apparent human culture. Following 
this logic, they acculturate better into Wwestern societies and there are 
no real problems, while Muslims are the antithesis; they do not want to 
work and are parasites on the system funded by the taxes of other, diligent 
other people. There is an assertion of a wider belief that the European is 
the sovereign subject of the world.45 Underlying this rhetoric is a fear of the 
threat to this suzerainty, and an explanation for the increase in neo-Nazi 
behaviour and belief, and attention by the media. Fundamentally, the First 
World is no longer, ‘positioned in the f irst person with regard to the Second 
or Third Worlds’.46 Journalists and media commentators have the First 
World rule without question, incapable of observing how the challenges 
of the world may relate.
Burchill is right to point out a relationship between the perceptions of 
immigration and increases in anti-Semitic attacks, but she is wrong to blame 
this on Muslim immigration. Everything comes down to problems with 
Muslims and their ontology. Quoting a 2013 study by the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, that found 64 per cent of German Jews 
avoid the public display of symbols that would identify them as Jewish, and 
only 28 per cent both report anti-Semitic incidents, Burchill blames this on 
Muslims, but she does so by offering no real evidence. Apparently, it is the 
way in which Muslims have moved into different countries, and do not work 
in them, that has made populations turn against anyone perceived as other, 
including Jews. Anti-Semitic attacks are blamed not on those carrying them 
out but on the Muslims. In a perverse logic, Muslims are the new neo-Nazis, 
with Muslim culture taking the West backwards; they are to be blamed for 
anti-Semitism, and they are the worst offenders.
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There was a point in the late 1970s where people began to question this 
polarized rhetoric. The end of hardened truths worked against academics 
and popular writers, who made a name out of being polemical, those who 
claimed they knew the truth better than anyone else. How could you state 
one truth was better than another anymore, if since the late 1970s all truths 
were being challenged? But, in this (post)post-structuralist world, as typi-
f ied by Burchill, it is as if an attempt to move from binary oppositions had 
not taken place. We are not simply back in the 1950s, where everything 
different is a threat to be condemned as evil from an ontological perspective. 
We are in a time where those who are demarked as assimilated and thought 
to be ‘good others’ are raised up as the antithesis of the evil that lurks 
waiting to steal jobs and women, threatening any semblance of peace. In this 
blinkered logic, one group is innately evil – and this racism is overlooked.
A Protestant work ethic is asserted, uniting certain groups with nation-
hood, while excluding others. Nations then construct the notion of greatness 
in the imagination, utilizing the media where they can. The British leader 
Theresa May’s meeting with Scottish leader Nicola Sturgeon in March 2017 
was one such construction. Even before the meeting, the media reported 
that May was asking Sturgeon to conceive of the United Kingdom as be-
ing ‘great’ again, without Europe but with England and Scotland staying 
together. Playing the game of greatness and nationalism is supposed to 
gain votes against Scottish independence. Behind all of this is an analogy 
of war and invasion, stressed to make sense of events, even when terrorists 
are home grown, such as the London attacker in March 2017.
The denunciation of a race of people as innately malign comes with a 
rewriting of history. More dangerously, there is the blurring of race and 
religion, so any cultural differences are completely blotted out. There is 
no scope for any thought that Muslim culture has brought anything of 
signif icance to the world, or will. This rhetoric has been highlighted here 
because it is common and unextreme, within general media discourse. This 
is the worst kind of biological racism and functions to enable one group 
of people to assert their superiority over another. Within this paradigm, 
which frequently predominates, immigrants are always Muslims, stealing 
‘our’ jobs and all Muslims are sex offenders, attacking ‘our’ women. This 
conjuring of hatred and fear leads catastrophically to the dismantling of the 
enlightened values and freedoms that Jewish culture within this rhetoric 
instigates.
Regardless of the conflict between Jews in Israel and their Muslim neigh-
bours in Palestine and the Gaza Strip, this rhetoric is promoted by groups 
who use it to reassert their connection with nationhood. This occurred 
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during the referendum on the UK to leave the European Union in 2016, 
when many people from ethnic backgrounds voted for the UK to leave 
the EU, def iantly stating their allegiance to the island state and condemn-
ing migrants. For Burchill, politicians trying to win votes are supporting 
immigrants, and are going along with this apparent evil. Given the spate 
of Islamic attacks and the conditions of women in some Muslim cultures 
this is understandable, but it has been shown how popular culture, such 
as NSU German History X, allows for nuance. Who the victims are and who 
the perpetrators are at times is blurred, which is a far deeper approach. We 
shall return to how these media transformations are constructing discourse 
in Chapter 4.
3. Nazism, Neo-Nazism, and Comedy
In the run up to the American presidential election in 2016 a whole raft of 
comedians mocked Donald Trump, but this did not damage his power base. 
Any transgression via satire and comedy could be used to reassert the status 
quo. Trump was no long considered a joke when he started to implement his 
policies. This chapter considers comedy, Nazism and neo-Nazism in f ilm 
and media, with reference to theorists on transgression, such as Chris Jenks 
and Julia Kristeva, and novels and televisions shows that gained media at-
tention. Taste is key to any discussion of comedy. Surf Nazis Must Die (Peter 
George, 1987) is a prime example where all forms of taste are contested, 
both in terms of content and aesthetics. With laughable production values, 
ludicrous dialogue, and an insane plot, the f ilm is wrong on many levels 
but still works. Set in a post-apocalyptic world, this is a comedy revenge 
story of black empowerment. Leroy’s mama (Gail Neely) goes after the gang 
of neo-Nazis who have murdered her son. The f ilm succeeds in indicating 
how absurd Nazi-related belief systems are, with the neo-Nazis doing Hitler 
salutes on surf boards.
Another excellent example is Look Who’s Back, a comedy f ilm directed 
by David Wnendt in 2015, based on the bestselling satirical novel of the 
same name by Timur Vermes. This could be criticized for being purely 
about controversy and entertainment. This implies there is something 
wrong with both of these categories, suggesting there always needs to be 
an educational value. Often the educational value of any work of art is in 
the interpretation. Vermes obviously felt a need to spell out that his novel 
was a work of f iction, given at the beginning he states that certain people 
have not met Hitler (played by Oliver Masucci in the f ilm). This is part of 
the joke that feeds into the idea that there are actually various versions of 
Hitler. The underlying more serious point is that we all have Hitler within 
us, as does every nation. We just may not know it yet.
In Look Who’s Back Hitler returns from the dead. In some sense we have 
all met Hitler, or we believe we have. This encounter with the various forms 
of Hitler or the Nazis takes different forms, whether it is: the comedy Hitler 
of American Mel Brooks; the British entertainer Freddy Starr; the party-
ing Nazi of Britain’s Prince Harry; the cool Hitler of David Bowie; or the 
depressed and lost Hitler of Bruno Ganz in Downfall (Oliver Hirschbiegel, 
2004). Or even as a young man in Liverpool, as in Beryl Bainbridge’s 1978 
novel Young Adolf. We can all suggest ways on how to ‘improve’ Hitler, 
explicitly for comedy impact, if nothing else. Another paradox is that if we 
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were to portray a Hitler, or to reenact an exact Hitler, returning from the 
dead as a saint, we would have to contend with the controversies around 
sainthood. For example, Mother Teresa and Pope John Paul II have both 
been accused of fascist activities, as has Pope Francis. Once again, we do 
need to be careful how we use the terms ‘fascist’ and ‘neo-Nazi’.
From a novelist’s perspective, the prose of Look Who’s Back in the early 
stages could easily be attacked in terms of its style. For example, Hitler nar-
rates, ‘seeing as I did not drink’, which is an obvious well-known fact, and ‘I 
turned my head’, the latter phrase being unnecessary.1 But the narrator here 
is Hitler himself. Being critical of Hitler for being bad at prose, or criticizing 
Vermes for not being particularly prosaic, or praising Vermes for making 
this deliberately bad to simulate Hitler’s incompetence or awkwardness, 
would be inaccurate. This is, therefore, an excellent novelistic device to 
indicate Hitler’s and our discombobulation. This may also be a problem 
with translation, from German into English. Plus, with the dictator suddenly 
appearing in the twenty-f irst century, after being dead for over 60 years, 
his language and point-of-view narration and sense of being is bound to 
appear strange.
Hitler sets this us up in his introduction with the point that this might be 
comic, as it was in the trenches, but there are paradoxes given the tragedy 
underlying Hitler’s original impact. What is highlighted is that people will 
do anything to get ratings for a television show and are not in the slightest 
bit interested in truth. This in itself is not funny, original, or news, but what 
is interestingly controversial is how the overt racism becomes a spine within 
the novel. It is up to the reader to judge whether the author challenges this 
racism. Could the author be accused of attempting to gain cheap racist 
laughs, for example? This is debatable and might conceivably be judged to 
be verisimilitude, with racism still ubiquitous and increasing, especially 
concerning immigration and Islam. The Turks come under attack in this 
sense, especially in the laundry scene in both book and f ilm. The Turks 
recognize him and ‘cleanse’ him, getting him ready for his performance 
on television. This implies that the leader of any state is always dependent 
on the underclass, even if it is a despised class that must be destroyed. 
Hitler’s main motivation was not simply to destroy all Jews, but to bring 
down civilization. This could be described as a class war but even that is not 
going far enough. At every stage, given this is Hitler narrating, the author 
can hide behind the narrator.
If all we can perceive are mediated images then the conclusion must be 
that we do not own our consciousness – the media does. This moves us away 
from Bergson’s view on the images constructed by our memory, and his 
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arguments against realism and idealism, to a fusion with Jean Baudrillard’s 
and Guy Debord’s take on the world.2 Of course, the resurrected Hitler 
must learn about the world through whatever channels he can, including 
the television and the Internet. What he discovers is that most channels 
are not being used for ‘propaganda’, in his opinion, but for cooking shows. 
Hitler is correct in his judgement that these are gruesome and in many ways 
offensive. This is humorous, but it unwittingly ignores the wider point that 
these television shows are a form of propaganda by the state far subtler 
than anything Hitler imagined, hence capitalism has had a longer reign. 
The propaganda of capitalism has worked so well that most people, of the 
left and the right, f ind it inconceivable that any other system should exist.
Hitler believes television is the medium of the age, but this is where 
the novel in terms of the media and neo-Nazism appears already out of 
date, given everything is on YouTube. When Hitler starts shouting at the 
television, because he thinks it knows what he is doing, this is for pure 
comic impact, drawing on the clichés of the loud, bad and mad Führer. No 
acknowledgement is made of the technology that does already exist, such 
as Netflix, which actually follows exactly what you watch, and suggests 
shows to you, starting you at the point in the programme from where you 
left off, and so on. Hitler’s assessment of the point we have reached is still 
enlightening. Why do these shows always have to repeat what they have 
told us, at length, as if we are morons, with the memory of a goldf ish?
He has further comic insight into the Internet, especially Wikipedia, 
whose content, he quickly observes, can be made up as you go along – which 
has its advantages. We do not need a fascist dictator returned from the 
dead to tell us this, but for someone new to the Internet like this Hitler, this 
is interesting in terms of its potential for propaganda. In a fascist regime 
facts no longer matter, as people have continually pointed out with Donald 
Trump. When Hitler wastes three hours playing the game Minesweeper 
we all can empathize, as most people are aware of the addiction of games 
or new technologies. In this sense, it is maintained that it does not take 
long for someone from the past to adjust to the present, however deluded 
or mad they are. This is an interesting observation, implying Hitler returns 
from the dead with a childlike openness to the new, rather than a closed-off 
mind.
Hitler believes this ‘programme’ they are all talking about is his mission 
and programme for the German ‘race’, not just a television programme. 
Despite an ongoing emphasis on the rapid change in technology, Hitler 
existed less than 70 years before the action in this f iction. The war neces-
sitated advancements in technology, such as the innovations of Alan Turing, 
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which pioneered the modern computer. It is hard to conclude from this that 
Vermes is in any way promoting the notion that it was through the Nazis that 
technological developments were enhanced, although Hitler’s knowledge of 
the actual war becomes a rather didactic history lesson for those ignorant 
of the facts. The argument here is that f iction can educate and warn people 
in a more interesting fashion than dry history books, offering the potential 
to counteract neo-Nazism.
The actual format of the narrative is not new. In the 1970-1971 UK tel-
evision series Catweazle, an eleventh-century wizard accidentally travels 
through time to 1969. The technology is much harder to grasp, and believed 
to be magic, dealt with by the time traveller through incorporating modern 
language into his own mental framework, with words such as ‘elec-trickery’ 
and the ‘telling bone’. Magic is paradoxically an essential element to Hitler’s 
propaganda. He understands that these advancements in technology are 
due to the hard work of the German people and their amazing industry. 
They might metaphorically be miracles for Hitler, but they are also another 
example of the supernatural superiority of the German race.
The comedy is contemporary and comments on political positions and 
psychological states. Hitler’s view on Angela Merkel as a mother f igure, or at 
least his reading of the media’s view being this, is one that many Germans 
when the book was f irst published and f ilm released might acknowledge. 
Hitler here is the voice of the people. In reality, rather than being a steady 
presence, however, there is criticism and concern from German academics 
over her f ickleness, as evidenced by her policies on nuclear power and 
immigration.3 This weakness could actually be a strength, given her abil-
ity to be flexible and make fast decisions. Hitler himself, in this novel at 
least, claims this is the primary duty of the Führer. You do not need the 
support of the Volk. All you need is the ability to make decisions. This logic 
has f iltered into many industries, and is promoted as a sign of strength 
in a leader, despite the possibility of it leading to long-term, disastrous 
consequences. There are number of politicians of the contemporary period, 
such as George Osborne, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer from 2010 to 
2016, who stuck to their decisions, no matter what, for the sake of ideology. 
From this perspective, we can view Merkel’s position as being much more 
rational. Hitler in Look Who’s Back is condemned for being mad, because 
people think he believes he is Hitler, but he actually is Hitler. Whether Hitler 
was mad or not is another question. In this f iction he is psychotic in his 
continued hatred for the Jews and anyone non-Aryan and in his obsessive 
mission. Whether a pathological hatred of the other is madness is arguable, 
as def initions of madness are cultural.
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The sensitivities over Nazism and Hitler are played out in the novel, when 
even the wearing of a uniform is in question, as if it is remarkable that you 
can get away with wearing a ‘real’ Nazi uniform.4 Hitler re-appears in the 
place he always was, suggesting he has never gone away. Whether Germany 
has taken decisions to bury its past, ignore its past, resist or change its 
past, or accept its past, all roads lead back to Hitler. Germany now leads 
Europe, so where would they have been without him?5 Given all the post-war 
support Germany received, one can make a perverse argument that Hitler’s 
self-destruction led to their predominance within Europe, especially its 
economic leadership. In terms of the multiplicity of Hitler, he is in everyone.
Hitler in this f iction feels successful, given the number of Jews in Ger-
many is now so low. Israel is positioned in the middle of the Arabs, which 
according to Hitler is great as it keeps them occupied. Having Hitler point 
out the absurdities of history and geo-politics is obviously contentious and 
dangerous, but it does emphasize the absurdity of many global situations. 
In this sense, while many who meet Hitler think he is a mad man, akin to 
those who think they are Napoleon or Cleopatra, his take on the current 
situation in Germany is enlightening. Who exactly is the mad one in this 
context? Rather than Hitler being mad, is it more accurate to pinpoint 
the insanity as being a group psychosis of the politicians and even wider 
madness of the general population of Europe who accept what they are told?
The English comedian Sacha Baron Cohen has frequently been criticized 
for mocking various nationalities, or even regions, such as the north of 
England. In the television show in Look Who’s Back Hitler gets a part on stage 
following on from a man who mocks certain ethnicities and nationalities 
for cheap laughs. Full of irony, Hitler lambasts the man for using all sorts 
of clichés about foreigners, claiming these are serious issues which should 
not be debased for comic reasons. Translating humour is diff icult. Baron 
Cohen’s various incarnations, from the UK television show character Ali 
G, to Borat Sagdiyev in the Oscar-nominated feature f ilm Borat: Cultural 
Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (Larry 
Charles, 2006), to gay Austrian journalist Brüno Gehard, to Admiral General 
Aladeen, and Nobby Butcher, do not necessarily mock the region they are 
from, but those who encounter them, who are unaware he is in disguise.
The double-BAFTA-winning Da Ali G Show (2000 to 2004) is a pre-eminent 
example of this, which might be lost in translation. Ali G, using the mask 
of an Asian wide boy from Staines, actually mocks everyone around him, 
including politicians, who do not understand his real identity. Those in 
authority and part of the establishment are duped into believing they are be-
coming more authentic conversing with a person they assume is authentic, 
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and the voice of the youth culture, when he is actually inauthentic. Part of 
the joke is that they take him seriously, even his most outrageous views. 
The controversial side to Ali G is that he can make homophobic comments 
that are framed as jokes, but people who are homophobic may actually see 
these remarks as supporting their homophobia.
Vermes’ Hitler is in some sense the opposite. He is the real Hitler, mis-
taken for a fake, but he is so good at his performance that he really does 
unsettle people. For the programme makers in this f ictional world he has 
re-invented comedy that is cutting edge and is not just about mocking other 
people. The amazing thing about this creation is that people might believe 
in him, not merely in his veracity through his authentic performances, but 
in his actual mission. And this is the nexus of the novel. He gains followers 
from different sectors in the community. History appears to have been 
forgotten or German guilt overcome, so that the so-called real German belief 
can come through. Placed in the context of Donald Trump’s later victory, 
this should have been considered to be a prophetic warning. What this new 
Hitler does is offer authenticity, just as Trump claimed to do.
From 2009, during the period the book was written, there was a rise in 
neo-Nazism in Germany and across Europe. Because of the legacy of Nazism, 
the notion of closing borders and turning back refugees is far more conten-
tious for Germany than most other countries. In 2017 Trump demonized the 
whole of Europe as being the zone of terrorism, where all acts of violence 
occurred. He falsely claimed European media did not report terrorist at-
tacks, using this falsity to support his ban on people travelling to America 
from seven Muslim countries and refugees from Syria. Of course, the high 
number of people killed in America by white separatists is signif icant, but 
Trump’s aim was to promote a climate of fear to justify building up the 
American military. In Germany immigration was also a central issue, but 
immigrants are not totally banned.
These sensitivities have an impact on the way the media operates. 
On 9 April 2016 Netflix began streaming the television adaptation of the 
novel Look Who’s Back, but not in Germany or World War II territories or 
Germany’s allies, including Austria, Japan, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Taiwan. An Italian version 
featuring Mussolini was developed. This had a wider implication in Italy, 
where Silvio Berlusconi has held a wide variety of senior political positions, 
including Prime Minister, for a total of nine years and been a member of the 
lower house for nineteen years. Unlike Merkel, his influence in Europe has 
not been felt to be benign and he is surrounded in controversy. Berlusconi 
is the nexus where politics and media unite, given he has the controlling 
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shareholder of Mediaset, and was ranked by Forbes in 2009 as the twelfth 
most powerful man in the world.
All of this is far more transgressive in Germany. In other countries 
there has been a satirical genre mocking the Nazis and Hitler. In America, 
there was Mel Brooks’ The Producers (1967). In the UK, there have been 
a variety of comedy programmes, such as Monty Python’s Flying Circus, 
where in one sketch, broadcast 4 January 1970, Mr. Hilter (sic) is staying in 
a bed and breakfast in England. Here it is the insanity of the English that 
is emphasized, with one couple arriving and the husband proceeding to 
describe their journey in excruciating detail. This is an accurate portrayal 
of how English people behave. The joke gets more intense when they are 
introduced to the other guests, including Mr. Hilter’s table. The Germans are 
studying a map to fathom the logistics behind an invasion. The English man 
then proceeds to berate them for not travelling in the direction he suggests 
across England. This English male habit of always needing to be right, and 
always controlling the route, is what is fascist here and comic. Hilter is 
dressed in a Nazi uniform, as are his comrades, but there are no swastikas, 
and they are just trying to get on with their business. The whole absurdity 
of a bed and breakfast, where people are forced to be public whilst paying 
money for a private holiday, is also highlighted. As with Look Who’s Back, 
the fascism and the insanity is obviously not that of Hitler or Mr Hilter but 
the contemporary society. In this instance, it is John Cleese who is playing 
Mr. Hilter/Hitler, to good effect.
The now classic Fawlty Towers episode ‘Don’t Mention the War!’ (season 
1, episode 6, aired on 24 October 1975) is another relevant sketch. Cleese 
already had a reputation for his comic long legs, and his Ministry of Silly 
Walks character (from Monty Python’s Flying Circus) often used ridiculous 
Nazi goose-steps. As hotel manager Basil Fawlty he confronts a German 
family in his restaurant, all the while insisting to employee Polly (Connie 
Booth), ‘Don’t mention the war’. The more you ignore something the more 
it resurfaces, as a famous Austrian and contemporary of Hitler, Sigmund 
Freud, discovered. In a dazed and confused condition (having hit his head), 
Basil Fawlty takes the food order of the guests and reads it back to them, 
using the names of the Nazi hierarchy in the place of the dishes. One of 
the female guests bursts into tears while Fawlty launches into a full-blown 
Hitler imitation, with his f inger under his nose and the crazy walk. The 
misunderstanding over ‘who started it’ – either the war or the argument 
in the dining room – turns into a ‘we won the war’ statement after Fawlty 
is stopped from telling a joke about a bomber headed for Berlin. Fawlty 
excuses his behaviour by claiming that he is just trying to cheer the crying 
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woman up. This is confirmation to him that the Germans have no sense 
of humour. In 1978 the show was sold to 45 stations in seventeen countries 
and was the BBC’s best-selling overseas program for that year.
Many other comedians have utilized Hitler in a variety of comedy 
sketches. For example, there is the Armstrong and Miller Show sketch (in 
season 3, episode 5) about Hitler, where classif ied information concerning 
the Nazis is phoned through from Germany to London. A man who has been 
constructing bawdy songs in a bar to boost troop morale is then handed the 
‘facts’: ‘Hitler has only got one ball, Goering has two, but small; Himmler, 
has something similar, but poor old Goebbels has no ball at all.’ His previous 
songs, such as, ‘Goering’s piss is f illed with diseases, that’s why he has to 
piss with tweezers,’ have been conjecture, but now they have the ‘facts’. 
With this it is apparently game over for the Germans. ‘Gentleman, I think 
we have won ourselves a war’. The Nazis then sing, ‘Churchill has a large 
cock’, but then question whether this is meant as a compliment or not, at 
f irst thinking this is an insult.
Just as Shakespeare used a disability based on an alleged fact to construct 
Richard III’s character, disability is equated with not just moral weak-
ness but evil. The obsession with Hitler’s balls has not dissipated. Hitler’s 
medical records appeared for auction in Bavaria in 2010, but were swiftly 
confiscated by the Bavarian government. It took until 2015 before Professor 
Peter Fleischmann of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg became the 
f irst person to analyse them. What he discovered was that Hitler suffered 
from right-side cryptorchidism, that is, an undescended right testicle.6 The 
medical report dated to 1923, following Hitler’s failed Beer Hall Putsch. 
This seemed to contradict the report and evidence given in 1943 by Hitler’s 
childhood doctor, when he was interrogated by the Americans and informed 
them that Hitler’s genitals were normal. The obsession with Hitler’s balls is 
overtly comic in itself, and underlying it is the notion that a ‘monster’, like 
Richard III, should have some form of disability.
Comedy can function specif ically as a form of nostalgia, asserting that 
the past was always better than the present, a key theme of many right-
wing movements, such as UKIP. The British television sitcom ʼAllo ʼAllo! 
(1982-1992) epitomizes the use of nostalgia. Staring Gorden Kaye and set 
in a café in German-occupied France, it primarily uses farce, fake accents 
and sexual innuendo for its comedy. There is an overarching narrative to 
the whole programme concerning stolen art (The Fallen Madonna with 
the Big Boobies), but the following tagline neatly sums up the whole series. 
‘Meet René, the most wanted man in Occupied France. Women want his 
body. The Resistance want his brain. And the Nazis want his sausage.’ Sex 
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dominates everything. In season 1, episode 8, when René’s wife catches him 
with another woman, he explains that he is teaching her martial arts to stop 
her being ravished by the Germans. The Nazis are made to look ludicrously 
old fashioned and pedantic.
By 2009, Downfall (2004), referred to in Look Who’s Back, had become one 
of the top 25 f ilms parodied on YouTube. These parodies included Hitler 
ranting because a pizza was late, because Oasis had split up, and due to a 
parking problem in Tel Aviv. There is always a question over the purpose of 
comedy in this context. For Daniel Gross the problem with most contempo-
rary Nazi comedies is that they are humorous, but nothing more.7 Charlie 
Chaplin made The Great Dictator in 1940, but writing in his autobiography 
in 1964 he claimed if he had known of the concentration camps he could 
not have made the f ilm. There are deep questions concerning using this 
topic for comedy but these various forms of Hitler mock both Hitler and 
his ideology, functioning as satire and often serving a political purpose. 
Rather than hit out at the YouTube parodies, the producers of Downfall 
went on to make the f ilm version of Look Who’s Back where Hitler indeed 
becomes a YouTube star. The climax is when it is realized that Hitler is not 
a ‘real’ comedian but the ‘real’ Hitler. When a TV producer wants to murder 
him, Hitler comments that it is impossible to get rid of him, as he is part of 
everyone. This is not mere sophistry or postmodernism but fact. Hitler is 
not merely a character stemming from the imagination.
Germany defines itself in opposition to Hitler, given every time ‘Hitler 
dies on a movie screen, every time he’s reduced to a pathetic and bumbling 
fool, society reasserts its loathing for Nazism’.8 It is the parodies on YouTube 
of Downfall that have been seen by millions of viewers, not the f ilm. For 
Gross, when these comedies work they enable audiences to understand the 
past and reinterpret the present, which helps them see injustice, but on the 
other hand they can just ‘allow’ viewers to look away. This tends to come 
back to the purpose of art, briefly discussed in the opening of this chapter. 
Nazis are sometimes innately humorous, especially Hitler with his weird 
moustache, tightly wound persona, and rages, an element John Cleese in 
particular has played with. It does seem wrong that we should laugh at all 
in the context of 6 million Jews being killed by the Nazis, but is this laughter 
enabling us to look away?
Freud maintained that laughter was fear appeased; we laugh when 
someone slips on a banana skin, but it is out of relief that they have not 
cracked their skull open. The very act of laughter in these circumstances 
can be a form of transgression, which inevitability reinforces boundaries. In 
this context, mocking Hitler may actually reassert the status quo, and is not 
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transgressive or subversively political at all. Transgression then is not the 
same as total disorder. A border may be crossed, but ultimately it reasserts 
order, and it is concerned with the limits. Within this mythology, Hitler is 
a f igure who can be mocked in all sorts of ways, to reassert the social order. 
What is actually being mocked is not Hitler or Nazism or the Jews. What is 
being mocked is the notion of the absolute ‘other’, that which is also in the 
German people, and is actually the same as the German people.
To admit this is diff icult, however. As Julia Kristeva has explained, it has 
taken one of the history’s most famous Jewish inventions, psychoanalysis, to 
help us detect the foreignness in ourselves.9 Furthermore, as with concepts 
of pure evil, to split this off, to place this elsewhere, is to place this nowhere, 
but lends it omniscient power. Kristeva coined ‘the abject’ by an analogy 
with ‘subject’ (sujet) and ‘object’ (objet), from the same Latin root ( jectum, 
from iacere, meaning ‘to throw’). The abject is that which is ‘thrown away’, 
or ‘cast aside’ from conscious perception, neither a perceiving subject nor a 
perceived object, and it is a third state: the shadow of images of the sublime.
When discussing Nazism and the media it is appropriate to explain what 
evil may consist of. Despite utilizing the interior monologue of the novel as 
a voice-over, the f ilm version of Look Who’s Back has as its primary focus 
the character Sawatzki (Fabian Busch). This character, whose name is close 
to swastika, is the f irst person connected to the media to discover Hitler 
(Oliver Masucci). Sacked from his television job as a freelance documentary 
maker, at home with his mother, he is going through footage connected 
to a documentary he is making about soccer in an apparently rundown 
area of Berlin. During this review of his footage he spots Hitler talking to 
the children playing football, and so the real story begins. These might be 
diff icult times in Germany, with many people unemployed, including those 
connected with the media. It is through Hitler that Sawatzki, at least, gets 
his job back. He is like the ‘little man’, who appears in many comedies, from 
those of Harold Lloyd to Charlie Chaplin, to Woody Allen and Simon Pegg. 
The thesis is if such as loser can succeed then anyone can, plus it is funny 
seeing him fail, and sometimes overcome the odds.
In the f ilm, Hitler and Sawatzki tour the country to meet the people, with 
Hitler doing a number of outrageous stunts, such as shooting a pet dog who 
will not leave him alone and kicking the lights in of Sawatzki’s mother’s 
car. Back on the road Hitler has the dead dog with him, using it as a type of 
ventriloquist doll to macabre comic effect. They also come across football 
fans who appear to love him, many wanting ‘self ies’ taken with him. On the 
tour as a whole many people speak to Hitler and say that Germany has ‘gone 
to the dogs’, and that they need someone like him, a strong leader. Hitler 
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then is controlling the people as he controls the mouth of the dead dog. The 
f ilm has Hitler as more of a Borat f igure, given it is in some ways harder to 
show his inner life, and he does speak with more people, ascertaining their 
views while campaigning.
The novel reveals more of the inner life of Hitler, and shows he does 
have a human side. Around Christmas time he states he does regret not 
having a family and he thinks of others he knew in his command that had 
families, and how important it is to have a representative of the people in 
your inner circle. At the same time, Hitler admits there are sacrif ices that 
need to be made, and this festival period is a good time for him to read 
and plan out buildings. The clear point is made in the novel that it does 
not matter what this comic Hitler says anyway, because people will report 
what they like. Whether this is a condemnation of the press and the media 
is unclear. In an interview with Bild the journalist condemns him, and edits 
his responses, but this only draws more attention to him.10 The publication 
in this instance has a mission to bring reconciliation between the Germans 
and the Jews. The television show Hitler works for is only worried about 
is ratings. Despite how offensive his comments might be perceived to be, 
overall most of those working with the television channel are pleased, given 
this draws more attention to him, and works as free publicity. In this sense, 
the more offensive he is the better.
Conclusions – Comedy and Politics
Comedy occurs unintentionally during serious television programmes, and 
public mockery can have impact. When the BBC decided to allow the head 
of the British National Party onto their f lagship politics television show 
Question Time in 2009, many questioned the eff icacy of allowing this. A 
strange form of comedy entered the show, which took place under heated 
circumstances, with employees of the BBC unable to leave the building 
given the strength of the protest against Griff in outside the building. In 
2016 if another f igure arose like Griff in it is hard to believe this would be 
allowed, given the voice of those opposing freedom of speech is so strong. 
Jack Straw, Sayeeda Warsi, Chris Huhne, and Bonnie Greer, all appeared 
along with Nick Griff in. Jack Straw, a Jewish Labour politician, had stirred 
controversy by stating in 2006 that the Muslim veil was oppressive, and later 
by his comment in 2011 that Pakistani men see white females as ‘easy meat’. 
In 2015, Straw was exposed by Channel 4’s programme Dispatches, and The 
Telegraph, as being willing to take cash for ‘offering services’ in parliament. 
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Similarly, Baroness Warsi, at the time of the Question Time debate Shadow 
Minister for Community Cohesion, broke the ministerial code multiple 
times, and numerous controversies over expenses have dogged her. In 2013 
Chris Huhne, also on the panel, was sentenced to eight months for pervert-
ing the course of justice.
Other than Bonnie Greer, everyone on the panel has since fallen from 
grace, so the moral high ground of the panel needs questioning. Other than 
some form of schadenfreude, this is not especially comic, but the point of the 
show was to expose Griff in for who he was and to make a mockery of him. 
The claim was that he was racist, so the idea was to show him for what he 
was, and then make him and his party a laughing stock. On Question Time 
Griffin declared his own father served in the RAF, f ighting against the Nazis, 
so by implication he is not a Nazi, and then attacked Straw personally for his 
father not fighting against Nazis. All of this stemmed from a question around 
Churchill, and Griffin uses this to claim Churchill was anti-immigration, and 
indeed the nationalism expressed through the wars was evidence of this. The 
f irst black member of the audience to have a voice calls Griff in disgusting 
and challenges Griff in to admit that people from ethnic minorities bring 
something to Britain. Griff in then claims he is continually misquoted in the 
media, so if you perceive him as a monster this would be understandable, if 
you believe what they say. The host challenges Griff in, asking him to state 
which quotes about him are inaccurate. ‘Are you a Holocaust denier?,’ he 
asks. His response is that he did not have a conviction for this, and a member 
of the audience laughs. ‘Why are you smiling?’ Dimbleby asks Griffin, ‘It’s not 
particularly funny.’ It might be concluded the audience member is laughing 
at the audacity of Griffin, and his attempt to deflect the question with Griffin 
just continuing this ‘comedy’. His response is then to state the Holocaust is 
used and abused in arguments about immigration.
A number of his own quotes are read out to him, such as, ‘I want to see 
Britain to become 99 per cent genetically white, just as she was eleven years 
before I was born.’ In July 2014, Griff in stepped down and was replaced by 
former teacher Adam Walker. A major period of success for the party was 
2008, when the BNP held 50 local council seats, won a seat in the London 
Assembly, and Griff in and Andrew Brons were elected as Members of the 
European Parliament. In the 2015 election the party stood eight candidates, 
a reduction of 330 from 2010, receiving less than two thousand votes. They 
were then a joke party at this stage, and not a serious threat. It was wrongly 
assumed the threat of the far right has dissipated. Despite Britain’s First 
popularity through social media, UKIP appeared as the mainstream alterna-
tive, Farage flirting with all manner of racist discourse.
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Within two years the leader of the main anti-immigrant party in the 
UK was now the f irst political f igure to meet the newly elected president, 
Donald Trump. While the media and popular culture mocked f igures such 
as Nick Griff in, right-wing leaders such as Donald Trump were gaining 
support from movements headed by people such as Nigel Farage. Politicians 
and the media did not actually take Trump seriously enough, given his 
unexpected victory. In a spoof infomercial on Saturday Night Live, ‘Racists 
for Trump’, a woman is ironing, commenting she likes Trump because he 
is authentic. Only later do we see she is ironing a KKK gown. A young man 
states his support for Trump is due to the economy, which he indicates will 
grow under Trump by raising his arm, revealing a Nazi armband. Despite 
the mockery, this did not prevent Trump taking power on 20 January 2017, 
and immediately setting a new agenda of global disharmony.
Trump’s spat with Alec Baldwin for his impression of him on Saturday 
Night Live is an obvious example of how comedy can antagonize. Whilst 
victimizing Muslims, immigrants, and other people who might be consid-
ered ‘others’, including those who are lesbian and gay, and those who are 
women, Trump has reinstated himself as a victim. The Nazis turned the 
whole of Germany into a victim, desperate for revenge. Trump himself is 
never caught on camera laughing. This lack of an ability to laugh at himself 
reveals how deeply serious he takes his image as do his allies, for whom 
image is everything. Steve Bannon as Trump’s chief media manipulator 
in the White House until August 2017 closely choreographs this, a subject 
we turn to next.

4. Necrospectives and Media 
Transformations
Myth and History
Going beyond representation, we now examine Nazism and neo-Nazism 
and the media with regards to Hegel, Baudrillard, Bergson, and Levinas. 
Questions over authenticity, the disappearance of meaning, history and 
truth, are evaluated. There is an examination of postmodernism and ir-
rationality and the rise of the right and Donald Trump, and how engaging 
with neo-Nazism rhetoric has been used to galvanize support for the right. 
We also realize how the neo-Nazi position is akin to mainstream business 
practices. There is an explanation of how the media reporting on events 
eliminates meaning from them with the persistence emphasis on the next 
event. With reference to postmodernism, how authentic this engagement 
with neo-Nazism is will be outlined.
For Hegel, history does not have the immediate existence of art.1 The nar-
rative of representation, such as media images, has more veracity, regardless 
of accuracy, when compared with historical ‘truth’. Hegel took the metanar-
rative approach to the extreme, writing that art ‘brings before us eternal 
powers that hold dominion in history, without any such superf iciality in 
the way of immediate sensuous presentation and its unstable semblances’.2 
While there might be something higher than art, such as philosophical 
thought, and religious or moral principles, art points beyond itself, making 
it superior. Hegel continues to emphasize the importance of the sensuous 
form in art, typically promoting Greek art over anything else, but there is 
the caveat that this is only the partial truth. When it comes to God, this 
is an eternal Spirit which German writers like Goethe, whom Hegel knew 
well, linked to the spirit of the country.
As with Nazism and neo-Nazism, Hegel and Goethe battled with the 
notion of the rise and fall of culture and cultures. Hegel’s art criticism 
essentially argues that it was only during a period of decline in the aesthetic 
qualities of art that good reflection and criticism could take place. Seeing 
as this period was the birth of German criticism, ipso facto, the art was 
substandard according to those involved in the criticism, such as Hegel. In 
the German Nazi state these insights needed to be rewritten. Hitler needed 
to overcome any doubt about the quality of German art and rewrite history 
appropriately. But history does not have to be rewritten if the gaze can be 
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averted, which in 1940s Berlin it was. Over 70 years on, some of the more 
right-wing commentators during the 2016 presidential race in America 
praised Trump for his propaganda and his ability to bring theatre into 
his campaign. Condemned in some quarters as a modern-day snake oil 
salesman, in others Trump was praised as refreshing. Following Nietzsche, 
the carnival of festivities was materialized through cruelty, so this form of 
entertainment becomes the paramount centre of pleasure, and the more 
violent the better. Christopher Lasch in The Culture of Narcissism had placed 
street protests within this paradigm, condemning them as theatre.
For Jean Baudrillard this return is perverse, given it is an obsessive at-
tempt of the present to put the balance straight by returning to the past. 
Writing towards the end of the twentieth century, he saw the obsession with 
the Holocaust as part of a general drift towards a revival of an interest in 
fascism, in Nazism, and in extermination.3 We are indifferent to the present 
and to our own condition, leading us to continually rethink the past, the 
process known as necrospective. Everything has disappeared, so there is 
a constant returning to the past. This antithetical stance appears liberal 
and non-dogmatic, but can come across as apolitical, and divorced from 
humanity. There is an insuff icient amount of everything, including history 
and philosophy, and this leads to the conclusion that there is no point trying 
to f ind out any more about the Holocaust, or any other atrocity.
The underlying view that it is the media that governs moral conscience 
contains some truth. Just as Nazism and neo-Nazism is concerned with the 
delineation of boundaries, the media functions as the delineation of moral 
boundaries. From approximately the early 1980s when definitive history 
and truth was being exploded by critics such as Derrida and Baudrillard, an 
alternative history was being developed, often based on f ictional sources, 
such as The Turner Diaries. This neo-Nazi text became a blueprint, revealing 
a world where a f inal battle occurs between the races and the white race 
wins. The neo-Nazi movement seized on this text as an idealized projection 
of the future, already written. Science fiction then becomes a form of writing 
history from the point of view of the survivors, those here with Aryan blood 
considered to be the strongest. The dominance of the image creates a form of 
amnesia and there is an entry into the mythic stage, away from history. Here 
history and projects of the future are idealized f ictional zones. Neo-Nazi 
movements have used this media form, the novel, as a religious and historical 
text. Importantly, given the void of meaning and telos from history, it is only 
the novel that is able to depict human consciousness and society.4
A question is raised over trying to understand events like the Holocaust 
because, ‘basic notions as responsibility, objective causes, or the meaning 
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of history (or lack thereof) have disappeared, or are in the process of disap-
pearing’.5 It should now seem obvious why this is. Moral or social conscience 
is a phenomenon ‘governed by the media’.6 Writing in a time before Twitter, 
Baudrillard is referring to the legacy of mainstream media controlled by 
large corporations, the government, or both. He declares that Nazism and 
the concentration camps are even more unintelligible now because of their 
reworking in the media. The image has removed their veracity completely, 
functioning as part of our amnesia. He suggests that it is now possible and 
legitimate to ask, ‘Did all those things really exist?’7 This is precisely because 
of the proliferation of their images in the media. This is not the same as 
confirming their immateriality. He admits this question is ‘an intolerable 
one’, but the point is to ask and examine what makes this impossible logic 
possible. The media replaces, ‘any event, any idea, any history, with any 
other’.8 This scrambling of specif ics, this transferring of the present with 
any past, demolishes both. His point that a full and detailed study of the 
facts nullif ies events and history, making them cease to have existed, gives 
too much weight to the researcher’s endeavours. They may continually 
delve into the entrails of history, f inding certain new truths, but they are 
not destroying history, as Baudrillard claims.
Post-Auschwitz, when explanations are hard to f ind, there is a movement 
from the historical to the mythical. And this mythical is media-led, with one 
tweet creating a mirage. The mythical and reality merge. The frenzy of the 
media is explained using the language of nature, sport, and nutrition, such 
as ‘Twitter storm’ and ‘click bait’. There is an attempt to turn the fantasy 
and myth into the natural. With the Holocaust and other crimes in order 
for them to become a myth, ‘historical reality must be eradicated’.9 Baudril-
lard is implying we now have entered a world where violence and reality 
are not manageable, so this is merely positioned onto the past, forging a 
loss of reality, ‘which is now our reality [sic]’.10 This logic may give pseudo 
substance to neo-Nazi arguments. Those condemning postmodern wrongly 
misinterpret Baudrillard in the same manner. Pushed to its f inal conclusion, 
the summary would be: ‘We ourselves no longer exist suff iciently even to 
sustain a memory, and that hallucinations are the only way we have left to 
feel alive.’11 What then are these hallucinations exactly? For neo-Nazis, they 
are perhaps the absolute belief in a Zionist conspiracy, which then feeds 
their desire for revenge. Baudrillard’s discourse can be viewed as a form of 
hallucination, which has been seductive.
If we want to define certain texts as neo-Nazi or Holocaust texts, it is im-
portant to remember that classifying work this way as generic is limiting for, 
‘genres are agents of ideological closure – they limit the meaning-potential 
92 NazisM aNd Neo -NazisM iN  FilM aNd Media 
of a given text’.12 Typically, the more generic a text the more meaning will 
be limited. The text is nothing without an audience and critic, so the way 
media is branded is important. As with Noel Carroll’s arguments on the 
horror f ilm, some of these forms of media have an appeal and are popular 
due to a form of ‘repulsion’ and ‘disgust’, matched by a form of ‘pleasure’. 
While it might at f irst appear perverse to claim there is a form of ‘pleasure’, 
despite the millions of deaths we know the ending is a ‘happy’ one. Good 
triumphs over evil. In some degree, the Nazis were defeated, even though 
neo-Nazism continues, and there is still a subtler triumph. The tropes of 
the horror genre are applicable here. If we do not brand the Holocaust f ilm 
or elements connected to neo-Nazism as genres in themselves, but see this 
as part of the horror genre, then Carroll is still relevant. Carroll’s views on 
genre have a synergy with Baudrillard’s work. The audience of horror is 
seeking that which it would seem natural to avoid. But this engagement 
might explain why what formerly is natural and unnatural has now merged.
Can the echoes of Nazism through popular culture create its own brand 
of neo-Nazism? Like all totalitarian ideologies and all religions, Nazism 
sought to position itself ‘higher’ than family ties. Any successful religion 
or state must coexist with the family, whilst containing it. Nazism can be 
viewed as just an extension of Christianity, which in turn has its origins in 
a splinter group of Judaism. For Eric Voeglin, there is a millennial prophecy 
underlying Hitler’s discourse, and this was, ‘mediated in Germany through 
the Anabaptist wing of the Reformation and through the Johannine Chris-
tianity of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling’.13 The Nazi belief in a ‘superman’ is 
part of the trajectory that stems from the English Reformation mystics, 
and their promotion of the ‘godded man’. Nazism was in this paradigm a 
resurrection of Gnosticism. What formed the Nazi ideology was faith in the 
End, shaped by Christianity, which required a f inal battle between good 
and evil.14 Each age has its version of this battle, with the media latching on 
to this apocalyptic discourse to maximize the drama. This was startlingly 
clear in the 2016 Clinton versus Trump presidential campaign, when both 
sides strategically pushed the point that this could be the end of times. In 
every month of his presidency Trump has pushed this rhetoric further, in 
August 2017 threatening war with North Korea.
This profound belief in the End is reflected in Freud’s growing conception 
of the death drive, which had a signif icant impact on philosophy. Freud had 
moved out of Nazi occupied Austria due to the destruction of the Nazis. The 
f inal stages of Freud’s life are intimately linked to how Nazism has come 
to be recognized globally and then mediated. The countless biographies of 
Freud explain how he was able to escape persecution due to his connections 
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and wealth, offering another interpretation of Nazi persecution. Almost 30 
years before Freud moved from Vienna to London, he published his essay 
on the uncanny, ‘Das Unheimliche’ (1919). This opened up the gates to the 
questioning of what is real and the notion of a bifurcation between the 
feelings of being at home and not at home. It has been the primary essay 
for discourse on the gothic within literary and cultural criticism ever since. 
Nazism and the Holocaust can be interpreted as part of this, given they 
haunt texts and often provide the backstory. There has been a resurgence 
of neo-Nazi ideology and this concerns the related issues of identity and 
rootlessness. Historically, within the Old Testament, there had always been 
part of this playing with the notion of the home within the Jewish tradition. 
Nazism and neo-Nazism deif ied the homeland.
History, theology, anthropology and philosophy overlap with narrative 
theory. This narrative can be regarded as a key narrative of history, where 
traditionally there is exposition, development, the complication (ghosts, 
for example), climax, resolution, and verisimilitude. When it comes to the 
paranormal, issues can never be f inally resolved beyond the narrative and 
if beyond genre they are never resolved. The question of the Holocaust, in 
representation or in fact, sits within this framework. Historically, in the 
modern age, Nazis and neo-Nazis have been the monsters, normally the 
absolute evil, continually reworked in media and culture. For the Nazis, 
the Jews were in abstract the ‘specter of evil’ with German anti-Semitism 
having an ‘hallucinatory image of the Jews’.15
Any event past, present and future, in this discourse, is merely represen-
tation. Baudrillard was not the f irst person to state this; he followed Greek 
philosophers, Middle Eastern mystics, and Guy Debord, who in 1968 claimed 
that everything that is directly lived has now moved into representation. 
Given the overwhelming dominance of the media, Baudrillard was probably 
the f irst prolif ic writer on the subject to witness this position most fully 
realized. For Debord, the subservience to the society of the spectacle leads 
to the disappearance of personality with authentic experience removed.16 
Under this regime of the spectacle historical knowledge is exterminated.
Seeking explanations is one way of dealing with the Holocaust, and 
seeking to rid the earth of neo-Nazism is another way of redressing the 
past. However, as with genre, this linear approach may not be correct 
because it is a false way of containing the uncontainable. Gilles Deleuze’s 
term the rhizomatic is of use here. For Deleuze, the rhizomatic concerns 
the non-linear, nomadic and anarchic. Just as today we are haunted by 
images contained in social media that continually disappear and then 
reappear, the Holocaust and Nazi iconography does the same, being part 
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of the rhizomatic. Some artists, such as Francis Bacon, incorporated this 
iconography, using a layered system of artistic media, via combined im-
ages such as historic photographic stills merging with Nazi iconography, 
copied and overlapped through painting. Past, present and future fuses, and 
original non-identif iable meaning is created, moving outside the structures 
of genre. A haunting occurs and reoccurs with this methodology akin to 
the uncanny. What is now signif icant is how the mainstream has merged 
and moved beyond, without being beyond the mainstream, the normal 
with the paranormal.
Despite a call for clarity, these forms better portray the current condition, 
where the unconscious is made up of a variety of elements. There is a ques-
tion concerning the return to the scene, a question that Baudrillard raises 
repeatedly.17 What are we looking at, as such, and why this frequent return? 
In this view, everything has disappeared, and that is the reason we keep 
looking. What of the suggestion that nothing has been depicted in the f irst 
place? There is a further complexity here, when we consider what the past 
and what memory might be. There are two levels, according to Bergson. The 
past is memory and the unfolding of time, and then we have the ‘ideal past’, 
which is formulating part of the ‘paradox of Being’.18 There is a continual 
dialectic between an examination of the image and discourse on memory.
The actual is always present for Bergson but the present changes or 
passes. We can always say that it becomes past when it no longer is, when 
a new present replaces it. But this is meaningless. It is necessary for it to pass 
on for the new present to arrive, and it is necessary for it to pass at the same 
time, as it is present, at the moment it is the present. The image has to be 
present and past, still present and already past, concurrently. If it was not 
already past at the same time as present, the present would never pass on. 
The past does not follow the present that is no longer; it coexists with the 
present that was. If the media is the moral conscience of the people, there 
is amnesia with and from the image, and a movement from the historical to 
the mythic stage. In this mythic stage, neo-Nazism perpetuates the myth of 
the necessity of violence, but this is no different to perpetuating the myth 
that Western society always needs conflict and wars to thrive. Whether the 
representations are violent or not, the form may contain or portray violence.
There is a danger that the representation is then reality and even forms 
morality and conscience. Neo-Nazism consists of a celebration of violence 
against the other, and the media itself works violently. There is violence 
represented in and through the medium; media adds violence to violent 
culture not by content but by, ‘the very fact of their facticity’.19 This suggests 
the frenzy of the visible, where the form of the media itself is violent. This 
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argument is exaggerated, because there is an overuse of the term ‘violent’. 
Just because new technology might break away or rupture from the past, 
creating a f issure or wound, this assumes a teleological and linear progres-
sion. For f ilm such a breaking with the past, aesthetically, is not a linear 
trajectory, given the complexity concerning continually reworking styles 
and tropes. Moving back to hauntology, this is resurrecting the ghost. There 
is a rhizomatic occurrence, where tributaries concerning technology move 
backwards and forwards, future ages reifying the past, seeking to use the 
technological medium of the past assuming an authenticity. Like f ilm, 
memory condenses, simplif ies and magnif ies, and cannot be present in its 
entirety. Essentially, meaning in terms of f ilm and memory is subordinated 
to feeling but memory is more real than the present, in that the present is 
always f iltered through memory. Memory is a construction of the present, 
constructed by the present throughout the changing present, for consciously 
there is no such thing as anything but the present. Bergson argued that the 
past dominates all the present, so there is no such thing as a pure perception. 
We may have more of a concrete grasp on reality the more we are aware 
of these past images.
There is simultaneously a seeking after ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, and ‘au-
thenticity’ through technological developments, matched by a desire for 
‘authenticity’, by getting back to ‘primitive’ f ilmmaking, such as the Dogme 
95 movement. Murder scenes are arguably, ‘the most powerful and eff icient 
vehicle for getting to the crux of f ilm aesthetics’.20 This is because they reveal 
the workings of the f ilm; deadly ‘violence’ is then a metaphor for montage. 
Placing ‘violence’ in brackets is appropriate, because what ‘violence’ is here 
can be contested. The ‘murder scene becomes a site through which f ilm-
makers reflect on cinema as a set of formal components’.21 To maintain the 
manipulation of f ilm images is absolutely violent is arguable and always 
contentious. Repeated enough, what is initially a mild metaphor, such as 
manipulation, is constructed as something extreme, such as violence. With 
regards to the Holocaust, if the scene of mass murder is never framed at all, 
and never allowed to be represented, continuing the violence metaphor, this 
is hardly non-violent in itself. Crucially, this can be conceived, historically 
and metaphorically, as a vast long take, with gaps in the montage, a f ilm 
form which is a specif ic style for which there is no language. This is our 
morality and conscience, hence the frequent repetition throughout history. 
A large gap like this, the non-depiction of the gas chambers, for example, 
allows for the imagination to come into play, but also for it to be obliterated.
In Son of Saul, discussed in Chapter 2, the chamber door is shut by the 
protagonist, and we are placed in the position of the unwitting next victims, 
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but the camera always draws attention to the survivor, not the victim. With 
an emphasis on the image, paradoxically, there is the pre-occupation with 
the nexus of the real. As Hal Foster argued, there is a return to the ‘real’ 
subject, in opposition to the excessive emphasis placed in the 1980s on the 
textual modes of culture, or conventional notions of realism.22 This cultural 
dissatisfaction is expressed as a return to the shocked subjectivity of a 
traumatized subject. This is where the Holocaust is relevant. The results 
of the trauma embody actualized catastrophe and emerge as a revived 
cultural paradigm. The paradox here is that the white power movements 
and neo-Nazis argue they are the wounded culture. The obsession with 
the obscene takes the negative form of the cult of the wounded, diseased, 
traumatized bodies.
The vast machinery of the Holocaust, which still primarily lays non-
visualized, within a perpetual mode of denial, was then followed in the 
decades since by a transformation in the news media. Documentaries such 
as The Sorrow and the Pity (Marcel Ophuls, 1971) have taken an objective 
stance to the position of statesmen, resistance f ighters, and collabora-
tors. A proliferation of images and 24-hour news has not led to a deeper 
understanding of global conditions, or even a greater compassion. Despite 
the theoretical means to depict all-out war, and its devastation, what has 
occurred is a sanitization of war. The more images that are produced, in 
whatever form, the less they are seen, with the image supplanting reality. 
Stock footage is often repeated, like a mantra, offering no further under-
standing in any form.
Aerial bombardments are invariably shot from a distance, always reflect-
ing back aesthetically to f iction f ilms, such as Apocalypse Now (Francis 
Ford Coppola, 1979), leading to a position where fact and f iction blur. In the 
f ictional forms, such as Coppola’s f ilm, there is actually more veracity, with 
soldiers on the ground facing the explosions, in a number of ironic ways. 
Rather than photography and the media leading to awareness, therefore, 
following Baudrillard, it obliterates the existence of reality. Occasionally, 
when a child is pulled from a collapsed hospital or dies on a beach, their 
face makes the front pages of newspapers, generating a frenzied storm on 
all media platforms, until the next event. The focus on the one is supposed 
to highlight the position of the many, as in the numerous f ilm narratives 
that focus on the singular protagonist. This inevitably impacts on how 
populations perceive mass violence. In screenwriting terminology, the 
protagonist is the one that suffers the most, experiencing the most agony. 
If the evidence is placed on the one the many are ignored. This is not just 
the fault of traditional narratives, but of the news media. The natural 
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progression is to suggest that the one can represent the many. This is how 
audiences relate to a story and how audiences have been initially educated.
The police and governments drive the notion that destruction is inevita-
ble and unpreventable. This is unwittingly following a tenet that has strong 
similarities to Baudrillard’s belief in the inevitability of evil. Fatalism and 
a certain predetermination enter the discourse. This is not merely so the 
authorities can avoid culpability if any event of mass violence occurs, such 
as a white-power terrorist attack. It has the added social control benefit of 
allowing extensive freedoms to be drastically curtailed, giving leverage for 
surveillance to be increased, while offering support for increasing security 
budgets, boosting the profits of the military and industrial complex. The 
police frequently move into such industries. Here, in stark summary, is the 
nexus of the contemporary position, where this theatre of cruelty is not 
prevented but ostensibly revelled in, staying true to Nietzschean discourse. 
Here theatre of cruelty is not referring specif ically to the work of Antonin 
Artaud, Jean Genet, Jerzy Grotowski, and Peter Brook, but something far 
broader and insidious concerning global politics and economics.
The essence of the global media, within this lens, has performed what 
the Nazis only dreamt of. This discourse maintains the only way to attract 
the attention of the general populace and to create drama is to perpetuate 
this theatre of cruelty, or an apocalyptic worst-case scenario. With the rise 
of Donald Trump in 2016, children, and some adults, believed World War 
III was imminent and neither side in the presidential race did anything to 
reduce their fears. This then produces a profound level of conformity, in an 
attempt to control behaviour, and enables policies to be enforced. Without 
this theatre there is no wider interest in events. To vanquish violence would 
remove the audience’s interest which is the means to control the audience. 
People may attempt to switch off, but in reality, the human race is now at a 
stage beyond this position of withdrawal. Only the minority remain beyond 
this position. Mobile devices and other methods have become fused with the 
living physical body, making the transfer of violent images and dominant 
discourse on violence cellular and biological. Biological and non-biological 
elements have fused. Arguing there is artif icial or false memory produced 
by images, as juxtaposed with real memory, is inaccurate.
There was a serious attempt to record at least the impact of the Nazi 
ideology, which would counteract deniers and neo-Nazis proclaiming 
any denial discourse. Sidney Bernstein wanted to create a documentary 
that would contain solid evidence of Nazi atrocities, gaining the help of 
Alfred Hitchcock, and also approaching Hollywood director Billy Wilder, 
an Austrian refugee from the Nazis. Even straight after the liberation, 
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f ilm-makers realized that attempts would be made to deny the horrors 
that had been carried out by the Nazis. After 70 years, the f ilm was restored 
and completed, directed by André Singer, entitled Holocaust: Night Will Fall 
(2014). Apart from documentary films, such as Hitchcock’s on the Holocaust, 
which was felt to be too hard hitting just after the victory over the Nazis, 
there were no detailed documentaries. In this sense, the theatre of cruelty 
was not overtly carried out concerning the actual Holocaust.
With the continual reworking of the Holocaust in later documentaries 
Baudrillard takes on a striking relevance. The masses, according to this 
logic, feel a posthumous emotion about these events, ‘which will make them 
spill into forgetting with a kind of good aesthetic conscience of the catastro-
phe’.23 What is noteworthy here is the bind between understanding, which 
must always be limited, and systems of recording, montage, and editing, 
which will be also always be limited. The Holocaust becomes a documented 
event, via various methods such as television, but the television does not 
work as a deterrent to later similar occurrences. Indeed, with augmented 
reality, including now common headsets linked to videogames, virtual 
participation in violence is normalized. The apparent loss of authenticity 
is at the heart of this discourse.
A return to the real is always part of this agenda, and this is where the 
extreme right fuses politically with the extreme left. They are manifesting 
their differences by proclaiming they are authentic and true. This is per-
petually played out ever since the real event of the Holocaust, with various 
overlapping acts of violence, differing in scale but often reflecting back to 
this period. The iconography of the Nazis is transferred onto a variety of 
national and international groups, each with their own local differences 
and variations. They may have local differences, but each has the sole aim 
of ridding the earth of what is perceived to be the racially inferior, bringing 
back what is felt to be authenticity. This functions in a pseudo-religious 
fashion, as a form of sacrif ice, which leads on to the influence of the occult 
on Nazis and neo-Nazis. Myths have grown up over the Nazi interest in 
the occult and the supernatural, which again relates to the notion of the 
predetermined. There is hard evidence of the Nazis investigating aspects of 
witchcraft, not from the position of persecuting people supposedly involved 
in such practices, but the opposite.24
Heinrich Himmler had established an SS unit that explicitly investigated 
the history of witch trials in Germany, which were far more numerous than 
in other areas of Europe.25 The Nazi interest in the occult explicitly fed back 
to the work of influential anthropologists, such as Margaret Murray and Sir 
James Fraser.26 The latter was convinced that he had found a common myth, 
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that of a king volunteering to sacrif ice himself for his people, throughout 
Europe. Given the First World War saw devastating carnage, explicitly 
concerning national and ethnic conflict, there was politically a strong global 
call to f ind a common link that would tie all nations together and prevent 
future carnage. Murray believed that witches in the sixteenth century had 
not been involved in activities the authorities accused them of, but were part 
of a pre-Christian fertility cult.27 Popular writers, such as poet laureate Ted 
Hughes, were also convinced of this. The Nazis then searched extensively 
in archives related to the period, in an attempt to f ind evidence to support 
the theory that Christianity had persecuted German Aryan women.28
This reveals a strand in Nazi and neo-Nazi ideology concerned with a 
call for a post-Christian belief system, turning accusations of violence back 
on Christianity. Just because purity is a myth, it does not mean a desire for 
purity should be ignored. Conversely, it is often at the heart of damaging 
forms of all ideologies and religions. Of course, neo-Nazi gangs feed into and 
off youth culture. Childhood is frequently understood as what is natural, 
inner and positive, contrasted with the artif icial world of the grown up. 
Rousseau posited the child as being at one with nature, but also the notion 
that the past is always tainted in the present.29 Despite the mystique of this 
context, none of the interest in the occult was especially underground, or 
purely part of Nazi ideology. The occult is often portrayed as part of esoteric 
knowledge on the fringes of the society, but it has been frequently part of 
the mainstream. For example, British Prime Ministers Arthur Balfour and 
William Gladstone were interested in psychical research, and both of the 
established writers Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Ted Hughes were deeply 
influenced by spiritualism.30 Elements of Nazi occult belief, such as chan-
nelling a pure native self, were part of the wider, mainstream, non-German 
culture, which fed into a literary tradition tied to mystical Celtic belief 
systems and romanticism.
Historically this strong interest in the occult occurred during a time 
of huge upheaval following the impact of unprecedented carnage and 
world war. A fragmented self, as epitomized by the ‘hollow man’, to use 
T.S. Eliot’s term, was dominating the collective psyche and the rational 
man was felt to have failed. For Hughes, the importance of the primitive 
native animal self was now stressed, as it was for D.H. Lawrence. These 
two f igures are now central to not just English culture, but global culture, 
epitomizing a way of thinking that has become mainstream. Donald 
Trump in his presidential campaign appealed to this non-rational part 
of the self, through rational rhetoric, although this manifested itself in 
numerous contradictory ways. People believed it was insanity that he 
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was nominated, dismissing him as a joke, and then found it complete 
insanity that he won. But, rationally speaking, playing into people’s basest 
instincts generates deep interest. Debord revealed the media instigates 
this irrationality with lies swamping the society of the spectacle.31 The 
mainstream press galvanized this interest, with anything Trump did, such 
as a tweet, making headline news.
Until the Next Event
Neo-Nazi violence and its mediation through media platforms is central to 
the theatre of distraction. ‘Until the next event’ could be the mantra of our 
times. While the media has one eye on the current atrocity, such as a racially 
motivated mass killing in America, or a series of violent anti-Semitic crimes 
in Russia, once reported these are no longer news items, and are stored in 
a virtual archive. The reporting takes precedence over their reality and 
content. Indeed, the reporting causes the invisibility. Rather than the future 
distorting the past, through rewriting history selectively, the future frames 
the present, voiding it even of the status of an event. The form dictates 
the content, and Marshal McLuhan’s well-known aphorism becomes fact. 
Indubitably, the medium is the message. There is a constant need to feed 
the machinery of news media, the audience given the semblance of taking 
part, through various feeds, adding to an appearance of excitement. To 
retweet, doing the job of the media, is felt to be an action, giving the veneer 
of interaction and control. Clicking on a link, an app, or anything similar, 
offers a simulation of control, stimulating an unconscious spurious belief 
that a level of influence is occurring.
This simulation, offering the belief in self-agency, is in practice the 
reverse of power. People follow the live updates on Twitter and Periscope 
and other platforms, as swathes of innocents are murdered and maimed, 
giving the followers a fake sense of intervention. Because they in some 
way ‘witness’ the events, the image or message is manipulated, and they 
are part of it. In the realm of simulation, it does not exist without them. A 
violent ubiquitous loss of signif ication leads to an implosion of meaning.32 
If everywhere socialization is measured by an exposure to media messages, 
those under exposed are desocialized or asocial.33 While we think informa-
tion produces meaning the opposite is occurring which can be termed the 
‘phantom content’34 Wisdom was replaced by knowledge, then information 
replaced knowledge. Data, big or small, has now replaced knowledge; who 
has access to and owns this data is a serious question.
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Debord formulated how disinformation was attractive to the dominant 
society as it contained truths within lies.35 Remarkably, it took until 2016 
before an awareness of fake news became ubiquitous. By then people were 
not overly concerned because news was not about facts but entertainment. 
Hoaxes and fakery at the centre of the debate over authenticity are at the 
heart of discourse over the Holocaust, with neo-Nazi Holocaust deniers 
being so prolif ic on the Internet that a search for the Holocaust on the 
Internet comes up f irst with the debate over its authenticity. When it comes 
to fake news there is in reality nothing more occurring in this instance 
than total manipulation. This is more so than previously in history, which 
had limited forms of communication. People now believe they are actively 
taking part in and are choosing how they interact with media. This is the 
participation myth that those connected to media forms, such as Twitter, 
promote, boosting revenue from advertisers. Sadly, people become excited 
when they are following an event live on Twitter, because they are feeling 
part of the action, from a war, a revolution, to a sporting event. This feeling 
of involvement offers a spurious feeling of power, plus any information or 
knowledge about a system and event, ‘is already a form of the neutralization 
and entropy of this system’.36
Furthermore, if this information is broadcast it is degraded. The fusion 
of reality with the image negates reality. The proliferation of the face, via 
the self ie, or any other overdeployment of the image, destroys the human, 
given the real face is removed. This has dramatic consequences, if by face 
we take a broader meaning outside and beyond the mere biological. The 
Jewish philosopher Levinas is associated with the concept of the Other. 
This is a presence within which God exists, along with our true identity, 
and is a conduit to our true identity. For Levinas we can only understand 
ourselves through this Other. This face is not biological, ethnic, or even 
social. The face evoked is the concrete appearance of the idea of inf inity 
that exists within me.37 The face then, in this context, ethically fulf ils the 
whole purpose of Levinas’ philosophy. The importance of the face is that it 
is perceived to resist possession or utilization.
This philosophy is beyond knowledge. Levinas invites and obliges me to 
take on a responsibility that transcends knowledge. The face signif ies ethi-
cal knowledge, which is there from the beginning: thou shalt not kill. There 
is then in the face what seems like the impossible: it forces us to receive 
the idea of inf inity, prior to engaging the operations of cognition.38 But an 
important question is: How can we receive an idea prior to entering ideas? 
Theodor Adorno claimed the Hegelian system objectifies the subject, raising 
it in the process to a transcendental status. But for Adorno the separation 
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in philosophy between object and subject since Descartes is wrong, as they 
are mutually mediated by each other.39 Created being (totality) is but the 
trace of the passing of the ‘inf initely other’.40
The reversal that Levinas refers to is also familiar to those aware of Jung-
ian psychology. ‘It is not the self that constitutes the meaning of the Other’s 
existence; rather, it is precisely the opposite: subjectivity is constituted in 
and through its relation with alterity.’41 In this sense, one is not aware of his 
or her individuality until one enters into a relationship with another. This 
relationship calls the subjectivity of freedom itself into question.42 ‘Ethics, 
the welcoming of the Other by the self, is only accomplished through the 
recognition and maintenance of the radical disjunction of same and other, 
of subject and object.’43 For Levinas, who was saved the fate of his fellow 
Jews as he was captured in Rennes in 1941 and treated as French prisoner of 
war, the violence endemic to sexism, racism, classism, nationalism, and so 
on, is the denial of the totality of being as the trace of the inf initely other.44 
Levinas places an ontological awareness in otherness, and this has the 
possibility of the inf inite. Sameness obviously is f inite. Neo-Nazism would 
f ind such philosophy not just diff icult to understand, but anathema to its 
essential ideology.
From this shift into philosophy we can enter into a more nuanced view 
concerning an understanding of not just what neo-Nazism is or might be, 
but what it does. Neo-Nazism negates the inf initely other as present in 
being, that is, our being and that of another. By demonizing the other, 
as the extreme difference beyond the same, it removes all traces of the 
inf initely other within the same. In the totalitarianism that dominates 
the majority of corporations and industries an element of this neo-Nazism 
has taken hold. This is not hyperbolic, or merely metaphoric. Only through 
such mechanisms is difference denied and homogeneity in all its form rules. 
This is much subtler than any overt practice of obvious discrimination, 
but quite the reverse. Normally this sits within a framework where equal 
opportunities are promoted in organizations.
For Levinas it is only through the other that there is any real truth, 
identity, ontological essence, being, and inf inity. Despite the variety and 
fragmentation of groups, and within groups, neo-Nazis appear united 
in their hatred of ‘the other’, broadly def ined. This unif ication, often 
electronically through the Internet, has numerous levels of paradox. We 
should be wary of the solidarity formed electronically for unification across 
the globe, given every ‘strategy of the universalization of differences is 
an entropic strategy of the system’.45 Those caught up in the frenzy of the 
media, and its theatre, are tragically blinkered to this blindingly obvious 
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point. Paradoxically, chasing the event on Twitter, or any other platform, is 
no more or less than a remote form of watching a game, in any era, with the 
bombing of Syria and the Arab Spring fusing via observation with viewing 
Roman gladiators. Indeed, the framing of these events then nullif ies them 
of their human signif icance.
The semblance of participation generated by such forms allows for shar-
ers of information to pretend to be journalists, and anyone to feel they are 
taking part. Depth of analysis and criticism is avoided, and is exchanged 
for a thrill from a press of a button that might lead to a ‘like’. The narcissism 
and self-referencing of this should never be overlooked. More dangerous is 
the veneer it gives to the belief in personal people power, as if the public are 
more engaged when the antitheses is the truth. There is a constant thread 
concerning audience participation, which is entirely simulated. Only the 
latter is physically conducted, with the audience present, not hiding behind 
a device. Through this mechanism of the simulation of participation identity 
formation takes place, eliminating any dream of authentic identity, allowing 
for further acts of violence and the removal of freedoms.
Whether the possibility of an authentic identity is a myth is immaterial 
in this context. Concurrently, f igures concerning the use of social media 
need to be questioned. The racist right-wing organization Britain First is a 
group that has made broad use of social media, but claiming the number 
of ‘likes’ or the number of followers on any social media platform indicates 
correctly the extent of real support needs questioning. For example, Britain 
First polled only 1 per cent of the vote in the London mayoral elections in 
2016. In December 2016, the former leader of Britain First, Paul Golding, was 
jailed for two months. Their Facebook page read: ‘The High Court has sent 
Paul to prison for confronting a hate preacher in Cardiff who said it’s okay 
for Muslims to keep sex slaves!’ In November Jayda Fransen, leader of the 
party, was found guilty of religiously aggravated harassment, after hurling 
abuse at a Muslim woman wearing a hijab. Labour MP Louise Haigh called 
for Britain First to be listed as a terrorist organization. Terrorists, activists 
and journalists fuse in this zone.
When a newsreel is played in the Amazon Prime television series (2015 
to present) adaptation of Philip K. Dick’s 1962 novel The Man in the High 
Castle showing the allies winning World War II and Winston Churchill in a 
victory parade, the paradox is within this text the Nazis have won the war. 
But, it should be clear by now that in many ways they have. It Happened 
Here (Kevin Brownlow and Andrew Mollo, 1964), is a similar example, 
where there is a world where Germany has won the war, and the slogan is, 
‘Germany and England – a community of race’. The media is an integral 
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part of this victory, driven by a need to generate fear, creating division and 
hate. This is not a victory for random splinter neo-Nazi sects that exist in 
a variety of forms across the globe. That would not be a victory, despite a 
certain rhizomatic element making it akin to ISIS in its potentiality. Why 
this current engaged media is far more insidious is that it is a victory within 
the mainstream, not merely in media discourse, but in ontology. It goes to 
the heart of being. As Charlie Brooker has made clear throughout most of his 
Netflix Black Mirror television series, there is an appalling loss of identity 
through attempting to seek approval via social media. Again, using Buddhist 
terminology, it is not just sangha (community) that is lost, but also Buddha 
(truth), and dukha (awareness).
In 2016, with a rise in racist discourse and neo-Nazi activity globally, 
it was easy to forget that previously battles had been fought between and 
against the far right and the left, leading to deaths on the streets of Britain. 
People were once unable to hide behind social media, and so allegiances 
were more publicly expressed. Margaret Thatcher stood for election in 
1979, a year when social unrest was becoming the norm in the UK. For 
example, in April 1979 Blair Peach died after taking part in an Anti-Nazi 
League demonstration in Southall on 23 April 1979, St George’s Day. Three 
decades later, information was f inally released that placed the blame with 
the police. Reports into his death were only made public in April 2010, when 
it was identif ied that the police were probably responsible for the sustained 
head injuries that killed him. Even three decades later, no one was willing to 
take responsibility. On the day of the attack against Peach, 3,000 protestors 
had been protesting against the National Front, with 2,500 police involved. 
Two years later, London witnessed the Brixton riots, and the public inquiry 
led by Lord Scarman, indicating Britain was involved in a race war. In the 
Peach case, evidence was tampered with, eleven witnesses saying they saw 
Peach being hit by the police, and the police at the event were found to be 
Nazi supporters.46
Regardless of the evidence that surfaced, despite the attention this case 
received no one was brought to justice. The prime suspect, Alan Murray, 
went on to work as a university lecturer. This conf irms neo-Nazism is 
not on the fringes of society but at its heart. The media often dramatizes 
events connected to neo-Nazism to create a theatre of extremism, which is 
misreporting. With neo-Nazism at the heart of culture, it becomes diff icult 
to differentiate its traits. The Metropolitan Police accepted the accusation 
of institutional racism in 2015, but only in terms of the police being just a 
reflection of society, where it was stated this was bound to happen. Fol-
lowing the points previously raised in relation to Baudrillard, there is the 
Necrospec tives aNd Media traNsForMatioNs 105
suggestion here that this is inevitable and unpreventable. This followed 
on from the MacPhearson report, published in 1999, which showed black 
people were six times more likely to be stopped and searched than white 
people. Reports do not change cultures, but often function as an excuse for 
justice. By 2007 this f igure had gone up to seven times more likely, and in 
the following three years the number went up for all ethnicities. By 2012, 
the LSE reported that a black person was 29.7 per cent more likely to be 
stopped and searched than a white person.47
In a wider context, in 2016 the BBC reported that the f igures for 2015 
showed that 5.5 per cent of UK police off icers were from a black or ethnic 
minority background, while these groups made up 14 per cent of the popula-
tion. It is disingenuous to claim that the police just reflect society, as did 
Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, in 
2015. Despite claims to the opposite, the police were not a reflection of the 
societies they were policing, and their continuing behaviour suggested they 
were made up of racists, given the level of searches carried out on those from 
ethnic backgrounds. Outside the police, the number of attacks on foreigners 
following Brexit went up. The excuse given in America concerning the 
support for Trump was that the politicians had ignored the white working 
classes. In any case, there was a celebration of a certain form of animal 
savagery, which went against humane behaviour. The un-evolved began 
to triumph and Trump was shown to be channelling the group id of the 
American people.
The call to return America to the whites was a slogan that fuelled Trump’s 
victory, and he had the whole-hearted support of the neo-Nazis. After his 
victory, he attempted to distance himself from certain right-wing groups, 
but the appointments he made to the White House indicated he was allying 
himself with the far right. There were further suggestions that key control-
lers of online media channels close to Trump were attempting to influence 
European elections, such as those in France. Angela Merkel was in a difficult 
position, given Germany had spent almost 70 years attempting to atone for 
the Nazis, with Hitler salutes and Nazi material illegal. She condemned the 
neo-Nazis in America that supported Trump, but also claimed she did not 
believe Trump was sympathetic to their cause because he had no ideology. 
Tangentially, it is worth noting that this may have been part of his success.
During his campaign rallies some black protestors were attacked, and 
Trump harkened back to the early 1960s and 1950s in his rhetoric and media 
campaign. His argument was that it was right to use violence against black 
people, letting hatred rule victorious. Elsewhere, his views on Jews are 
more ambiguous. He had tweeted it was important for him to have Jews 
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taking care of his money. As soon as his victory was announced, many in 
Israel called for the dismantling of the Palestinian state. The left-wing press 
had compared Trump’s discourse with Hitler’s. Both UKIP and the Trump 
campaign had almost declared defeat in advance, to make their victories 
seem even more impressive. The shock Brexit result was an inspiration for 
Trump. The churning of rumours on the Internet, primarily Facebook, was 
a factor in this result, but an outright condemnation of Facebook seems 
naïve. Denouncers of social media forget that the use of social media is 
voluntary. While overuse of anything may lead to health problems, should 
we blame the user or the tool? Trump’s victory does not negate the growth 
of the left elsewhere, with Momentum in the UK maximizing the impact 
of social media. In desperate times of austerity, the majority had chosen 
to blame the minority, just as in Nazi Germany. Neo-Nazism is formed out 
of a feeling of being persecuted and then persecuting the other, which can 
often be led by the media.
For Baudrillard everything is the look, everyone desiring that which is 
more real than real. All is multiplying and with a ‘mad’ overdetermination. 
The present world is that of ‘madness’. What is real does not ever occur 
because things are always in advance of their unfolding causes. This cor-
relates with the previous point made on the manner in which the media 
moves on from events. Reality has stopped; history has ended. Concurrently, 
the world is saved by the spectacle, by evil itself, the only liberation being 
in the ‘deepening of negative conditions’. The victory of Donald Trump in 
2016 was interpreted in the left-wing press as the return of the revengeful 
white man, Trump having the support of the Klu Klux Klan, which is older 
than Nazism and neo-Nazism. Foucault saw a triumph of madness and for 
Baudrillard there is a triumph by appearance, no one ever being able to 
enter ‘the blind spot around which the battle is arrayed’. A desire to f ind 
meaning is madness, and an absolute misunderstanding of the world as play 
and ceremony. In terms of social media activity, this argument is pertinent, 
because an involvement in this realm does involve play and ceremony, 
rather than meaning.
With a denigration of activity, this theorizing can be viewed as a form 
of madness in itself. After all, what is madness other than the ‘absence 
of the work’ (to quote Derrida)? There is a disturbing element to this line 
of thought that needs exploring further, because actually through his 
discourse Baudrillard is of course playing with the reader. One minute he 
states that priding oneself on difference is pointless, because indifference 
will prevail. The next he states that only the other knows. Unfortunately, 
despite this insight Baudrillard’s mission to turn people to the desire of 
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the world through the theory of seduction is not particularly innovative. 
Freud had turned people away from the desire of the mother to the desire 
of the self. Reason, for Baudrillard, destroys destiny because connections 
exist already, so all consideration of anything is madness in itself. We can 
envisage neo-Nazis leaping on this, seeing how destiny is central to their 
belief system.
Trump and the Rise of the Right
If the rise of neo-Nazi discourse following Trump’s victory in November 
2016 was inevitable it was nothing new; this discourse was never at the 
fringes of society. Le Pen in France had been f lirting with this rhetoric 
for over a decade. But what was new was that this type of rhetoric was 
now not overtly condemned in the mainstream and tabloid media, and it 
was often seen as a joke to be dismissed as not a real threat. The media in 
general appeared to be behind the political momentum, unable to catch 
up with the new dawn of Trump. A victory for Trump was viewed as a joke; 
until he won. Instead of getting on with the transition and with the job, 
Trump just continued having social media spats with celebrities, like Alec 
Baldwin. The television sketches where Baldwin played Trump were not 
particularly funny, showing him as invariably done through skits, such as 
looking up ISIS on Google. In this instance Trump had a point, because the 
humour was not strong, but Baldwin declared he would only stop if Trump 
published his tax returns. Trump was f ighting a war of words, rather than 
dealing with the real business, but Trump had fully realized that this war 
of words was where it counted.
The Daily Beast reported on 19 November 2016 that white nationalists 
and Nazi-saluting Tila Tequila were toasting ‘Emperor Trump’ in Wash-
ington. Again, the comedic angle was emphasized. A strange version of 
The Apprentice mixed with a Philip K. Dick story about the Nazis winning 
the war and The Hunger Games had materialized. A white-supremacist 
think tank led by Richard Spencer, the National Policy Institute, ran a 
conference near the White House in the Ronald Reagan Building after 
Trump’s victory. Spencer, it was reported, works to make extreme policies, 
like ‘peaceful ethnic cleansing’ and a ‘white homeland’ mainstream. Tila 
Tequila, who is a Singaporean Trump-loving ex-MTV personality, with an 
adoration of Hitler had been condemned by the Anti-Defamation League as 
a person who will do anything for publicity. Tequila Tila dresses in sexy-Nazi 
outfits, identifying with the alt-right. Her argument is their ability to attack 
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via meme wars is good for children, as it is funny, creative, artistic and 
magic. Certainly, by the end of 2016 the alt-right in America appeared to 
be winning the arguments within the media meme wars, and this was not 
limited to America. Trump, after some delays, denied any sympathy with 
the organization. Spencer then claimed everything overtly neo-Nazi, like 
the salute they were using, was ironic.
Spencer supposedly invented the term ‘alt-right’, and promotes the belief 
if you are not white American you should leave America. Josh Harkinson, re-
porting on Spencer for Mother Jones in October 2016, indicated that Spencer 
gives fascism a radical chic, which seems like a compliment for just getting a 
haircut.48 Others have played with this for decades, such as David Bowie and 
Brian Ferry. The level of Spencer’s racism is deep and broad: blacks, Asians, 
Muslims, Jews, and most Hispanics, are not part of his view of the future 
of America. Can this rise of the right then be put down to the last shudders 
of the American empire, given Spencer’s overt association with the Roman 
Empire? Empire’s do come and go, and ever since the OPEC oil crisis in 1973 
where the real global power was based has been questioned. America’s 
role as the global policeman always had opponents at home, isolationism 
going back to founding of the America, and lasting until 1941. Trump was 
vociferous in his condemnation of Hillary Clinton’s approach to American 
foreign policy, which had dragged them into two drawn-out wars. Within 
ten months of his victory Trump threatened all out war with North Korea.
After Trump’s victory in the presidential race in November 2016, the 
actor Tom Hanks made a speech stating this was not the end of the world. 
Apparently, America would triumph, given it is the greatest country on 
the planet. At an unusual time in its history, we could question why this 
one country once again needed to state it was the greatest country in the 
world. Was this a statement to counteract global threats, such as Russia or 
China? This rhetoric, trying to inspire optimism, was outmoded, stemming 
from certain 1950s idealism, and was likely to add fuel to the f ire of those 
that despise America, such as ISIS. Other white separatist right-wing media 
leaders included Jared Taylor, founder and editor of the white nationalist 
publication American Renaissance, and Peter Brimelow, founder of the 
website VDare. Combined with this was the CEO of Trump’s campaign, 
Steve Bannon, ex-chairman of Breitbart News, which was popular as the 
New York Post, but for Spencer these are ‘alt-light’. Bannon in November 
2016 became the president elect’s Chief Strategist and Advisor. Spencer’s 
influences included Taylor, and Leo Strauss, a Jewish German-born professor 
influenced by Heidegger and Hegel. Spencer’s wife Nina, who has been 
accused of being non-white, a dark-haired Russian, translated the writings 
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of Alexander Dugin, a Russian far-right nationalist, and they both have 
appeared on programmes broadcast on the Russia Today television network.
The nationalistic discourse that was always present in America was 
given greater power by Trump’s victory with people moronically chanting 
‘U-S-A!’ as the norm, but again this can be interpreted as a death shudder. 
Economically hard-hit communities believed that free trade was a curse 
and the cause of their woes; they were unable to fathom that the world had 
moved on. Trump immediately set about dismantling trade agreements, in 
an attempt to boost American industry. This isolationist position on the 
surface appeared anti-free trade and in this sense anti-capitalist, but it 
correlated with the neo-Nazi position on creating borders and boundaries. 
The concept of building a wall on the southern border was a master stroke 
with one Mexican company even offering to supply the cement. ‘Master 
stroke’ is an apt way of describing this, as it functioned as a metaphor and 
symbol for everything Trump stood for, and fed into neo-Nazi prejudices 
against the ‘other’. The wall was similar to a dam, functioning to keep the 
floods of immigrants out, a phrase often used in European media.
In Steve Bannon’s 2011 f ilm Generation Zero, big government and Wall 
Street are condemned as the two structural central evils, but the director 
of the f ilm is a former banker, trained at Harvard. Simplistically, the ideas 
of the 1960s get blamed for America’s ills, with these ideas infiltrating every 
layer of society, such as communism. Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, a talking head in the f ilm, discusses the lunar 
landing, in comparison to Woodstock, which is condemned as hedonistic. 
There is a declared split in American society between those who apparently 
work hard and deserve the rewards, and those who are reprobates. The latter 
are linked to those desiring progress, in terms of gender and race. In this 
f ilm, the American Enterprise Institute talking heads condemn the rise of 
youth culture, claiming there is a moral decay. What the f ilm indicates is a 
desire to return to the mythologized normality of the 1950s, this despite the 
maker of the f ilm personally going through numerous divorces, and being 
accused of domestic violence. The f ilm is an attempt to scoop up a broad 
audience of disillusioned voters, from alienated old people, to neo-Nazis, 
and to those who hate the elite and the ‘system’. This f ilm is for the so-called 
‘lost tribe’, akin to the group of mentioned on the back-cover blurb of the 
novel The Football Factory.
The 1960s are condemned as an era of moral self-righteousness and nar-
cissism. This is termed a betrayal of the past by the elites. One of the talking 
heads, Shelby Steele, Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institute, condemns the 
1960 activists outright, and then the f ilm’s narrative leaps to the 1990s 
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claiming it is the left that is in power, undermining the capitalist system. 
Free market capitalism is the god here, and anything that may have gone 
wrong with the system, such as the crash of 2008, is blamed on big govern-
ment interference. Strangely, the f ilm also appears as a condemnation of 
extreme greed, as epitomized by Donald Trump. While greed is promoted 
as being essential to human nature, extreme greed is attacked, to appeal 
to a wider audience disillusioned with the left. Bannon in this sense could 
have been Trump’s worst enemy, but is here rounding up all those who are 
lost, or who have seen no benefit from either a Republican or Democratic 
government. Social engineering is blamed, as are the political elites. Five 
years before Trump came to power, Bannon made this overt propaganda 
f ilm, calling for an overthrow of power. Nazi propaganda had condemned 
the elite as the cause of all ills, calling for a complete overturn of power.
Bizarrely, the f ilm ends as a condemnation of tyranny, with a reference to 
Hitler and Mussolini, referring to inflation in Germany, and comparing this 
to the current quantitative easing, with the printing of money as the future 
of America. Another talking head, John Bolton (former US Ambassador to 
the United Nations from 2005 to 2006), attacked the decline in American 
military inf luence. The message of the documentary: Stop. Obama is 
condemned for being European, in regards to his approach to health care, 
education, and the energy system. No details are given. Paradoxically, the 
wealthy and the elite who made this f ilm are using it to condemn the elites, 
and even the concept of social justice is attacked.
Similarly, in Bannon’s 2011 f ilm about Sarah Palin, The Undefeated, it 
is the elites that are blamed. As Ian Kershaw put it, Hitler’s ideology was 
based on the belief that specif ic values determined a people’s fate: ‘blood’, 
or ‘race-values’; the ‘value of personality’; and ‘sense of struggle’, the ‘self-
preservation drive’. These were within the Aryan race, but the Jewish vices 
were democracy, pacif ism and internationalism.49 The latter, international-
ism, is condemned vociferously by Bannon in his f ilms, and forms part 
of the main thrust of the attack on Obama. To claim there is no ideology 
here in any of these Bannon f ilms would be to ignore the obvious points. 
Putting up barriers, even to the extent of building a wall, is one element of 
this. Blaming everyone or everything foreign is another aspect. And then 
inventing an apparent elite linked to social justice, which is vehemently 
attacked, is another part of this ideology.
Speaking as an ex-employee of Goldman Sachs, Bannon’s 2011 lecture at 
the Liberty Restoration Foundation refers to the 15 September 2008 financial 
collapse, emphasizing Armageddon. He states there was a need for a tril-
lion dollars to f ix the system, and to prevent social chaos, and Bloomberg 
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calculated this as $5 trillion. Bannon blames this on Medicare, pension 
funds, and the trade deficit, caused by buying foreign goods from China 
and foreign oil. Relying on the rest of the world is the problem because 
anything foreign is the problem. For Bannon, the total assets of America, 
including all stocks and companies and cash, adds up to $50 to 60 trillion, 
with the national debt at over $200 trillion. The welfare state is to blame. 
Speaking of his f ilm Generation Zero, he claims this title reflects the current 
new generation, which has zero prospects. For Bannon, they know zero 
about history. This is part of the Tea Party, a grassroots organization that 
was not supported by the Republican Party. This for Bannon is the fourth 
turning in American history and retrospectively appears as the start of the 
Trump campaign.
What Richard Spencer, Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and Adolf Hitler 
all have in common is their absolute condemnation of the media. This goes 
beyond a normal scepticism. Spencer has used the German term Lügenpress 
(lying press), which is how the Nazis described the media, condemning 
the press for being run by Jews. In response, in November 2016 Twitter 
suspended his account and that of other white supremacists. Other alt-right 
supporters, such as Milo Yiannopoulos, an associate editor at Breitbart News, 
were also criticized. Yiannopoulos was due to return to his old school, the 
Simon Langton Grammar School in Kent, but the visit was cancelled after of-
f icials at the UK Department for Education expressed concerns over safety. 
This had nothing to do with the planned content of his speech, but concerns 
that counter-extremists would protest. Langton sixth formers had signed 
up to the event with parental consent. The school’s head of politics, James 
Soderholm, had invited Yiannopoulos, who had been banned from Twitter 
for life in the summer of 2016 for making racist comments. Appearing on 
the Channel 4 News, Yiannopoulos in his defence sold himself as a maverick 
outsider, a gay Jew, claiming his journalism is just mischievous. ‘Am I sup-
posed to take this as a joke?’, asks presenter Cathy Newman, of statements 
such as, ‘If we allow mass immigration, get ready for mass rape.’ He then 
launched into an attack on ‘victim culture’, which apparently must come to 
end, and claimed the wage gap is a total conspiracy theory. However much 
these people dress themselves up as outsiders, they are straight from the 
elite themselves, having gone to private schools and colleges. His moment of 
fame was short lived. After proclaiming the benefits of boys having sexual 
relationships with men, he quickly resigned from Breitbart News and lost 
a book contract deal.
Within this discourse, political correctness is a ‘cancer’. Between the 
late 1960s and the 1990s there was a movement towards social justice, but 
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this was not linear. Logically, one would expect a backlash. Yiannopoulos 
claimed to know what American’s were thinking, given lots of people fol-
lowed him, especially the gay community, despite him now being banned 
from Twitter. Trump and his allies were apparently functioning as radar 
for the American repressed id. Yiannopoulos had an exaggerated narcis-
sistic self-importance that was believed by the global. Yiannopoulos gave 
interviews all over the world, during a period of great uncertainty following 
Trump’s election. Unlike Cathy Newman on Channel 4, most journalists 
saw him as the refreshing face of modern journalism. Multiculturalism 
and globalization are the enemy here, for Yiannopoulos, with Islam being 
anti-gay, anti-women and pro-terrorism. Feminism is anathema. Israel 
becomes a model for nationalism, globally. Those who found his beliefs 
outrageous should be condemned as the extremists, for not allowing him 
to have or express these beliefs. This twisted logic continued after Trump’s 
election. The narrative was they had been silenced for too long and this was 
their time. Those that demanded equality for all were ‘pussies’ and they 
constantly repeated their right to proclaim uncensored discourse, including 
hate speech and racism.
The fact that Donald Trump retweeted a neo-Nazi’s tweet in January 
2016 created a mild protest, but this only added to his profile in the run-up 
to the election. Trump appeared to be able to get away with anything. In a 
world that had evolved into a system where having respect for others was 
not abnormal, Trump’s abnormal disrespect was admired as refreshing. In 
this regard, those critics of political correctness were correct. The public 
appeared to have had enough of being told what was appropriate, a very 
vague term anyway, and Trump and his associates capitalized on this. The 
media appeared to keep venerating and courting Trump, because of the 
need for profiteering from advertising, so no one properly challenged his 
racism or other outrageous opinions. Trump continually played the game 
of attacking the ‘evil’ media, and attacking the election process, just in 
case people might not vote. Even after they voted for him he claimed the 
voting system was rigged. Building on a culture of mistrust and conspiracy 
theories, Trump fuelled the f ire, turning people away from some simple 
facts. Indeed, he even appointed neo-Nazi sympathizers who had no politi-
cal experience to important positions.
Berating the media for being biased, his war with the press presents an 
image of someone who will not be pushed around, which again changes the 
political norm. Trump excluded the press from presidential events, where 
previously the press had been allowed, such as foreign visits. This lack of 
transparency and avoidance of questions from the press meant allegations 
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of incompetency, fear and corruption could be made. Any association 
between his key advisers and the far-right groups and neo-Nazis was dealt 
with by a condemnation of these groups. Rather than a two-way process, 
statements were made, plus tweets written. In the build up to the election 
before November 2016 social media was crowded with allegations Trump 
was a fascist. Following his victory, the mainstream press just vaguely asked: 
Is America drifting towards becoming a banana republic?
Bannon was considered by numerous commentators to be a neo-Nazi, 
so the closest adviser to the president was now feeding him these extreme 
beliefs. Early on Trump had tried to distance himself from the Klu Klux 
Klan. When asked on 26 August 2016 on Bloomberg Television about the 
support of David Duke, former Klan Grand Wizard, Trump said he had 
never heard of him. But Trump had mentioned Duke as his reason for a 
previous failed attempt at running for the presidency. In 2000 Trump issued 
a statement saying he was not running for president with the backing of the 
Reform Party because Duke was a member. Despite vague attempts at dis-
tancing, Trump’s rallies still became zones of violence against non-whites. 
In November 2015 he stated in Alabama that blacks needed to be ‘roughed 
up’. This volatile rhetoric fed an appetite for racial violence that ran deep in 
the region. When he was less popular he had to tone down his rhetoric, but 
as his support grew Trump’s overt racism was constantly commented on by 
the media. The f irst sitting senator to endorse Trump was Jeff Sessions of 
Alabama, who had been rejected in his application for a federal judgeship 
in 1986 for apparently saying he had thought the KKK were ‘OK’.
Dressing casually, verging on the scruffy with his unshaven face masking 
his establishment education, navy training, and f inance career, no one 
can consider Bannon, the primary influencer on Trump and the American 
media, as not from the establishment. And yet his media outlets did a 
remarkable job in claiming they represented the non-establishment, the 
voiceless, the powerless and the dispossessed. The possessing class running 
the state is overt, with people like George W. Bush and Donald Trump 
in power, although the latter claimed a new dawn of anti-establishment 
politics. The neo-Nazis were cohering with the interests of high capitalism. 
As with Trump, they did this via an ideology which was lower middle class.50 
Both the neo-Nazis and the Bannon propaganda machine castigated the 
upper-class ‘parasites’, including bankers, despite Bannon having a career 
as a banker. This was a form of radicalism of the right, which denies civiliza-
tion, appealing to the radical in those who, the system has not benefited.
The end-of-time rhetoric pumped out by the Clinton and Trump team 
prior to the November 2016 presidential election was black and white: 
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there was a choice between God and the Devil. Hillary was the witch, 
but anti-Semitism on the right was hard to pinpoint, given Trump had 
immense support from the Jewish community. Both the left and the right 
had attacked the technocratic society, ever since it existed. The rhetoric 
was framed to enable Trump to dismantle the state, reducing the need 
for any protection of the poor, dropping taxes and changing inheritance 
tax laws. Comparisons between Trump and Hitler had been misplaced. 
Initially, he did not have an expansionist agenda. What appears as a self-
declared white power movement from the inside, from the outside looks 
like a white inferiority complex. Right-wing commentators in America 
saw Israel as a correct model for America to follow, given its aim of an 
ethnostate.
As the world approached the 2020s, the core conspiracy theory was 
just a repetition of the 1920s. During this period, the National Socialists 
claimed the Germans had actually won on the World War I battlef ields, 
and they spread the belief that it was the Jews in government that had 
betrayed the nation. There was then the conspiracy theory that the Jewish 
f inanciers were raiding the economy. This is the perpetual myth repeated 
again throughout the last hundred years. Richard Spencer’s neo-Nazism has 
total synergy with the views that there are actually two enemies, which is 
part of the metaphysical struggle. These enemies are: the Jew-Capitalists 
and the Jew-Bolshevists. The solution in Germany was for the Nazis to 
establish a community under a supposedly divine leader, but in America in 
the 1920s a unification of white supremacist and anti-Semitic organizations 
did not materialize. In 2016, this unif ication occurred to a degree, uniting 
behind Trump, despite him distancing himself publicly from support from 
organizations like the alt-right.
As fringe groups with undeclared support at the heart of culture in the 
1980s and 1990s became mainstream, Trump was guided by Bannon on 
how to win this vote. A 2016 book on Trump’s rise to prominence and his 
presidential campaign used the word ‘Nazi’ six times in the context of his 
presidential campaign, including elements of the iconography of rallies and 
salutes. Neo-Nazism had filtered into the Trump campaign, and was nothing 
overtly to do with Richard Spencer’s movement.51 The latent and blatant 
neo-Nazism that was evidenced at this time to the build up to the November 
2016 presidential election reveals the manner in which neo-Nazism can be 
incorporated into mainstream politics. The period 2015 to 2016 witnessed 
a global shift. Citizens often cast aside traditional parties, or traditional 
leaders, opting for the anti-establishment f igure, however much in practice 
this description was inaccurate.
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Trump did not materialize from nowhere. His use of Twitter is just one 
part of his media influence. For four years prior to his presidential campaign, 
Trump appeared normally by phone on Fox & Friends, billed as ‘Mondays 
with Trump’. There was a symbiotic surge in support for Trump and a rise 
in ratings. According to Nielsen Media Research, between February 2016 
and February 2017, ratings increased by 46 per cent. The show had allowed 
Trump to dominate as a platform for his strange musings, especially on 
Barack Obama’s birth certif icate, with citizenship, identity, nationhood, 
and religion all involved in this. All of his claims were broadcast without 
any critical invention by the show’s hosts, Steve Doocy, Ainsley Earhardt, 
and Brian Kilmeade. This slot can be interpreted as a free one-man party 
political broadcast, on the most popular morning show on cable television. 
The Fox News Channel was formed in 1996, after Australian-American 
Rupert Murdoch employed Republican Party media consultant and CNBC 
executive Roger Ailes to be its CEO. Murdoch is still its chairman and acting 
CEO. The channel is continually criticized for being biased. Headlines on 
networks such as CNN declared Trump the Fox News president. Never in 
history had there been such a close relationship between a president and 
a media outlet.
Overall, it would be wrong to view Trump’s election as a new turn 
encapsulated as a movement towards an unprecedented post-truth era. 
Media and cultural theorists had been examining phenomena connected 
to this as far back as the 1970s. If the medium is the message, then Trump’s 
use of Twitter is basically saying: This is the way it is; there is no room for 
debate. Blasting off 140 characters is a form of headline-grabbing journalism, 
without the delay and editing of gatekeepers. The whole approach was a 
rebuke to the editors who believed they had the say on what the general 
reading public believed to be truth. Despite this, Trump’s election was a 
clear statement to everyone globally that truth, in terms of governance, 
overtly no longer mattered at all. This was then a subtler shift than has 
been recognized. Media theorists and philosophers such as Debord in the 
1970s and Baudrillard in the 1980s had predicted this. Societies were being 
managed via media manipulation and knowledge was eroded.
In Austria, after a second election in December 2016, due to postal vote 
irregularities in the f irst one in May, some were relieved that the far-right 
candidate Norbert Hofer was f inally defeated in the presidential election. 
But Hofer’s nationalist Austrian Freedom Party did gain 46.7 per cent of 
the national vote. Anti-immigration parties were all gaining support across 
Europe, especially in France, the Netherlands and Germany, where elections 
were taking place in 2017. Supporters of the European Union viewed the 
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Austrian outcome as a good sign that openness and liberal culture could 
prevail over the wave of right-wing populism. Trump had capitalized on this 
postmodern era. This involved no special skills or talent, although there is 
an extraordinary veneer put on this activity, mythologized as verging on 
paranormal power, both in its impact and significance. The media generated 
around these activities leads to this semblance of ability. Always outsmart-
ing your opponent and never being predictable is part of the equation. 
Capital itself takes on a magical quality. The controllers of this capital, such 
as Trump, are the magicians. People will do anything to be close to power. 
Constantly calling the other ‘evil’ conjures up the concept that evil may 
exist, deflecting from any other evil perpetrated by the name caller. Unlike 
his initial candidates in the race for the nomination by the Republican 
Party, Donald Trump never had to worry about offending anyone, as he 
did not need any f inancial backers (or so he claimed). Big business was the 
stated overt enemy, as it had been to the Nazis. This rhetoric was aimed at 
appealing to the working classes who felt exploited, and small businessmen 
who believed they were unable to compete.
Conclusions
Despite very real fears concerning Trump’s connections with the far right, 
any connected neo-Nazi agenda was just a cover. A veneer of neo-Nazi 
belief is employed to generate support, overtly borrowing from their tactics 
which is utilized as a tool to gain power. Once in power, various policies 
are introduced to benefit the actual elite voted into power, as the reward 
for their support, and to f irm up this support, such as drastically reducing 
taxes, especially inheritance tax. Once defeated on ObamaCare, Trump 
was nonchalant, as this meant more time could be taken on cutting taxes, 
bringing him personal benefit. All methods of benefiting those in power 
are implemented, and appointments strategically made, to hold on to this 
power perpetually. This form of class warfare by the power elite is then 
an attempt at regressing society away from progress and equality, which 
threatens the elite power base. Equality of race, religion, class, and gender 
are signif icant. Equality is demonized as inequality, the jargon and slogans 
being that it is benefiting those who do not deserve it. The UK government 
had employed the same rhetoric when benefit cuts were announced in 2015.
This is moving towards what is otherwise known as ‘crony capitalism’, 
following Luigi Zingales.52 Other examples of overt crony capitalism include 
the activities of Italian politician and media mogul Silvio Berlusconi. Public 
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relations f irms linked to media companies were enabling political agendas 
satisfying vested interests and promoting certain ideologies. Nothing had 
changed since Mario Puzo and Francis Ford Coppola wrote the screenplay 
to The Godfather Part II in 1974, which reveals how an extensive power base, 
f inancially and politically, is formulated. George Lucas, Coppola’s assistant, 
encouraged him to take the project for f inancial reasons, after Coppola f irst 
rejected it. This trilogy of f ilms (1972, 1974, 1990, all directed by Coppola), 
based originally on Puzo’s 1969 novel of the same name, while focusing on 
the f igure of the godfather, actually unearths how political f igures must 
be bought by underhand businessman. The f ilms explain how institutions, 
from the family, to the church, to governments and courts, adapt their 
morals to justify themselves, and this is typically part of capitalism. In the 
Trump era, the relationship between business and government is no longer 
underground, but is raised up as quintessentially American.
Racism can be seen to be at the heart of the American dream. The 
complexities here stem from American racism, in this culturally specif ic 
environment, against the Italians, covered in the f ilm. Actual war service 
by Michael Corleone (Al Pacino) is viewed as making him a true American, 
and guilt free, regardless of his illegal activities. But when he returns from 
the war he is alienated from his family, explaining that their methods are 
not his methods. Michael’s patriotism is unquestionable. In a f lashback 
sequence, Sonny Corleone (James Caan) lambasts his brother for putting 
his country before his family. In this sense, Michael’s tribe is beyond the 
blood ties of the clan, which subverts a form of racism which states only that 
part of the family clan are pure and worthy. This, however, is still a form of 
nationalism that can easily slip into extremism. The moral message of The 
Godfather is overt: power always corrupts.
As with the Nazis, the strength of the purity of the family is emphasized. 
And yet Michael goes beyond blood ties, which is evocative of his strength 
and wider appeal. Loyalty is beyond blood. Michael’s consigliere (lawyer) 
Tom Hagen (Robert Duvall), essentially an adopted son of the family, is asked 
whether he wants to fully step into Michael’s world. Michael’s own family 
betrays him, causing him to have his brother Fredo (John Cazale) killed. 
This is the story of America itself. Whether through a cultural product, such 
as a f ilm, or a politician like Trump who became a reality TV star, there is 
always an attempt at claiming authenticity, suggesting antithetically a lack 
of authenticity. This can be interpreted as a crucial aspect of Nazi and neo-
Nazi ideology, where authenticity is raised up as both a realistic possibility 
and an absolute goal. But this is obviously a fallacious quest, given there 
never was a pure origin, or an absolutely authentic way of being, especially 
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in an American context. Even the indigenous population of America prior 
to the European conquest was extremely diverse.
Like others who have drawn on extreme discourse, Trump manipulates 
the dichotomy between the insider and outsider. The former insider status 
appeals to the population that feels under threat, and the latter outsider 
status appeals to those who believe they are now the total outsiders, also 
under threat. In both cases the enemy is asserted. When extrapolating 
analogies or parallels and patterns historically we need to be careful, but 
the tactics of those wishing to keep power have not changed. These were the 
same myths pushed by the Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s, when they claimed 
non-Germans had taken over the f inancial systems and the media. The 
manufacture of fear along with the message that evil is out there waiting 
to get you is triumphant. Trump’s attack on the media is virulent and a 
departure. President George W. Bush took the stance of a cowboy in his 
rhetoric, using phrases such as, ‘we’re going to smoke them out’, referring 
to how America would deal with terrorists. Bush retrospectively does not 
look so extreme since Trump’s regime won power. Trump’s main modus 
operandi is that he appears to not care, and this generates support and 
offers what could be interpreted as a nihilistic freedom.
The narrative myth propounded by the Trump camp is that the legacy 
generated over decades for the marginal and the oppressed are false con-
cerns and human rights are a myth. Both the Nazis and neo-Nazis thrive off 
hate, and are set up in opposition to what they consider to be the establish-
ment. This same myth is propounded by Trump, overtly and full-heartedly. 
Why should he care if his stance towards China antagonizes the Chinese 
and places 40 years of delicate diplomacy under threat? This mantra of the 
survival of the f ittest, or an ‘America First’-style manifest destiny, blended 
with pseudo-post-Nietzsche philosophy, all might be drawn on by various 
white power groups. These groups or movements claim to support Trump, 
but he is driven by capitalism; one feeds on the other. The level of paranoia 
is signif icant. Both the left and the right are on high alert because of the 
enemy within. The intense attention paid to f inding an enemy both within 
and without is fundamental to this culture of fear.
5. Globalization
Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Questions over race and nationhood are more widely exemplif ied when 
globalization is explored. A good example of this is in India, where the 
Hindu nationalist Bharatyia Janata Party describes the race of ‘Aryans’ as 
indigenous.1 This then constructs those who are Muslims as aliens. The re-
lationship between Nazism, neo-Nazism and globalization is multifaceted, 
with the original Nazis having to make a series of international treaties, 
but the far right in general is anti-internationalism. Those with neo-Nazi 
beliefs who may have been in isolation are now through new social media 
platforms part of a global network that transcends class and country. In 
Germany, there is a new generation of Nazis, known as Kravattennazis, 
literally translated as ‘Tie Nazis’. They are well dressed and middle-class 
professionals, not the clichéd skinhead. Globally, neo-Nazis appear to 
emphasize smart clothes and education, to suggest they are part of the 
establishment.
Poet Michael Rosen writes in his poem ‘Fascism: I Sometimes Fear …’ 
that fascism works by normalizing itself, by being your friend, protecting 
your job, your house, taking away ‘anything you feel is unlike you’. What 
he fears is that, ‘people think that fascism arrives in fancy dress/worn by 
grotesques and monsters/as played out in endless re-runs of the Nazis’.2 
Sartorially astute neo-Nazis are no more international in scope, seeing 
globalization as destructive because it is working against national pride. 
The Immortals believe that Germany is for the Germans, and it is positively 
anti-globalization. This group attempts to recruit from the upper classes, 
seeing any concession to immigration as a weakness. A simple question for 
those seeking to have their homeland for a select group of people is: Can 
we go back to a pre-globalization period, or is this just fantasy? As Britain 
is learning with Brexit, any restriction of the movement of people into the 
UK may also restrict the movement out of the UK. German nationalists 
speak the same language as British nationalists. They believe they have 
become second-class citizens.
Across the world the beliefs, language and symbolism of neo-Nazism 
has seeped into numerous movements, including: Pegida in Germany; the 
Greek Golden Dawn movement, which has adopted a swastika-style logo 
and neo-Nazi forms of violence; in the Ukraine, the Azov Battalion has 
fought under a banner with a swastika-style logo; in Hungary, the Jobbik 
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Party was ultra-nationalist. A range of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America are surveyed here, including Taiwan, Mongolia, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Namibia, Sweden, and Peru, indicating the scope of the global nature of 
neo-Nazism. We shall explore the world of the Nazi hunter which has taken 
people all over the globe, especially to Latin America. Some examples are 
more influential than others, both in their size locally, and also in their 
international influence.
The Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları) in Turkey have had a wide impact, 
their breadth of support a good example of how neo-Nazi beliefs can take 
hold, leading to extreme violence across traditional borders. Their success 
illustrates how those right-wing groups calling for a curb on migration have 
actually been successful due to migration. This group is not the only one 
where there is a signif icant incongruity between the ideology and the real-
ity. The transnational scope of Nazism and neo-Nazism, especially through 
the media, has been highlighted so this should not be surprising. The fact 
that Nazism has fed into a variety of forms via neo-Nazism in different 
cultures and times indicates that the tropes and beliefs are transferable, 
and go way beyond the cultural context of Germany. Even though Nazi 
iconography is globally recognizable given the reach of World War II with 
its devastation and aftermath, it is signif icant that there is an essence that 
is far more primitive than Nazism.
In terms of transnationalism, there are a number of examples. German 
white separatist organizations gained inspiration from American white 
separatist movements, which, in turn, were informed by early Nazism. 
Local variations on Nazism and neo-Nazism exist globally, the symbols 
and belief systems rebranded, often linked to national identities and a 
feeling of threat to local cultures, and in some countries this is linked to 
environmentalism. While it is still open to further analysis, Germans were 
indoctrinated into accepting that Jews were inferior, as were other ‘others’ 
for the Nazis. The Nazis played on economic interests, and gained support 
through denouncing Jews as the root cause of the problem. This emphasis 
exists in a variety of circumstances and has been used to denounce Muslims. 
Globally, it is no coincidence that an economic crisis has led to a rise in 
support for right-wing parties that are close to some of the Nazi beliefs, 
the central one concerning purity of the home population. Indigenous 
Latin Americans have constructed a narrative that the invasion of the 
Americas by the conquistadors was actually part of a Jewish plot, with a 
global conspiracy stemming from the f ifteen and sixteenth centuries. This 
was the period when Jews were actually being driven out of countries in 
Europe, especially Spain.
GloBalizatioN 121
Given the global nature of the phenomenon of Nazism and neo-Nazism, 
with beliefs disseminated and refashioned globally by the media, global 
organizations such as the United Nations have attempted to confront these 
issues. In 2012, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 
67/154 on, ‘Glorif ication of Nazism: Inadmissibility of Certain Practices 
That Contribute to Fuelling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Dis-
crimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’. The resolution focuses 
on concern about the glorif ication of the Nazi movement and the various 
members of the SS. The resolution goes on to point out the problems over 
erecting monuments and memorials and holding demonstrations glorifying 
the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and neo-Nazism. In not too condemna-
tory language it expresses concern at attempts to desecrate or demolish 
monuments erected in remembrance of those who fought against Nazism 
during the World War II, as unlawfully exhuming or removing the remains 
of such persons. It urges states to fully comply with their obligations under 
Article 34 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
There is also deep concern at attempts of commercial advertising aimed 
at exploiting the sufferings of the victims of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed during the World War II by the Nazi regime. But 
22 countries of the European Union did not support the United Nations 
anti-Nazi resolution, and chose to abstain. Even Iran and Syria voted to 
support the anti-Nazi resolution, together with Israel and 120 other member 
states of the United Nations.
These attempts are noble, but there are obvious contradictions at the 
heart of racism and racialized discourse, and anti-racism discourse. With 
globalization and the potential to transgress traditional boundaries there 
is simultaneously the move to re-focus these boundaries, and narrowly 
def ine racial and national identities. Donald Trump was not the f irst 
leader to state that citizens must show an unwavering allegiance to their 
national home culture, and this involves relinquishing other identities. 
In Britain tests to prove citizenship were introduced, full of absurd ques-
tions highlighting that answering questions cannot prove anything. If we 
attempt to move beyond racism, then we need to recognize that there will 
be those clinging onto all sorts of beliefs and myths, including those such 
as, ‘biological determinism, desire for imagined cultural and biological 
purity, and myths about the immutable qualities of different cultures and 
ethnicities’.3 None of this is black and white. Media discourse has enabled 
anti-racism to paradoxically assist racial classif ications, counteracting 
attempts to de-racialize popular culture.4 Terms such as ‘mixed race’ 
automatically assume a form of singular purity, with people always being 
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classif ied, monitored, and defined by their relationship with a ‘pure’ white 
centre.
Globalization has been perceived to not have benefited everyone, espe-
cially when right-wing movements, organizations, and parties construct 
globalization as a form of colonization that challenges the fundamentals of 
a society. This either/or position plays directly into the hands of those who 
wish to go back to a past that never actually existed. Being anti-international 
is actually a key policy of fascism, especially Nazism. Taiwan, for example, 
has the National Socialism Association (NSA). Trump angered China over his 
close relationships with Taiwan, and had to back down from overtly backing 
their independence, for fear of retaliation from China. This NSA in Taiwan 
is a neo-fascist political organization, founded in Taiwan in September 2006 
by a female scientist, Hsu Na-chi, believing in the ideology of Nazism. The 
constant political struggle between the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist 
Party) and the Democratic Progressive Party dominated Taiwanese politics, 
and so the NSA wanted an intervention in the two-party state. The NSA 
was registered as a public organization under Taiwanese law in September 
2006, and so neo-Nazism has been legitimized, although global knowledge 
of regions in Asia only occurs via the media once Western figures like Trump 
are involved. Countries then become pawns in a wider global political game, 
giving neo-Nazi groups leverage through asserting vehement nationalism 
against such perceived oppression.
In the Western world, it is often highlighted how Britain and America 
are different in their approaches to freedom of speech. The former has 
stricter laws than the latter. In Taiwan, the government indicates that the 
establishment and existence of the NSA are protected by the constitution, 
which guarantees freedom of speech and organization. They view Hitler 
as the leader of their group, being condemned by Jewish human rights 
groups, aware of their reif ication of Nazism. In Asia, these local groups 
appear to be a way of defending local interests against what is perceived 
to be colonial oppression, such as that from China. Even superpowers have 
used similar rhetoric, with Donald Trump attempting to remove free trade 
agreements under the rhetoric that America is being swamped with cheap 
foreign goods. Hitler had used such rhetoric during the build up to World 
War II, claiming that foreign powers had enforced too much of a draconian 
punishment on Germany through the Treaty of Versailles after World War 
I. This rhetoric appealed to the German people, fuelling a level of grievance 
that gave a powerful source to a sense of necessary justice, and gave him 
signif icant support. The Germans believed World War I was forced upon 
them, and that the f ive year f ight had been a noble one. They concluded 
GloBalizatioN 123
they had been cheated by the allies over the terms of the Armistice and 
‘stabbed in the back’ by the Reichsfeinde, socialists and Jews, who had used 
the moment to gain power.5
Blaming foreign intervention, across time and geographies, is a popular 
trait of fascism, in whatever form, as is condemning internationalism. Any-
thing that goes wrong can be blamed either on an immigrant, a foreign nation 
or movement. This is not a trait just of fascism, however. During the world 
economic crisis of 2007 to 2008, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown blamed 
the international system, rather than his own economic policies, such as 
deregulation of the City of London, which allowed banks to operate without 
interference. This blaming of an ethereal system was one thing, but we need 
to consider the impact of this recession on the wider rise of neo-Nazism. 
Brown admitted he did not see the scale of the crisis coming, the worst 
f inancial crisis since 1980, under Margaret Thatcher, when unemployment 
reached an unimaginable height. In this regard, Brown’s mismanagement of 
the economy played a significant role in the instability to follow, making a 
global impact in Asia and America. Different nations and groups have learnt 
from each other via the globalization of the media, in terms of controlling 
and using the press, to support their propaganda. Given access globally to the 
Internet is becoming easier, ideas connected to Nazism and neo-Nazism can 
flow more easily in what on the surface appear divergent cultures.
It would be wrong to state that each country and time period was the 
same, but Hannah Arendt’s views in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 
are enlightening in a variety of contexts. Here she explains how often the 
supporters of these movements are non-political people, who are seeking 
some form of stability, when the real situation is far more nuanced. The 
key to understanding totalitarianism is the ability to understand the need 
for rootedness amongst populations. The difference between political 
movements and totalitarian movements is that that latter employ violence. 
Arendt showed how the terror of totalitarianism concerns the removal of 
the human to support an idea, whatever idea that might be, and however 
removed it might be from reality, such as racial superiority or the march 
of history. Psychologically, this range of racist beliefs is not something 
culturally specif ic, although America does seem to be extreme in one area. 
Arendt divides camps up into three: the refugee, labour, and concentration 
camp. Prisons are part of this system, as is Trump’s idea of building a wall. 
America, where one in six African Americans will spend some time inside 
prison, has racism at its core.
Totalitarianism and fascism are not unique to German Nazism. In terms 
of globalization, none of this wider influence should be surprising, given 
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the preference for parochial interests. Populist support for nationalism has 
Trump as a role model, globally. During a march against fascism in London 
on 18 March 2017, a group identif ied as the neo-Nazi English Defence League 
(EDL) shouted pro-Trump slogans. The importance is in the language and 
terminology utilized. Trump called what he was leading a movement, not a 
party, focusing on the apparent alienation of the people from government. 
His role globally has been to unite disparate local groups like the EDL 
under the banner of anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric. Through the 
constant global attention to Trump, the media have in part enabled this 
unif ication of splintered groups, and strengthened their supporters’ sense 
of purpose, mission and validity, pushing their beliefs even further to the 
centre of public discourse, globally.
Mongolia is interesting in terms of the utilization of neo-Nazism ideology, 
symbolism and rhetoric. It implies that Nazi and neo-Nazi beliefs can be 
taken and used to f it most cultures, even one that was actually persecuted 
by the original Nazis, just as we f ind examples of neo-Nazi Israelis. This sug-
gests that the feelings behind these beliefs are ancient, and not necessarily 
Nazi and neo-Nazi, the latter existing as a framework and model within 
which to operate. Tsagaan Khas (White Swastikas) is a Mongolian neo-Nazi 
organization, founded by Ariunbold Altankhuum, known as Big Brother 
that claims to have 3,000 members. The groups mission is to preserve their 
national identity and while they claim to support Adolf Hitler in his ideol-
ogy they dismiss the notion that they are extremist. They do not support 
violence, but they are self-proclaimed Nazis who support nationalism rather 
than fascism. They strive to stop interracial marriage and are especially 
against the Chinese. The group’s members dress like Nazis, making use of 
the Nazi greeting, utilizing all the standard signif iers, such as Nazi colours, 
and the Nazi eagle, identifying the swastika as an ancient Asian symbol.
Hannah Arendt noted that those that believe in totalitarianism are 
not necessarily the uneducated. In Asia these groups have deliberately set 
out to redefine themselves as not part of an uneducated sect. The White 
Swastikas work closely with other ultra-nationalist groups. Despite the 
denial, the group has been accused of promoting violence against interracial 
couples. Some of their music played in clubs includes lines about shooting 
Chinese people. If this discourse was transferred to America this could be 
interpreted as resistance against oppression, just as the black community 
need to defend themselves against white oppression. This indicates the state 
has been open to the free flowing of these beliefs. Yet the group claims it 
welcomes law-abiding visitors of all races. There is a pattern here linking 
neo-Nazism globally, with a simple positioning on the other all the ills of a 
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society, a tradition that goes all the way back to scapegoating, placing the 
‘sins’ of the culture on the animal and banning it.
These groups globally relate to a threat the male population feels to 
their own masculinity, with sexual and gender politics at play, especially 
in the f irst example given concerning Hindus and Muslims. The group 
claims it is just a law enforcement body making sure Mongolian girls are 
not falling into prostitution and having sex with foreigners. While the use 
of violence cannot be condoned, there do appear to be ulterior motives for 
this behaviour, linked to the stated belief in local ethnic purity, but sexual 
tourism is a very real phenomenon. Wealthy Western tourists as well as 
Chinese visitors target poor Asian countries where prostitution is prolif ic. 
With regards to Mongolia, the US state department warned travellers of 
increased assaults on interracial couples, including violence carried out 
by nationalist groups.
Donald Trump’s scepticism over the impact of human behaviour on 
climate change is well known. Neo-Nazi groups do have a correlation with 
some survivalist groups, especially in America, that have turned their 
backs on the city, and returned to the land. There a complex relationship 
between nationalism, fascism, and environmentalism, often in cultures 
where foreign nations are perceived as seeking to exploit them. Members 
of the White Swastikas moved their focus from attacks on foreign men 
who they believed were exploiting their women, to environmental issues, 
rebranding themselves as an environmentalist organization, f ighting pol-
lution by foreign-owned mines. There is a deliberate focus on attempting 
to acquire legitimacy tied into this environmentalist agenda, through 
sending Swastika-wearing members to check mining permits. In an era of 
global austerity, following the global economic crisis, agencies, including 
the police, claim to be underfunded, so organizations argue they must take 
things into their own hands.
Behind this rhetoric concerning environmentalism, the question is 
whether they are actually scapegoating and attacking the innocent. Some 
of their behaviour is certainly extreme, such as threatening to shave the 
heads of women who sleep with Chinese men. Much about this group is 
paradoxical. Even though they claim to not support the killings the Nazis 
carried out, they do embrace Nazi ideology. This is diff icult to understand, 
given that during the war captured Soviet soldiers who appeared to be 
Mongolian were executed by the Nazis. In England, far-right groups have 
attacked Eastern European migrants, who paradoxically sometimes 
have far-right connections themselves. Contemporary far-right groups in 
Europe have attacked Mongolian migrants. Not all ultra-nationalists use 
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this iconography. Widespread ignorance about the Holocaust and other 
atrocities may help to explain why some do. They have a population of 
under three million, and believe they need to maintain their blood purity, 
hence the rejection of mixing with the Chinese.
When assessing how these ideas are transferred transnationally, it is 
of note that nationalist groups came to the fore in Russia after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. With Mongolia, often perceived as a satellite state of 
Russia, these ideas fed into society and combined with its unique brand of 
neo-Nazism, which directs hatred against the Chinese. The issue concerning 
China is a wider one, given China is asserting influence in the region, which 
could be construed as imperialistic. Globalization in general is construed 
as a threat to local identity, and one way of combat this is to incorporate 
Nazi and neo-Nazi methods in defence. This includes utilizing violence 
against anyone constructed as other, such as those who are transgender, 
or any other perceived ‘other’ who are threatening what is traditionally 
perceived to be normal. A resurgence of nationalism is understandable in 
regions like Mongolia that feel under threat, landlocked between Russia 
and China. These two powers have historically competed for influence and 
sometimes complete control of the country. There are legitimate concerns 
about foreign exploitation of mineral wealth that fuel nationalistic fervour.
There is an obvious link between neo-Nazi groups globally regarding their 
beliefs, and often this unity occurs through cultural exchanges achieved via 
new media, especially through music. This is not to say that these groups 
are uniformly identical, with all having their local variations, depending 
on local political issues, such as environmental challenges. Malaysia is 
another Asian country that has its own brand of neo-Nazism, and this is 
linked at promoting what they term Malay power. Their aim is to rid their 
country of any non-ethnic Malays and stop immigration into the country, 
concerned with keeping a ‘pure’ Malay community. All manner of crime is 
blamed on immigrants, as it tends to be globally. The influence of American 
and British neo-Nazi culture is noteworthy, given they listen to American 
and British Nazi bands like Screwdriver and Angry Aryan.
Before it is implied that neo-Nazi belief and behaviour is somehow justi-
f ied due to postcolonial oppression, the next group of neo-Nazis needs to 
be considered. Globalization has enabled the movement of people across 
borders. The Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları) is one of the main neo-Nazi 
groups in Turkey, and has a broader geographical impact due to diaspora. 
This group, which distributes copies of Mein Kampf in Turkish, is part of 
the Nationalist Movement Party. Although the leader, Devlet Bahçeli, at-
tempted to reform the party, its violence is still renowned. The Grey Wolves 
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started in 1968, led by Alparslan Türkeş until 1997 when Bahçeli took over. 
It is active in Turkey, Northern Cyprus, and Western European countries 
with signif icant Turkish populations, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Germany, plus Iraq, Syria, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, and 
China (Xinjiang) and is banned in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This is 
not a bunch of skinheads absorbing the sartorial signif iers of a transgres-
sive style to assert their identity. The group’s ideologies include: Turkish 
nationalism, pan-Turkism, anti-Kurdism, anti-Armenianism, Russo-phobia, 
and anti-communism. They strive for an ideal Turkish nation defined as 
Sunni-Islamic only inhabited by ‘true’ Turks and they are hostile to non-
Turkish elements within Turkey.
Hannah Arendt’s observations are relevant, with the view that fascism is 
essentially about the homeland and rootlessness. The homeless Kurds are 
frequently the focus of all forms of attacks by various nations. In Germany, 
the Grey Wolves are monitored by the authorities as an extremist organiza-
tion. Many events are alleged to have been linked to the group, including: 
the Taksim Square massacre in 1977; the Beyazit massacre in 1978; the 
Bahçelievler and Maraş massacres in 1978; the Pope John Paul II assassina-
tion attempt in 1981; the Prime Minister Turgut Ozal assassination attempt 
in 1988; the coup d’état attempt in Azerbaijan in 1995; and the Bangkok 
bombing in 2015. In 2016, the Swedish Minister of Housing, Mehmet Kaplan, 
sparked controversy after a photograph of him emerged having dinner with 
members of the Grey Wolves. Kaplan, a member of the Green Party which 
forms part of the coalition administration with the Social Democrats, was 
seen with the president of the Swedish branch of the Grey Wolves. Mehmet 
later compared Israel’s treatment of Palestine to that of the German Nazis’ 
treatment of the Jews, and resigned. In Germany, a group known as the 
White Wolves Terror Crew was banned in 2016. They had formed out of 
the fan club of the band Weisse Wolfe (WWT), with the aim to carry out 
violence. In January 2016, a group known as the Oldschool Society was 
charged with planning to bomb refugee shelters and assassinate clerics.
While we might expect neo-Nazism in Europe, an African component is 
more unusual. According to NamRights, a national private human rights 
organization in Namibia, a number of German-Namibians glorify Hitler and 
Nazism. This glorif ication is achieved through selling Nazi-related artefacts 
in tourist shops in the coastal town of Swakopmund and on their tourism 
farms. Nazi fugitives are said to have been hiding there since 1945. Article 23 
of the Namibian Constitution prohibits Nazi ideology and the spreading 
of its propaganda, the latter point open to interpretation. The influence 
of the media is important, given some media outlets such as Namib argue 
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that these rumours are entirely false, and are spread from Norway-based 
Internet magazines, and are not in Namibia. There is an economic element 
to this. Owners of shops in Swakopmund would claim that the interest in 
the products does not stem from an interest in the ideology. The interest in 
Nazi globally memorabilia is remarkable, but it is arguable whether people 
interested in the artefacts are actually neo-Nazi sympathizers.
Elsewhere in Africa racist ideologies have f lourished. In 1973 Eugéne 
Ney Terre’Blanche and six other far-right Afrikaners formed the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) that had hoped to establish a Boer state. Ini-
tially he called for armed struggle and revolution, and was imprisoned for 
three years for attempted murder, and was himself murdered in 2010. Louis 
Theroux’s BBC documentary on the Boer leader popularized the f igure, 
who perversely constructs white people as victims of oppression, with 3.5 
million white people versus 40 million black people in South Africa. His 
influence should not be seen in isolation, related merely to Africa, given his 
beliefs have influenced other white separatists. Theroux’s style is to almost 
play an innocent fool normally, but in the episode of Louis Theroux’s Weird 
Weekends called ‘Boer Separatists’ (season 3, episode 3), he does confront 
the man’s racism.
Latin America is a signif icant zone concerning Nazi and neo-Nazi activ-
ity and its interpretation in a variety of media. Legends and myths blend 
with facts with stories about contemporary politicians meeting with active 
neo-Nazi groups merging with myths about areas internationally where 
neo-Nazi activity continues, constructed as part of occult behaviour. Peter 
Lavenda in Unholy Alliance: A History of Nazi Involvement with the Occult 
explicates the research he carried out in Chile and how he discovered a 
cult compound called Colonia Dignidad, described as housing a sect that 
combines Nazism and voodoo. While it might seem farfetched to assume 
that neo-Nazi groups globally were and actively are still engaged in the 
occult, a brief glimpse at the origins offers some insight. Thule Gesellschaft 
was a pagan anti-Semitic aristocratic society, founded by Baron Rudolf von 
Sebottendorff. He approached Walter Nauhaus, a veteran of World War I 
and the Thule Society was formed. Their focus was on racial evolution, 
Nordic mythology and German nationalism, and one interpretation is 
that this society gave birth to Nazism. They recruited among Germany’s 
working class, by forming a group called the German Worker’s Party, which 
met regularly in beer halls to discuss the threat of Jews, communists, 
and Freemasons. This group later became the National Socialist German 
Workers’ Party (the Nazi Party), and in November 1923, they made their 
f irst attempt at a national takeover, the failed Beer Hall Putsch, led by a 
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man who had originally been sent by the German Army to spy on them, 
Adolf Hitler.
Due to investigations made popular via blogs some of the myths 
around this subject situated in Latin America are more easily unearthed, 
debunked and tracked. Generally, it is well-known that some Nazis left 
Germany and entered Latin American society, living anonymously in 
places like Chile, but what is less known is that National Socialism was 
established in Chile prior to World War II. Memories of this are celebrated 
annually even today. Each September a pilgrimage is made to a monument 
in Santiago’s General Cemetery, which concerns paying homage to an 
attempted coup in 1938. This coup was by young Chileans, many with 
German heritage, who were then killed by government troops. Since 1938 
the support in Chile has grown. In the south, a German enclave that was 
complicit in the torture of the Augusto Pinochet regime lost its leader 
following charges of child abuse. Years of living under the vicious regime 
of Pinochet resulted in the f lourishing of neo-Nazism in Chile, a country 
in which young people were willing to embrace an identity formulated 
around the notion of militarism.
There is a vigilante element to this. Peruvians who may be from a lower 
economic group are targeted by the neo-Nazis, as are homosexuals, drug 
addicts, and anyone perceived as different. There is an even earlier history 
to this. At the start of the twentieth century, Nicolás Palacios published the 
book Raza Chilena, and the ideology propounded in this text is still adhered 
to. Palacios, a criollo (a person of full or near full Spanish descent born in 
Latin America), popularized the belief that Chileans were the chosen race, 
a group formed from a blend of Native Araucanos and Spanish blood.6 
Stepping outside of the Chilean environment, we can witness the absurdity 
of neo-Nazism when we consider Peruvian neo-Nazism. The leader of Peru’s 
far-right political group seeks to expel the country’s small Jewish popula-
tion, believing they control the global economy. This is a common theme 
of Nazism and neo-Nazism. Claiming the system is being controlled by a 
bunch of evil people who are Jewish has been central to anti-Semitism, and 
has had a global impact. Hitler’s hatred towards the Jews stemmed from 
this belief, and the view that Jews controlled the governments of all the 
countries he wanted to defeat. The iconography around Nazism and neo-
Nazism and its absorption and mediation are central to its global impact. 
Martín Quispe Mayta, the leader of the Andean Peru National Socialism 
movement, admires Adolf Hitler and his off ice is adorned with portraits 
of the Nazi dictator, as well as well as a copy of Mein Kampf and a large flag 
bearing a symbol that looks like a swastika.7
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Mayta, who drew his inspiration from Hitler’s Nazi ideology as well as 
Henry Ford’s anti-Semitic book The International Jew, further claims that 
the leader of Spain’s brutal conquest of Peru, Francisco Pizarro, was a Jew. 
‘The Jew Pizarro and his band of genocidal Jews killed millions of native 
Peruvians in their mission to possess our gold,’ he told The Guardian. There 
are only about 5,000 Jews in Peru, of a population of nearly 30 million people. 
In a place whose political and economic power remains largely in the hands 
of a white elite minority, with indigenous Peruvians at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic scale, it is the Jews who are, once again, blamed for the 
country’s grievances. The Jewish Association of Peru said in a statement 
to The Guardian that it rejected Maytam’s ‘open expression of anti-Semitic 
racism’, and had ‘appealed to authorities to take the necessary measures to 
halt the incitement to racial and religious hatred’.
As a brief survey reveals, from Taiwan to Peru, the global impact of 
Nazism and neo-Nazism is clear, and the manner in which the media may 
invent and reconfigure Nazi and neo-Nazi stories tangible. As with some 
of the media, it would also be tempting to blame Donald Trump for every 
atrocity, globally, but this ignores history. Trump has been perfect for satire, 
despite the comedy so far not seeming to have any real impact. As the laws 
of transgression dictate, Trump might be mocked, but this only goes to 
reinforce his desire for a control on channels of information, which includes 
the media as a whole. Since taking off ice as president up until March 2017 
there were over one hundred attempted bomb attacks on synagogues and 
Jewish-related centres in America. Globally, anti-Semitism has often been 
prevalent. A decade earlier, in 2007 police in Israel had thwarted a neo-Nazi 
ring, after an eighteen-month investigation. This was after attacks on two 
synagogues. The powerful signif icance of Israel in international politics 
should not be underestimated.
Since 1990 a million people from the former Soviet Union have emigrated 
to Israel, which has a population of 7 million. Israel’s Law of Return al-
lows anyone to claim citizenship if they have a Jewish grandparent, but a 
signif icant number of the new immigrants have no connection to Judaism, 
moving purely for economic reasons. Again, who is the victim is an interest-
ing debate, with Russians believing they are discriminated against, being 
denied the right to marry. The police found explosives in the home of one 
of the suspect with plans to hold a Nazi ceremony at Yad Vashem, the Holo-
caust museum in Jerusalem. These events had wider ramif ications. While 
Eff i Eitam of the National Religious Party wanted a bill to restrict the rights 
of non-Jews emigrating to Israel, an Arab member of the Israeli Knesset, 
Ahmed Tibi, raised the issue of the absurdity of Israeli laws. Extensive rights 
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are given to Russian newcomers with tenuous Jewish connections, whereas 
Arabs who have lived in the region for generations are denied rights.
International Nazi Hunters
Media attention has inspired the drive to confront Nazis, as well as neo-
Nazism now being a genre in international f iction and documentary 
f ilmmaking. One area that has received global popularly is that of Nazi 
hunters, a term invented by the media. Various f igures are hunted down 
and exposed during a documentary, and often found to be living quietly and 
anonymously. The overall argument for the makers of these documentaries 
is that the hunt for Nazis draws media attention to a subject that some f ind 
unpalatable, and this has definitely enabled justice to be carried out. During 
the Cold War, former Nazis were utilized in the West to f ight against the 
Soviets, and certain deals were made to protect people from prosecution 
if they cooperated. The Advisory Board of Clemency headed by John J. 
McCloy did commute the death sentences and reduce the prison terms of 
various Nazi war criminals. The activities of freelance Nazi hunters have 
become the subject of a plethora of dramas and books, especially hunters 
Serge and Beate Klarsf ield who delivered SS off icer Klaus Barbie to French 
courts in 1987. There was the diff icult goal of having to incorporate millions 
of former Nazis into societies.
While the scale and international reach was incomparable, this whole 
area of pursuing state criminals was not just a problem Germany and related 
countries faced with the Nazis. We only have to consider a handful of Latin 
American countries to see the parallels. Ariel Dorfman covers this in his 
internationally successful play Death and the Maiden. The play premiered at 
London’s Royal Court in 1991, and since then has been performed all over the 
globe and turned into an opera in 2008. The ubiquitous nature of the play, 
set in an unnamed Latin American country, means it has had an appeal in 
a variety of contexts. The play was adapted for a f ilm directed by Roman 
Polanski in 1994, starting Sigourney Weaver and Ben Kingsley, leading to 
worldwide acclaim and media attention. In the play a woman encounters a 
man who she believes was once her torturer under a dictatorship, but there 
are questions over truth and memory.
There is the subtext concerning gender, power, and collusion. In one 
interpretation, the play seems to ask: are we ready to confront the past, 
individually and as a nation, even if we are confronted with it? Rather than 
have f igures hunting down a man, who may have tortured them in the past, 
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here he appears by what seems like a random accident, following a problem 
with his car. This almost implies that life is actually far more random than 
we think, but we are always haunted by the past, whether we choose to 
confront it or not. Fundamentally, once you have been tortured, do you 
have the right to torture your torturer, or does this make us just like them? 
This question brings us back to the question about whether every one has 
the potential to be a Nazi. If this is the case, does this partially explain the 
ongoing fascination with neo-Nazism and related movements?
Sometimes the media collude with investigators who are outside the 
framework of the state, and by doing so can often achieve better results. 
Looked at cynically, we can assume this will create better drama through 
transgressing normal paradigms and structures. Rules are broken to attain 
a result, perhaps, or some form of accepted boundary transgressed. As 
with all forms of investigation, often the end justif ies the means. But when 
people take justice into their own hands we should be concerned. This is 
even if they are partly justif ied, as in Death and the Maiden, where there 
is still ambiguity. There is a wealth of literature and research on the way 
private activists have made it their objective to bring Nazis to court, and 
the suspected crimes of these people go beyond anti-Semitism. As with 
the neo-Nazi f ilm, the Nazi hunter documentary is a genre in and of itself.
These activists and hunters are arguably bringing about a greater sense 
of humanity, given those who have acted against humanity are being held 
to account, but sometimes they use methods that are inhuman. This is an 
international phenomenon, with the victims and perpetrators part of a 
diaspora that occurred during and after World War II. With documentaries 
about wars, and particularly about the Nazis, dominating channels, one 
with a live thread concerning a hunt was bound to create far more tension, 
having now become part of the zeitgeist. A subtext is this is a part of a new 
politically correct world, seeking transparency, by flushing out old evils. But 
there is an obvious parallel here with fascism. There is an alignment here 
paradoxically with racist ideology, which wants to cleanse the state, with 
the hunters wanting to remove evil from the world, to restore ‘true’ human-
ity. Justice needs to be done, but the close link to how this is documented 
and mediated via a variety of sources is of signif icance.
The media began referring to some of these seekers after justice as ‘Nazi 
hunters’, but pursuing Nazis was but only one part of range of activities.8 
From the position of the influence of the media, there was a demonization 
that frequently removed culpability. Through some documentaries, people 
began to question the eff icacy of using these methods. On the one hand, 
it was important for documentary teams to track down Nazis who had 
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blended back into society. On the positive side, these individual agents also 
insisted that the courts and police live up to their duties. They co-operated 
with these agencies on various levels, during the investigation of the crimes 
in question. Actively coordinating media campaigns to educate the public to 
their cause, while fully explaining what they were doing and the historical 
framework, this indicated the real benefits of the media in this context.
Creating media programmes with this kind of content has become 
standard, from hunting Nazis, to paedophiles, to cheating partners. The 
‘money shot’ here is the moment the person knows they are caught and 
cannot escape, like a caged animal after the hunt. The problematic nature 
of the Nazi hunters is the time it takes for this to go through the courts, 
given the people involved are elderly. Nazi hunting in some respects can 
be framed as a professional business, but still the legal process serves a 
function here, making sure all the evidence is weighed up. Often debates 
in the wider narratives come down to whether someone was aware of the 
deaths happening around them, or was just a functionary, or if there was 
an ulterior purpose if they helped some Jews escape. All of these stories 
make good material for documentaries or f ictional f ilms, as they involve 
unearthing a secret or solving a mystery.
We have seen how the f ilm Inglorious Basterds plays on this theme in a 
historical context, loosely juxtaposing an initial hunt for Jews with a later 
hunt for Nazis. Either way, it needs to be noted that framing this activity 
as a hunt constructs humans as animals, and positions those doing the 
hunting as predators. This in itself might be a true reflection of reality, with 
the acceptable view that humans are just animals, and the hunt functioning 
as a trope for the capitalist system. Nazi hunters may have helped prompt 
changes in the political and juridical handling of the Nazi criminal legacy 
and also influenced the public perception of it. But a very real question 
remains over people taking justice into their own hands, and the status of 
the vigilante within the law. Their involvement facilitated the investigation 
of Holocaust crimes and served as a corrective throughout and the publicity 
the private activists generated instigated a wider discussion about Nazi 
crimes.9
Media forms may have helped make the boundaries and taboos sur-
rounding the Nazi past more visible, shifting or overcoming taboos, but 
there were issues with crimes being distorted. As individuals gain the 
ability to create media products themselves, via personal documentaries 
made with handheld technology, we should not underestimate the value 
of individuals taking control of the processes of creating media. At the 
same time, often what appears in some contexts is beyond the hands of 
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the maker and consumer of the product. For example, large companies 
advertising on Google have complained about the positioning of their 
adverts, sometimes these appearing against neo-Nazi websites and YouTube 
channels. Concurrently, outside the law any manner of uncontrolled events 
can occur, including uncontrolled violence against suspected Nazis, who 
actually may not be Nazis at all. This violence was frequently the case with 
regards to the battles between neo-Nazis and the Anti-Nazi League in the 
1970s and 1980s. The hardcore dedication of Nazi hunters globally has tended 
to highlight its value, especially the input from the media. While the rest 
of the population, along with governments, may have wished they could 
move on from the past without addressing it, these activities help societies 
to confront their past authentically.
Simultaneously, these hunts have conjured up myths and legends around 
where Nazi groups are living now. Helicopter shots of swimming pools 
in Latin America supposedly containing swastikas is just one such non-
verif iable source, that generates this idea that in certain zones criminals 
linked to the evils of the past are being kept. There is also the implication 
that state investigations are not doing their job, and that only private 
individuals can get to the truth, which is not accurate. Transnationally, 
to position this evil always elsewhere serves a purpose of removing the 
evil from a known locality, making it always one step removed, and never 
containable. The most well-known example of the capturing of a Nazi by 
international state activities was that of Otto Adolf Eichmann captured in 
Argentina by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, in 1960. Eichmann was 
a major f igure, given he had been responsible for the strategy concerning 
the deportation of Jews to concentration camps. Eichmann denied nothing, 
but claimed he was just following orders, and was executed in Israel in 
1962. What the trial did was bring attention to the debates concerning 
culpability, with some historians arguing that not even Hitler called for 
the extermination of the Jews.
Other famous cases have been part of a series Nazi Hunters broadcast 2010 
to 2011, and reveal the international scope of this exercise of hunting Nazis. 
Episodes include: the work of Serge and Beate Klarsfeld, who tracked down 
Klaus Barbie, known as the ‘Butcher of Lyon’, and had him extradited from 
Bolivia to stand trial in France; f inding the Gestapo off icer Erich Priebke, 
who was tracked down by American journalists in Argentina; the case of 
Josef Mengele, tracked for 30 years by Mossad, and who ended up moving 
from Paraguay and then to Brazil, where he died; hunting Paris Gestapo 
chief Kurt Lishka, who was living freely in Germany and then was arrested 
in Cologne, after being tracked down, again by Serge and Beate Klarsfeld; the 
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complex case of Paul Touvier, who murdered Jews and resistance f ighters in 
France; the hunt for Franz Stangl in Brazil by Simon Wiesenthal, which then 
lead to the arrest of the deputy commander of the Sobibor extermination 
camp, Gustav Wagner. These stories are packaged as real-life detective 
stories, and moulded within that genre.
Along with these real stories with tangible and intangible outcomes, there 
is a range of other media and cultural forms, such as the f ilm Weresquito: 
Nazi Hunter (Christopher R. Mihm, 2016), which concerns the aftermath of 
a World War II experiment in the context of hunting. The f ilm, like so many 
others, reveals how using Nazi themes becomes a simple way to develop 
a backstory in the context of ‘absolute’ evil. Soldiers are left transforming 
into blood-sucking killer insects at the sight of blood. The path to salvation 
is f inding the culprits who committed the experiment and bringing them 
to justice. With an estimated budget of $10,000 the tagline is ‘The most 
controversial movie EVER made!’ What this f ilm and others media products 
suggest is that internationally, far from global cultures denying the Nazis, 
from fashion in Japan and Peru, to the transnational style and flirtation with 
fascism engaged with by David Bowie and his transnational followers and 
emulators, elements of Nazism and neo-Nazism have become ubiquitous.
Nazis and neo-Nazis hunting their enemies, and vice versa, is a subject 
of numerous f ilms, globally. In Australia, it was Russell Crowe’s break-
through role as the lead in the f ilm Romper Stomper that marked him out 
as a formidable screen actor. As with Tom Cruise and Daniel Day Lewis 
playing people with disabilities, it seemed the more realistically you could 
embody a neo-Nazi the more your credibility would grow. Similarly, in the 
German/UK film I.D., previously mentioned, when Reece Dimsdale played a 
neo-Nazi (John), he was arguably at the height of his career, the f ilm gaining 
a cult status, with spin-offs and remakes, being distributed on various 
new platforms. In ID2: Shadwell Army (Joel Novoa, 2016), for example, the 
international scope of what was originally a seemingly very English f ilm 
is made clear. Now a young British Asian policeman goes undercover, with 
Shadwell FC, owned by a Russian oligarch. What he finds is a battle between 
the EDL and BNP, political and football violence combined.
Video Games and Conclusions
Video gaming is also a signif icant area where Nazi and neo-Nazi tropes 
are reimagined. Regardless of the actual ownership of games, due to their 
interactivity, there is often a wider influence of video games regarding 
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their impact with a global reach. A whole culture has built up since the 
1980s around the use of video games, which is a highly competitive f ield 
with its own rules. Concerning influences, it is also important to stress 
that various studies on the influence of video games need to be understood 
holistically. Video games frequently place the player in the position of a 
f irst-person narrator, or from the player’s point of view. Some are still quite 
traditional in structure, drawing on forms such as the book, having chapters 
and characters.
When considering influence we need to be careful. No one single area of 
entertainment can be said to have constructed someone’s identity and belief 
systems, or influenced their behaviour, despite moral panics about the use 
of video games amongst the young. Moral panics normally originate among 
those who have not engaged with the thing of concern. In this case, these 
games often offer a strict moral framework and are hardly transgressive. The 
relevance of a brief mention of video games here concerns their strong global 
appeal. Gaming is an international phenomenon and often transcultural. 
Arguably, unlike some literature or f ilms that may alter in their translation, 
video games can cross these national and cultural boundaries easily, and 
are made with this intention in mind.
Stereotypically, video games concern the elimination of enemies in a 
variety of environments. But there are interesting low spec games that 
play on moral decision making that reflects preconceptions regarding race 
and nation. Papers, Please created by Lucas Pope and released in 2013, is an 
example that functions philosophically on a number of levels, set in a border 
zone that reinforces national boundaries. Here the player is an immigration 
off icer in the f ictional country Arstotzka, working in an airport, who gains 
points depending on their eff iciency, but moral conundrums arise. If one of 
your clients tells you the next person in the queue is a terrorist, for example, 
do you take this as a diversionary tactic to obscure their own guilt, or act 
on this, but lower your eff iciency rate overall?
The Nazis, of course, are almost like a global ‘brand’, recognized in most 
cultures. Having a Nazi thread to a game’s background narrative appears 
natural, as then they are understood, with the tropes and signif iers already 
existing to draw on. Critics may conclude, as they do with some filmmaking 
and literature, that this overreliance on Nazi signifiers is uncreative, always 
returning to a set view of the past, but it would be diff icult to cast this 
allegation at the work of influential authors such as Philip K. Dick. Video 
games, similarly, have often taken the same route, and used the Nazi era as 
just a stepping-stone for something much wider, metaphysically. The game 
then is actually a form of mirror to some of the pressing issues confronting 
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the world during the contemporary period within which it was produced. 
This then informs the debates around neo-Nazism.
Even with the advent of postmodernism, critical discourse on video 
gaming is not as well regarded as it is on other forms of media and culture. 
Concurrently, the use of video games has always been considered as being 
slightly transgressive, part of an uncontainable youth activity that stands 
juxtaposed to the adult world, with its def ined rules and regulations. As 
explained, video games do have their own rules, however, not only within 
the basic algorithms of their own software, but in the individual and social 
behaviour surrounding their use. We have the moral elements placed into 
video games, as in some versions of Call of Duty, where the user is being 
asked to survey what they have done, and reflect on their choices. This 
confronting the player with their choices does make a real impact. Call of 
Duty began in 2003 and had thirteen different versions by 2016 with its third 
incarnation having the allies f ighting against the Nazis.
Caveats need to be added before a claim is made on the absolute inter-
national relevance of these games. The absolute need to win and beat the 
game is part of an adrenalin-fuelled experience that functions to create a 
personal sense of achievement, which may have more relevance in some 
cultures than in others. This is then self-perpetuating, and marketing of 
the same brand of games fulf ils this function. There is an appeal that comes 
from placing the player within a visceral immersive first-person perspective, 
which goes beyond the passive consumption of the culture that the older 
generation can be accused of. Given the signif icance of Nazism in history, 
it would be strange if a number of video games did not have this theme as 
their backstory.
Whether it is f ighting Nazis or demons, these games operate in a post-
civilization world, which reflects on a position promoted in cultural theory 
from the 1980s concerning ‘the end of history’. The title of Slavoj Žižek’s 
2011 work Living in the End Times sums this up. Life as we know it in reality 
is not functioning anymore. This whole ‘beyond civilization’ scenario is 
actually akin to much of the Nazi doctrine, which wanted to bring about 
the end of one era, and the instigation of another. Beyond the rhetoric was 
a belief in the march of history, and that this was part of destiny. Similarly, 
it is neo-Nazi ideology that maintains civilization is being damaged by the 
acceptance of immigrants, for example, and it is time to ‘refresh’ the world. 
The Turner Diaries makes this clear.
Section 86a of the Criminal Code of Germany prohibits the use or depic-
tion of unconstitutional organizations, and the video game Wolfenstein has 
been included in this ban. In its post-World War II scenario, the Nazis have 
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won the war via robots, and variations on these games involves hunting 
down and killings Nazis. Having an enemy has virulent as the Nazis makes 
any game more enjoyable, and so criticism that such games lack imagination 
is disingenuous. Hundreds of games involve traversing a diff icult terrain, 
being chased or chasing, in some ways hunting bounty. Again, we might 
return to Freud’s notion expounded in his explanation of his grandson’s 
fort/da game, where the interpretation is the ‘player’ is dealing with their 
relationship with their mother. Freud’s grandson throws a cotton reel, 
pretends it is gone, and then retrieves it, the game working as a form of 
psychodrama, reassuring him about his mother. The same can be said for 
video games.
Wolfenstein: The New Order, according to www.vgchartz.com, sold 1.56 
million units by 18 February 2017. Breaking this down internationally this is 
split 30.7 per cent in North America, 51.6 per cent in Europe, 2.1 per cent in 
Japan, and 15.7 per cent in the rest of the world. Set in the 1960s, the series 
involves the protagonist B.J. Blazkowicz, who launches a counter-offensive 
against the Nazis, who have taken over the world. This game was the seventh 
in the series, originally released in 2009. The game received numerous 
awards, globally, indicating how its transnational themes, including the 
aesthetics, were appealing. As early as 1981 Apple II offered Castle Wolfen-
stein, which had the player search for secret war plans, but it later switched 
to f irst-person shooting. By 1993 the successful Wolftenstein 3D was causing 
controversy. Opening with the Nazi Party anthem ‘Horst Wessel Lied’, the 
game involved the player making their way through swastika-smothered 
bunkers, killing Nazis in an attempt to f ind Hitler. Banned by the German 
government, attacked by the American Anti-Defamation League, the game 
led to evolution in the f ield, influencing a new generation of games.10
Through documentaries the media created the term ‘Nazi hunter’, and 
this then inspired the creation of video games, f ilms, and galvanized further 
interest in Nazism, internationally. Stating anything is universal is conten-
tious, given it may offer collusion with a certain violence of colonialism, 
where the European truth or value is def ined as the universal one. This 
chapter has briefly explored certain regions in the world where neo-Nazism 
proliferates, and stressed how certain attempts to address racism can be in 
itself be termed as re-inscribing the notions of race and purity. The paradoxes 
concerning immigration and diaspora, especially in a Turkish context, are 
significant and reveal how a group with neo-Nazi similarities has thrived on 
violence. A number of groups within certain countries that feel threatened 
by global powers that then turn to neo-Nazism have been surveyed. The 
importance of Donald Trump’s dominance through the media has been 
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shown to indicate a unif ication of disparate fascist support around the 
globe. The obsession with purity and origin is then disseminated through 
various media platforms. This is then tied into neo-Nazi ideology, leading 
sometimes to violence, offering believers a sense of power. In Latin America, 
for example, this related belief system in a different form existed prior to 
Hitler’s physical expansion of Germany. Overall, this suggests these beliefs 
are transnational in appeal and scope and have longevity, through hardcore 
believers claiming to adapt their beliefs to become more mainstream, and 
followers functioning as local enforcers of tradition.

6. Conclusions – The Infinitely Other
Evil and Violence
From 1990 to 1997 seven and a half million foreign-born people entered 
America legally, forming 29.2 per cent of the population growth.1 Globally, 
many white people sincerely believe their rights have been overlooked, and 
this victim status as the ‘new other’ then lends them a level of respectability 
which right-wing groups have capitalized on. Some German neo-Nazis took 
this position after World War II, arguing the treatment of Germany by the 
allied forces gave them this victim status. The discourse around books on 
hooligans, such as The Football Factory and various spin-off television series, 
claims that the white male has been overlooked in general. There is little nu-
anced analysis over how male violence is still a problem, especially domestic 
violence. Often racist violence in this context is given overt approval as a 
form of legitimized retaliation. The terms ‘nationalist’ and ‘populist’ replace 
the concept of ‘extremist’, and yet it is still extremism, and in some cases 
terrorism. In controlling the discourse by constantly branding the ‘other’ as 
a terrorist, often linked to a specific religion, any level of domestic terrorism 
can be carried out in the name of homeland security by the state. The state 
then commits acts of terrorism in the name of preventing terrorism.
Neo-Nazi groups have been quick to utilize social media for their 
purposes. Politicians like Donald Trump have thrilled in condemning 
the establishment. It is part of a general discourse to describe the current 
order as the establishment and the need for a new order as doing away 
with the old establishment. Adolph Hitler used it as a tactic. In Britain, 
the whole of Jeremy Corbyn’s construction as a leader was to claim he 
is anti-establishment. Before the Liberal Democrats joined a coalition 
government, Nick Clegg gained support via live UK television debates by 
painting himself as an outsider and anti-establishment. Trump, with his 
personal wealth, was always part of the higher echelons of society, despite 
the ongoing vagaries around what we mean by class. Clegg had gone to a 
school of the establishment, which made him part of the establishment. 
As Stuart Price has explained, the term ‘working class’ has been weakened, 
with regards to a positive political identity; simultaneously, the other large 
category, the bourgeois class, has been challenged. This is exemplified by the 
growth of managerialism matched with precarious employment practices.2 
There is the signif icance of the development of the use of technology which 
needs acknowledging, robots replacing labour, creating a labour-free class. 
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Whether neo-Nazis are part of the establishment, those that control the 
media fuel neo-Nazi arguments, which are normalized. No one could argue 
seriously for any direct hypodermic model of media impact, but the shift 
to making extreme right-wing rhetoric part of the mainstream offers a 
platform within which people formulate opinions. This is regardless of 
whether these ideas make any rational sense, have long-term validity, and 
stand up to testing.
In the UK and in America in 2017 there appeared to be no actual plan 
or real strategy, no matter how frequently Donald Trump or Theresa May 
repeated ‘we have a plan’. The media had taken a guiding hand in this chaos, 
with politicians since Tony Blair overtly guiding their policies in relation to 
how events were constructed by the media. Trump had taken this a step fur-
ther, more preoccupied with how he was perceived than any other previous 
politician. If the media was not supportive of his strategy, or lack of it, then 
they were condemned as spinning fake news controlled by his opponents. 
Satire and mockery did not dent Trump’s agenda. Simultaneously, the media 
itself was condemned by Trump as being part of the establishment, a normal 
tactic that politicians have employed. This condemnation appeared to be 
working. Trump was continually shown to be lying over various issues, but 
initially the media was silenced and condemned as being false and fake. 
To paraphrase a well-known phrase from George Orwell, in a world of lies 
speaking the truth is revolutionary.
The emphasis on Trump is so relevant because internationally America 
was still regarded as the leader of the ‘free world’ in 2017, despite becoming 
anti-international under Trump and the phrase now appearing antiquated. 
Trump’s use of the media was highly selective. This could be conceived as 
censorship and was also a theme former UK Prime Minister John Major had 
touched on when he pointed out that anyone thought to hold an anti-Brexit 
position was being condemned as being anti-British. In February 2017, the 
BBC were not allowed to take part in a press brief ing by the White House. 
The BBC challenged this decision, which became a news item in itself. This 
highlighted how information was now being selectively disseminated to 
those who would not challenge or question the approved message. Repeti-
tion of key messages, regardless of their veracity, became the norm. During 
Hitler’s rise to power he initially advocated brute force, but then realized 
he had to win people over through the system, and closely manipulated 
his own image for these purposes. In this regard, it would be wrong to 
suggest Trump was the arch-manipulator of the media beyond anything 
seen previously, given Hitler’s prowess. Unlike Hitler, however, Trump could 
reach the world instantly and directly through Twitter.
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In America, scholars often use the term ‘radical’ for some extremists, 
which is almost a compliment. At its heart is the constant threat of the 
‘other’. There is also a complexity concerning the relationship with the 
establishment. Whether you are a white separatist, a survivalist, a KKK 
member, or a neo-Nazi, you have the same ambition: ridding the earth 
of any non-white race. How far this goes is continually open to debate. 
White separatist movements existed before the Nazis, and so labelling all 
these movements ‘neo-Nazi’ could be questioned. During times of austerity, 
those with the most powerful voice, utilizing whatever media they can 
f ind, will turn the population against free thinkers. What we f ind within 
this discourse is an attack on the educated, those who have the ability 
to challenge the system. They are demonized as the elite, damaging the 
position of ‘real’ people. Once again there is the manufacture of the myth 
of authenticity and purity, with a continual harking back to a utopia that 
never existed. The f ilms of Steve Bannon are random and irrational, but 
have the central theme that there was shift during the progressive and 
liberal 1960s that attacked the so-called real and pure America. Within 
this ideology, this is what led to its downfall and must be counteracted at 
all costs. Myths are then created to serve a purpose.
In his seminal early book Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (1952), Alan Bullock 
showed that Hitler, despite myths to the contrary, was not from a poor or 
uneducated background. His father was an established customs official, and 
his pension continued after his death. Hitler pretended in Mein Kampf that 
he had a poor education, which again was false. He did leave school in 1904, 
not because he was too poor, but because he was indifferent to education, 
f inally leaving without any certif icates at all. He may even have completed 
a short course in marketing at the University of Munich. When Hitler left 
prison after writing Mein Kampf the global media reported that he was a 
reformed main, who wished to retire into anonymity. Regarding education, 
Trump is well-known for a court case over his Trump University, where he 
was sued by former students, who believed their fees were wasted on get rich 
property courses that had no basis in fact and were unethical. While Trump 
personally could be labelled an extreme capitalist, the epitome of a certain 
kind of American greed, calling him a radical or an extremist is suggesting 
he personally has a wider political ideology, which is debatable. But a basic 
review of Steve Bannon’s propaganda reveals a very clear ideology.
Hitler was in some ways preaching to the converted, as was Donald Trump 
in 2016. Prior to Hitler’s rise to power, there was the belief that hundreds 
of thousands of Jews were going to attack German girls, and that ‘Negroes’ 
were a threat to German purity, fears more recently drummed up with 
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regards to Muslims. The similarities in rhetoric between the regimes are 
uncanny, and debates rage on whether Trump is akin to Hitler, or whether 
that argument is overblown. Even diametrically opposed ideologies can 
use identical rhetoric, as with the Osama Bin Laden and George W. Bush’s 
speeches.3 Trump’s blustering rhetoric in his campaign and since he gained 
power focused on war, a sure way to galvanize those who feel they have 
been mistreated, and who seek revenge. This was essentially a war against 
liberal elites, a war against immigrants, and a war against the rest of the 
world, who apparently hated America.
According to Nietzsche, war is a state that ennobles mankind, and 
Nietzsche can be used to explain the theological concept of Judgement 
in post-9/11 theology and public rhetoric. Both Bush and Bin Laden used 
forms of vengeful sermonizing, as has Trump; there obviously would be no 
President Trump without 9/11. This emphasis on war, again, is nothing new. 
For Trotsky, war was the locomotive of history. William Gilmore Simms, 
a poet, novelist and historian from the American South of the nineteenth 
century, explored the following view: ‘War is the greatest element of modern 
civilization, and our destiny is conquest. The moment a nation ceases to 
extend its sway it falls a prey to an inferior but more energetic neighbour.’4 
American foreign policy appears to cohere with this view. In Trump’s case, 
as well as Islam, the enemy was switched from the Jew to the Mexican 
initially, with strong claims they were rapists, hence the need to build a 
wall. In Steve Bannon’s f ilms the covert attack is on Jews. The wall itself 
was not Trump’s idea, and had already existed in part across some of the 
Mexican-American border. For example, the city of Nogales has an existing 
wall that is eighteen feet tall dividing Arizona, USA, and Sonora, Mexico.5
The Department of Homeland Security patrols the wall, which advanced 
its militarization after the attack on the Twin Towers in September 2001. 
In southern Arizona, between October 2000 and September 2014, there 
were 2,721 people found dead, from a variety of courses, plus numerous 
others were not discovered, trying to enter America. Arguing which country, 
America or Mexico, is superior, is a false question, and relates more to f iction 
than fact. Because the space travelled to is outside the space travelled from 
it is a ‘nowhere, place without place […] the syncopation of an inf inity 
and paradoxically its limit, its frontier’.6 Trump’s views on miscegenation 
have a very long history and stem from a great deal of f ictional literature. 
H. Rider Haggard in Heart of the World (1894) portrays union between races 
as causing destruction. This myth is one used time and again in Europe and 
America by the far right. One even more metaphysical question is: Which 
country, America or Mexico, is the land of the free? Americans seeking 
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escape see Central and Latin America as the zone of freedom. This was 
cultivated by a generation of writers and f igures linked to a number of 
movements, including the Beat Generation.
In the run up to World War II, propaganda worked at home and abroad, 
with British papers such as The Express denying Hitler was a threat, and 
claiming there would be no war in Europe, even when Hitler was invading 
Poland. The media in general was in denial. Ownership of these papers was 
in the hands of Nazi sympathizers, and whatever activity he did initially was 
justif ied. Fundamentally, Nazism, like neo-Nazism, is based on long-held 
grievances. For the former, it stemmed in part from issues over the Treaty 
of Versailles, and the manner in which Germany lost territory, along with 
the high reparation payments forced upon them. Hitler, along with other 
Germans, believed their grievances were justified and they had been harshly 
treated. For neo-Nazism, grievances are linked with the perceived loss of 
identity and opportunities, with groups of ‘others’ to blame. From jobs, 
to houses, to women and children, the evil other is portrayed as stealing 
from and ruining the motherland. In America, Trump claimed Mexicans 
were raping American women. In the UK in the 1930s the newspapers were 
full of the apparent sex crimes committed by Jews.7 How much these were 
believed is questionable but we can see a parallel today with the discourse 
on immigration, especially in Germany. When repeated frequently enough, 
propaganda will be taken by the people to have some basis in fact. The 
evidence of its influence is debatable, but the message worked in Trump’s 
case.
The notion of purity has a long history. A German girl may become preg-
nant, and a non-Aryan might be blamed. This is also evidence of a threat 
concerning the power to reproduce. Makers of new technologies have had a 
problem with how they deal with hackers, those who are intent on subver-
sion and disruption. What better way of subversion than using Hitler? An 
example of this came in March 2016 when Microsoft was forced to delete its 
teenage AI after it became a Hitler-loving sex robot. On 16 January 2016, The 
Mail Online reported on ‘The Backlash: Neo-Nazis on the Rampage’. Appar-
ently gun sales were soaring. Sue Reid warned that sex attacks by migrants 
had ‘unleashed dark forces in Germany that have echoes of the past’. For 
The Independent, reporting 13 February 2016, the Cologne sex assaults were 
part of a Muslim rape myth which f itted the neo-Nazi agenda. On 29 March 
2014 the Daily News reported that the Neo-Nazi Party in Germany had 
dropped porn star Ina Groll, after discovering she had previously had sex 
with a black male. Issues over sex crimes can work both ways. On 14 April 
2016, the campaigning organization ‘Hope Not Hate’ reported that Ryan 
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Fleming, a British neo-Nazi on the sex offenders’ register, had released a 
book, Codex Aristarchus.
The media were very keen to unite Nazis with paedophiles. For example, 
The Daily Record reported on 7 May 2016, ‘Nazi Thug Who Chanted Allah 
Is a Paedo – Is Exposed as a Child Sex Pervert’, naming Kristopher Allan as 
an active member of the Scottish Defence League. In Russia and America 
there have been cases of neo-Nazis taking justice into their own hands, 
and in using violence in brothels. On 6 August 2016, The Inquisitor reported 
Jeremy and Christine Moody plotted a vigilante murder of a sex offender. 
There have been many killings globally that have been tangentially linked 
to neo-Nazism, but the most well-known ones seem isolated from any group 
ideology. On 23 September 2008 catering student Matt Juhani Saari killed 
ten people and himself at a college in Kauhajoki, 180 miles northwest of 
Helsinki, Finland. The day before the police had been questioning him 
over videos he had released on YouTube, but they had released him due to 
lack of evidence. Hate crime over social media is a developing area and it is 
questionable whether the police would have just released him if this hap-
pened today. Five days before the murders his YouTube message claimed he 
hated the human race, and that his favourite video clips were the Columbine 
school shootings in Colorado.
We need to be cautious when connecting neo-Nazism to a variety of 
mass killings that occur globally, especially in terms of cause. Similar 
killings, such as those by Pekka-Eric Auvinen in November 2007, a student 
from a town outside Helsinki, who shot dead six students, plus the school 
nurse and the head teacher, before killing himself, suggests that neo-Nazi 
influences are just some of the beliefs that turn an individual to hatred. 
The point that these killers make is that this is an avenue to f ind a voice 
and achieve notoriety, but it should not be overlooked that the ‘classic’ 
example of this is the Columbine shootings. In this instance, after plan-
ning on bombing their high school in Colorado on Hitler’s birthday, they 
instead shot twelve people after their homemade bombs failed to work. 
Postmodernism is key here. The Columbine killers wanted to be regarded 
as authentic killers, not copycat killers forming part of a wave of other 
killers, such as those at schools in Oregon and Kentucky. There is a strong 
argument that these killers are white terrorists, although their victims 
are not necessarily those from ethnic minorities, and some of the killers 
are from an ethnic background. Seung-Hui Cho killed 32 people on the 
Blacksburg campus of Virginia Tech on 16 April 2007. As Peter Conrad 
summed it up, referring to the current state where biology and technology 
have fused:
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Killing so coolly, Auvinen, Cho, Klebeld and Harris belong to a generation 
that has advanced into this uncanny existential future. They are certainly 
postmodern people, attempting to salvage what Auvinen calls a ‘free 
mind’ from the stale sameness prescribed by the media. But I wonder 
somehow if they’re not post-human as well.8
Rightly or wrongly, this comes down to the issue of authenticity. Culture in 
part thrives on the ideal of authenticity, with the idea that to be authentic 
we must openly express all our rage, raw sexuality, and cruelty, even when 
this may fly in the face of cultivated morality. Figures such as the Marquis 
de Sade, Arthur Rimbaud, Georges Bataille, and Antonin Artaud, are all 
central to lifestyle enclaves and art movements of Western culture. Freud 
most famously revealed the darkness at the heart of the human animal. 
But the only way we can distinguish right from wrong is by having a moral 
map gained from socialization. These killers were anti-society, but they 
liked to believe they were original, when in fact they were its antithesis, 
acting out the roles they had seen in f ilms, such as the influence of Oldboy 
(Chan-wook Park, 2003) on Cho. Even the witnesses had been so conditioned 
by violence on television and f ilm that they failed to believe what they were 
observing was real.
Postmodern discourse should not be shut down. We see this in the work 
of Quentin Tarantino. Simulated violence is utilized, offering a postmodern 
parody that penetrates bland calls for authentic discourse. There are mul-
tiple paradoxes. Postmodern philosophers, such as Gilles Deleuze, argue 
that the best theory leads to more theory. This takes us beyond blinkered 
thinking. Those that attack such philosophy are looking towards the past, 
to a period which they believe was clearer, and more authentic. In reality, 
that pure period never existed, other than in the desired imagination. 
Black-and-white frameworks and paradigms may have been employed 
to promote structuralist thinking. The playfulness of the postmodern is 
more subversive to the simplistic paradigms of fascism than anything else. 
New media technologies, while often being employed by neo-Nazi groups, 
have also successfully added to this openness, offering a more fluid way 
to both present knowledge and opinion, and for people to construct and 
play out their identities. This can challenge power systems and destructive 
ideologies, including neo-Nazism.
One of the major concerns of those that believe the Internet needs to 
be censored is that it may be giving people access to illegal material or 
misinforming people, as well as all the other issues over child grooming. 
Worshipping death, attempting to make a monument to death through the 
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virtual, posting on the Internet, killers, being ‘real’ neo-Nazis or not, and 
their followers, conversely wipe away the moment, the space in which an 
event can take place. While the Internet is a space with infinite possibilities, 
it becomes a scrapbook for images of nothingness. For Derrida, we can-
not have our being without violence; using Levinas, he claims nonviolent 
language is language without the verb ‘to be’. Usually, evil is said to be 
lies, ignorance, or deadly stupidity, all ways Trump has been described. 
Following Badiou, when we truly confront the condition of evil, we see it 
is much rather the process of truth.9 In relation to totalitarianism, there is 
always a desire for the omnipotence of the True.
There are further controversial elements to this subject we have only 
briefly touched on, and some of these relate to pleasure. What, then, are 
the ethics of Nazism and neo-Nazism as entertainment? The concept of the 
‘Holocaust industry’ is well known, and Nazi chic mentioned in Chapter 1. 
Does this phrase industry also apply to the Nazism and neo-Nazism and 
the media? Is there an industry around the use of Nazism and neo-Nazism 
as entertainment? And, if so, what is the wider purpose of this in the 
media and for society? Categorizing media products as white power mov-
ies, or neo-Nazi texts, can lead to their promotion and better marketing. 
The study of characters in certain texts can be utilized for knowledge 
concerning ‘the construction of subjectivity in the world’ beyond the 
text.10 Similarly, these texts may offer indications in the apparent real 
world of how to behave.
The plethora of media that utilize Nazi and neo-Nazi-related themes are 
too numerous to address in one book, but the question of entertainment, 
as a whole, can still be tackled to a degree. The stereotypical savagery 
of the Nazis has a ubiquitous appeal for screenwriting narratives, given 
questions of otherness and conflict are always being addressed. Stories 
concern tackling a secret with secrecy at the very core of power. Despite 
being so reworked, the full knowledge of Nazism and neo-Nazism can still be 
viewed as a secret, which can never be fully uncovered. The area of Nazism 
and neo-Nazism is one of the most contentious there is, and is bound to 
draw attention from a marketing perspective. To complicate matters, this 
question of otherness can always be reversed, such as when the skinhead 
racist f inds out he is Jewish, a theme in a variety of f ilms. The creation of a 
belief in a force that must be destroyed plays with the notion of the sacred, 
and the imagination.
Hatred towards Jews within a Nazi and neo-Nazi context goes beyond the 
physical to the metaphysical, a realm that involves the invisible. The belief 
is their malign influence has caused a negative impact that is beyond that 
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which is visible. In this regard, when examining Nazism and neo-Nazism 
and the media it needs to be understood that the frenzy of the visible which 
allows for a certain magical system. Paul Virilio in The Vision Machine 
declares that what we have in the media age is blindness, leading to a lack 
of understanding. But the question remains, Is part of the entertainment 
of the real a secret knowing, that this is, a playing with meaning? This can 
be illustrated by the Freudian fort/da game, inside the seen and unseen and 
the lost and found. In the position between the signif ier and the signif ied, 
do we really allow and then enforce an ethical judgement and shut down 
engagement? Engaging with this subject is touching on transgression. By 
doing so, this is moving towards the sacred and the paranormal, between 
the physical and metaphysical.
There is a playing with secrecy and revelation, and the controlled 
transgression of the revelation similar to the workings of shamanism. The 
media creates our contemporary myths, functioning to some degree in this 
shamanistic fashion. Despite a healthy scepticism towards the media, there 
is still an addiction to its output and a certain belief. To allow play and to 
engage the imagination some belief, even if it is simulated, is necessary. As 
with all forms of terrorism, neo-Nazi violence is a form of entertainment, 
a way of focusing the eyes of the media. To call this white terrorism re-
emphasizes the spurious idea that white as a category has some form of 
authenticity, although culturally it does. Nazism and neo-Nazism has war 
as one of its tenets, and war itself is a theatre. Nazi accounts of engaging in 
war take on a religious and romantic tenor, while French reports of their 
defeat take on a paranormal tone, their failure described as a ‘phénomène 
d’hallucination collective’.11
There is a philosophy propounded by Virginia Woolf and others that has 
maintained that an event only really exists if it is recorded. What would 
we truly feel if we could see inside the Holocaust? A diff icult question is 
whether this reminder of the Holocaust through the emphasis on Nazism 
and neo-Nazism in the media is actually an effort at doing so, at getting 
behind the Holocaust. Attempts such as Son of Saul, discussed in Chap-
ter 2, despite their well-meaning worthiness always fail. While seeking 
authenticity may be a noble aim, it should also be remembered that this 
is impossible. Neo-Nazism is not just about ridding the earth of Jews, and 
even that aim might be questionable to some neo-Nazis. In its original 
incarnation, groups like the National Front in the early 1980s in the UK 
were concerned with headline policies, such as repatriation and capital 
punishment. Nigel Farage’s UKIP had some similar headline policies, forcing 
the main Conservative Party in the UK to always move further to the right 
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to capture the support of the far right. Once more, the centre is then forced 
towards the extreme.
Farage was the f irst politician to be revealed by the media to be seen 
meeting with Trump, like a mascot of the new order winning the approval 
from the demi-god. Theresa May then going to America straight on the 
heels of this, and offering Trump a state visit to the UK within seven days 
of his inauguration, is clear evidence of Farage’s influence. Time and again, 
members of UKIP have been under scrutiny, and found to be verging on 
the neo-Nazi right of politics. May’s move legitimizes this. By playing the 
trump card of a state visit, which would be blessed by the Queen, in her 
authority May was asserting a triumph concerning class. May was using 
the status of royalty as a gift to Trump to gain his support, to subvert Far-
age’s power. Despite his party previously winning a vast number of votes, 
nationally, Farage was not a UK-based politician. Underlying all of this was 
a class-based nationalism, and a yearning for identity. At the end of March 
2017 UKIP had zero MPs, with Douglas Carswell resigning from the party.
Neo-Nazism is not at the extremes of culture but at its heart. A further 
question is, Can we consider this to be a new phenomenon? Only post-
Brexit and with Trump did people feel more comfortable expressing these 
views, the argument being they were always there. Optimistically, what we 
might see in America is the last roll of the dice of the extreme right, Trump 
known as the ‘disruptive president’, doing everything he can to create chaos, 
destroying any gains made by progressives. Steve Bannon’s f ilms are a prime 
example of media culture that attacks the notion of progress and equality. 
Our exploration of the television series NSU German History X also revealed 
how the extreme is at the centre of culture. Furthermore, media forms such 
as this Netflix series reveal that neo-Nazi belief has just f illed a void. Those 
portrayed in this drama based on fact have no clear direction, and see 
the older generation as not just conformist, but also betrayers of the past. 
Once again, there is the view that they have been betrayed, and progress 
is detrimental. There is also the international element, with the National 
Socialist neo-Nazis in Germany learning their tactics from Americans. 
The programme makes clear that Muslims are the new Jews, although this 
argument has been shown to be contentious.
A question is also raised about education and the contemporary audience 
through these forms of media. For those not raised on detailed history 
lessons about the Nazis, these media and cultural products are their history 
lessons. Identif ication with groups to gain social acceptance and a sense of 
personal identity is fundamental to this analysis. For example could, theo-
retically, a programme such as NSU German History X actually encourage 
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neo-Nazi violence? Influence is a complex area, with no definitive answer. 
No amount of ethnographic work could make it clear that cultural product 
X was the reason for behaviour or belief Y. In January 2017, The Jerusalem 
Post reported a number of anti-Semitic attacks across the south-east of 
England, including bricks being thrown through the windows of Jewish 
people in Edgeware. Post-Brexit, post-Trump, and post-truth, it appears 
that there is an increase in actions that can be conceived to be neo-Nazi. 
Neo-Nazi groups often viewed biopics such as NSU German History X as 
lessons in how to be a neo-Nazi.
One larger question concerns the issue of whether the actual context is 
important. For Tarantino, the issue is revenge. For Spielberg, the issue is 
forgiveness. In both contexts, however, there is the negotiation with the 
other highlighted by the face. For Levinas the face, ‘is not biological, ethnic 
or even social; the face evoked is the concrete appearance of the idea of 
inf inity that exists within me’.12 Film by its nature deals with this inf inity, 
and working with Levinas we see that his philosophy concerns resisting 
possession or utilization, which is anti-Nazi, regardless of the meaning of 
the sign over Auschwitz: work sets you free. Taking this a step further, can 
we really take on a responsibility that transcends knowledge? As Levinas 
shows, the face signif ies ethical knowledge, which is there from the begin-
ning: thou shalt not kill. This again is anti-Nazi. There is a profound paradox 
here. There is in the face what seems like the impossible: ‘It obliges us to 
receive the idea of inf inity prior to engaging the operations of cognition, 
but how can we receive an idea prior to entering ideas?’13
Theodor Adorno claimed the Hegelian system objectif ies the subject, 
raising it in the process to a transcendental status, but for Adorno the 
separation in philosophy between object and subject since Descartes is 
wrong, as they are mutually mediated by each other.14 For Levinas created 
being (totality) is but the trace of the passing of the inf initely other.15 ‘It is 
not the self that constitutes the meaning of the Other’s existence; rather, it is 
precisely the opposite: subjectivity is constituted in and through its relation 
with alterity.’16 While seemingly complex and abstract, this needs to be held 
in mind when considering neo-Nazi discourse within the media, in all its 
varieties. ‘One is not aware of his or her individuality until one enters into 
a relationship with Another [sic] and so calls the subjectivity of freedom 
itself into question.’17 The Nazis destroyed difference, as do all dictators.
Donald Trump has been condemned for being divisive, and also for 
demonizing difference, but also simultaneously praised for uniting America 
via hate; over 60 million voters agreed with him enough to vote for him. 
‘Ethics, the welcoming of the Other [sic] by the self, is only accomplished 
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through the recognition and maintenance of the radical disjunction of same 
and other, of subject and object.’18 We need to recognize the importance of 
the infinitely other, that is non-containable. Fundamentally, it appears that 
the Nazi and neo-Nazi movements concern containing this otherness. To 
summarize, for Levinas, ‘who was saved the fate of his fellow Jews […] the 
violence endemic to sexism, racism, classism, nationalism etc., is the denial 
of the totality of being as the trace of the inf initely other’.19
Denial and Memorial
In February 2017 Channel 4 News reported on a survey concerning Internet 
searches that found that the top four items brought up using any search 
engine or platform regarding the Holocaust were basically neo-Nazi-
orientated messages. People receive all their information from the Internet 
and despite it often being misinformation people will then believe that 
the existence of the Holocaust is debatable, for example. Even renowned 
Holocaust denier, David Irvine, in an interview with Channel 4, found this 
disturbing. He had tried to escape publicity by moving to a remote part of 
Scotland, but was still inundated with fan mail, from followers. The f ilm 
Denial (Mick Jackson, 2017) was based on David Irving’s 1996 libel lawsuit 
against academic Deborah Lipstadt and her publisher Penguin. Lipstadt 
had accused him in her 1993 book Denying the Holocaust of being a liar 
and Holocaust denier. Much of the debate focused on whether there were 
holes to place the gas into the chambers. The judge suggested that if Irving 
(played by Timothy Spall) truly believed his account then he was not lying. 
The drama of the f ilm also focused on the conflict between Lipstadt (Rachel 
Weisz) and her lawyers. The lawyers were convinced she should not take to 
the stand, nor should a Holocaust survivor give evidence. Message boards 
on YouTube concerning the f ilm’s trailer were again dominated by neo-Nazi 
discourse in February 2017, with commentators arguing tautologically that 
if so much weight was given to disproving the deniers there must be some 
truth in their denial.
In a Channel 4 interview in April 2000, after the trial Irving argued that 
he did tell his version of the truth, and that he was not a racist. He blamed 
the media, claiming the media was obsessed with racism. He positions 
himself as an old-school patriot, claiming his views are that of the majority, 
which is a common tactic we f ind amongst the far right. Almost 20 years 
later, with the Brexit vote in 2016, Irving’s form of racism became overt, 
suggesting he had a point regarding the majority. By this, I am not suggesting 
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this is legitimizing these views, or that they are commendable. The judge 
had called him a racist, stating he had falsif ied the facts, mistranslated 
documents, and his perception of Hitler had basically led him away from 
objective history. Irving’s view was that Hitler was basically innocent of 
the destruction of the Jews, because he was not fully aware of it. Concur-
rently, he claimed the death camps could not have been used for systematic 
slaughter. But discussing the trial with Krishnan Guru-Murthy, the Channel 
4 News presenter, his arguments do not come across as extreme; he agrees 
that he has to be selective with the facts. With both the trial and the f ilm 
the very real danger, as we saw with NSU German History X, was that this 
would fuel an interest in Irving’s work, especially his website, boosting 
his popularity once more. Despite the truth, the paradox is this would 
strengthen neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism.
Irving called the judgement ‘perverse’ and had called Holocaust survivors 
‘mentally ill’. The tactic here is to condemn anyone who disagreed with you 
as morally or mentally inferior, a classic fascist device. A more common 
way today of doing this is to claim someone is ‘on the spectrum’, dismissing 
someone because they may have some form of autism or related different 
ability. Signif icantly, in America the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but 
in English law the burden of proof is with the defendant. This gives the f ilm 
Denial an opportunity to work as a history lesson, with Lipstadt and her 
lawyers going to Auschwitz and elsewhere to f ind further evidence. The 
f ilm pushes the trial beyond Irving making it about preventing the rise of 
anti-Semitism, and neo-Nazism, and also about the importance of truth. 
The UK release date of the f ilm is also signif icant; the f ilm was released 
during January 2017 with Holocaust Memorial Day being 27 January. In 
America, it was noted that the White House issued a statement on the day 
which unlike previously did not refer to Jews and anti-Semitism. Some, like 
Jonathan Greenblatt, the CEO of the Anti-Defamation League, criticized the 
removal of explicit references, but the argument by the new administration 
was that this was an ecumenical statement.
In the age of Donald Trump, all media outlets became obsessed with 
the fake news phenomenon. Channel 4 ran a whole week of debates on the 
subject in February 2017. Commentators who were not exactly supporters 
of Trump but were attempting to stay outside the mainstream claimed that 
this phenomenon of fake news had always existed, and was the paradoxi-
cally the essence of news reporting. Altering reality, then reporting it as fact, 
has an old history. David Irving, for example, in his work in the 1960s on the 
bombing of Dresden, claimed that over a quarter of a million people were 
killed. The impact of this hyperbole is of note, and reveals how so-called 
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knowledge is generated from no evidence. Future histories took this as an 
absolute fact, until two decades later it was found irrefutably that Irving 
was a fabricator. The judge in the Lipstadt trial pointed out that Irving was 
not using documents correctly. Irving’s increased the number of deaths 
in Dresden by 1,000 per cent. Irving’s early work, taken as historically ac-
curate at the time, was an international best seller. This then had such an 
influence on belief about World War II that the allied forces in this context 
were then believed to be the savage aggressor, killing a quarter of a million 
innocent civilians just at Dresden. The f igure now is to thought to be more 
like 20,000, but in popular debates the view that the allies were as brutal 
as the Nazis is still held. Trying to dismiss such views as untruths leads to 
counter-allegations of denial, despite their being no evidence for Irving’s 
arguments. Once such views have been absorbed into the history books it 
is diff icult for them to be retrospectively edited out.
With the amount of rolling news and information on the Internet, the 
speed of breaking news stories can take precedence over accuracy, espe-
cially if the number of gatekeepers is reducing. Neo-Nazi groups globally 
have been successful in utilizing Facebook and other forms of social media 
to spread their message. It would be wrong to conclude that just because 
someone reads a neo-Nazi site, or watches a video posted by Britain First, 
they are a follower of this ideology. The British Labour Party, itself accused 
of being anti-Semitic, possesses the largest membership of any party in 
Europe, but stands in diametric opposition to Britain First. The 2016 London 
mayoral elections epitomized this, with the winner being a Labour politi-
cian and a Muslim, Sadiq Khan. In November 2016, The Daily Star reported a 
neo-Nazi group was calling for Sadiq Khan to be assassinated. The story was 
linked to the killing of Labour MP Jo Cox, and claimed the extreme-right 
forum IronMarch had postings demanding: ‘Now kill the London mayor.’ 
The administrator of the site was Benjamin Raymond, leader of National 
Action, a splinter group of the British National Party’s young wing. Other 
serious neo-Nazi-related attacks have occurred in the UK, with Zack Davies 
being jailed in 2015 for his attack on an Asian dentist. Davies was also a 
member of IronMarch with links to National Action. The drama concerning 
these events is central to the debate, conflict key to grabbing the audiences’ 
attention, the news media a form of entertainment. Examples include El 
Niño Skin, who was arrested for racism on 19 February 2015 and became a 
hero as he was perceived to be livening up a sports game.
Crimes connected with Nazism did not disappear over time, but were 
in general bought to light further. The Associated Press reported on 
13 November 2015 that Oskar Gröning was charged with 300,000 counts of 
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accessory to murder. This was signif icant, as it overturned a 1969 ruling 
that stated being a staff member at Auschwitz was not enough for you to be 
convicted. Gröning was known as ‘the bookkeeper of Auschwitz’, overseeing 
and helping redistribute the valuables of the Jews. He did express regret 
and claimed he spoke out in order to contradict Holocaust deniers. This 
ruling set a precedent for pursuing suspects, many now in their nineties 
accused of serving in death camps. The federal court’s ruling also cleared 
the way for prosecutions of ex-members of the Nazi mobile death squads 
known as Einsatzgruppen, which operated in Eastern Europe. Campaigners 
believed at least eight suspects could now be accused of murder because 
their membership of the death squads would be suff icient proof. This was 
a signif icant change in German policy according to Efraim Zuroff, the 
head of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Israel. Programmes concerning 
Nazi hunters have proved to be just as popular as variety of media forms, 
such as documentaries, a large number about the life and career of Hitler.
In terms of audience consumption, there is a fragmented approach 
contributing to a diverse construction of Nazism and neo-Nazism in f ilm 
and media. Certain products are suggested to a user, depending on what 
they have engaged with before, platforms such as Netflix developing profiles 
of whole families. One of the most popular platforms, Netflix has a whole 
category for f ilms that concern football hooligans, often with neo-Nazi 
content, other feature f ilms, and documentaries. Films such as Nazi Dawn 
(Dennis Devine, 2014), where the spirit of a Nazi ancestor possesses a young 
woman, and Nazi Revenge, where a man has past life regression, following 
him having nightmares and then believing he was a Nazi, play on the myth 
that at heart we are all Nazis, and we all have something to atone for. But 
these are normally horror f ilms drawing on the notion that the Nazi is the 
ultimate monster, lurking within the uncanny. And such systems do make 
mistakes. In one instance a documentary on Netflix made in 2011 about 
Hitler had the description: ‘Out and proud, they overcame prejudice to 
become some of the most influential voices in America’s LGBT community.’ 
These words appeared over an image of marching Nazis. Whether this 
‘mistake’ was a real or invented mistake is questionable, given an article 
was written about it, published on the Internet, and then entered the media 
domain.
While comedy can be used to tackle the subject of Nazism and neo-
Nazism, this could be considered to be trivializing serious matters. Pushing 
the boundaries through transgressive humour is balanced by changes in 
the law concerning Nazi-related crimes. Recent neo-Nazi incidents have 
been addressed through changes in the law, and this has generated media 
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interest. For example, Ursula Haverbeck-Wetzel received ten months for 
Holocaust denial, after years of just being f ined. She had been a Holocaust 
denier, at one point suing a Jewish organization for discrimination herself, 
personally taking on the position of a victim. Her flirting with all forms of 
media across the decades to her downfall, as this provided documentary 
evidence concerning her illegal propaganda. In a Panorama documentary, 
broadcast in Germany by ARD television in March 2015, Haverbeck-Wetzel 
denied the mass destruction of the Jews, claiming it was the biggest and 
most persistent lie in history. Her level of denial and the publicity she 
courted indicated she had come herself from a troubled past, although she 
had infiltrated right-wing political parties, who eventually rejected her. She 
published a video on YouTube protesting against the trial of Oskar Gröning, 
and distributed leaflets outside the court, which were reported to feature 
Holocaust denial. As with David Irving, not only was she trying to rewrite 
history concerning the Holocaust, but also concerning Germany in general, 
turning the latter into a victim. In 1992, Haverbeck-Wetzel became the f irst 
chairperson of the Memorial Sites Association, remaining in that position 
until 2003. The association was established to build remembrance for the 
German civilian victims of World War II, to end what was perceived as an 
unjustif ied unilateral view of history.
Just as with the false memory syndrome lobby, there are people active 
in denying the memories of others. While this might sound like science 
f iction, it needs to be noted that this is actually the way all of us now exist 
to a degree. Each news item is f iltered through an element of distrust. We 
get our main news sources electronically, and much of this is entertain-
ment rather than news. Outlets do have fact checkers, but the key point is 
they often attempt to break the news story as quickly as possible, without 
actually being at the source. A famous example of this is the German Wings 
tragedy. No one yet knows the true cause of this, but Russia Today claimed 
to have broken the news story f irst, without any of their journalists being 
at the scene. In this sense journalism and reporting has shifted, morphing 
into an interesting blend of fantasy writing in parts, given fact checking 
has become less important. Trump claiming there had been a terrorist 
attack in Sweden is another example. All he needs to do is promote the 
same message again and again.
Levinas celebrated difference and attempted to redefine how we viewed 
the creation of identity, which is a direct reproach to Trump. While Levinas 
focused on the other, on the refugee or immigrant, for example, Trump 
denied their existence. The lesson of the Holocaust is one of hope. You 
cannot destroy a people like this, no matter hard you try, especially a people 
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who possess a profound faith. While this may appear overoptimistic, to 
always focus on the evil on the Holocaust actually lends Nazism even more 
power. This book has recognized that neo-Nazism proliferates all over the 
world but it has not gone into the resistance to neo-Nazism, which is strong. 
Writers of science f iction, such as Margaret Atwood, have revealed future 
worlds where fascism exists but is embodied in the state and normalized. 
In an age of austerity, people may not resist and may just become one with 
main system to survive. We see this in totalitarian states like North Korea, 
but also in a different form in the UK and America.
British universities are a case in point. The voice of those that might be 
different are often quashed. The late Jewish MP Gerald Kaufman attacked 
the fact that pro-Israel organizations within universities in the UK were 
active in silencing any pro-Palestine voices. This book is a call for open-
ness and a lack of censorship. The question is, Should f igures such as Nick 
Griff in be given such a public platform? With f igures such as Nigel Farage 
this is questionable. The media seemed to believe everything Farage does 
is newsworthy. The only British UKIP MP up until March 2017 when he 
left UKIP, Douglas Carswell jokingly claimed that Farage was getting a 
knighthood due to his contribution to headlines. One thing that needs 
noting about those flirting with fascism is that they seem unable to take 
a joke. Trump is the main example here. Comedy can be used politically. 
Charlie Chaplin claimed that he would have not have made his masterpiece 
The Great Dictator if he had fully known about the Nazi death camps. This 
lack of being able to cope with humour suggests fragility unknown to most, 
and a preciousness that means more mockery will take place. By the end of 
February 2017, it did appear that Trump’s presidency was unravelling, the 
press beginning to be the opposition.
There will always be people like Trump and Farage who want to grab 
headlines. Farage claimed that 4,000 people with HIV/AIDS were coming 
every year from Africa to use the NHS, suggesting that Africans were infect-
ing the pure British. All of this hate rhetoric gets headlines, and some do 
believe these headlines. But the accountability of these politicians needs 
to be addressed, not just by other politicians, media scholars, or teachers, 
but by everyone. To ignore this would be to accept the status quo, and to 
enable a regressive state of affairs to commence. While this is a fear, it is a 
sound assessment and one grounded in current affairs. Unless each citizen 
believes in accountability, we shall f ind the rights of the citizen eroded. As 
with Margaret Thatcher, Theresa May has claimed society does not exist. 
Simultaneously, f igures like May and Trump continually promote ideas 
concerning nationalism and country.
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We began by drawing on the significance of boundaries and postcolonial-
ism, which drew on the wider philosophy of Heidegger. Believing passports 
should abolished and that boundaries and borders are an absurd human 
invention is too radical for some to comprehend, but it comes from having 
a legacy of the Holocaust. Israel strongly defends its borders, and the right 
for a homeland. For refugees and migrants today having a homeland may 
sound like a fantasy, and a sense of place is key. We have not yet tackled the 
true meaning and purpose of neo-Nazism, and to suggest this is singular 
would be specious. Neo-Nazism in some contexts is part of opportunism, 
a door to be pushed, or kicked open. In Britain, there is the continual high 
alert concerning terrorist attacks, which generates a constant fear of the 
other. After an attack on London in March 2017, the police confirmed that 
the perpetrator was attacking alone, negating the view that the Western 
world is under some kind of attack from fundamental Islam. Many people 
from ethnic backgrounds are killed in police custody, with the work of the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission stretched. Fear is a way of 
controlling the population to make the implementation of any policy easier.
To illustrate how extremism has become part of the centre we should 
consider those who previously seemed from the right now criticizing what 
they perceived to be too extreme, given its normalization highlights their 
own complicity. George W. Bush, a former leader of the ‘war on terror’, has 
become the voice of reason, claiming he does not like the racism of Trump. 
In the UK, it is the high echelons of the establishment, the House of Lords, 
which is attempting to alter Brexit proceedings so the rights of Europeans 
living in Britain are protected. This ref lects on another area, knee jerk 
culture, the belief doing something is always better than doing nothing. 
We can identify Trump’s policy as being part of this. The philosophy is you 
need to assert your new order immediately, without any thought and this 
proof of a deep level of ignorance. You ignore others at your peril. Without 
a greater depth of consideration, the implementation of anything will be 
problematic.
Trump’s business was sued in the 1970s for discrimination and not 
employing black people. Time and again he has resisted claims of having 
sympathies with racists. In the new order what exactly happens is that 
there is a stalemate. The more Trump pushes for passing policies without 
consultation the more they will backf ire. The greatest leader does not 
put them self at the centre but situates themselves outside the frame. If 
we reflect on leadership and the cult of the leader we see that those that 
desperately need to lead, and require the aff irmation of leadership, are 
often not the best leaders. But fascism, Nazism, and neo-Nazism all revolve 
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around the cult of the leader, and the cult of war, and with this is the need 
for an enemy. Peace becomes anathema, as is recognizing human beings 
as human beings. The drama of entertainment and media will always f ind 
the conflicts generated by these movements of use. Even a non-news story 
becomes a news story. When a group of neo-Nazis in the UK or Germany 
hold a rally and more anti-fascists turn up than fascists, this is news.
The feelings of fascism get channelled in differing ways, on to terraces, 
into boardrooms, and into bedrooms. The culture of fascism has blurred with 
fetishism, often linked with the sexual nature of Bondage and Discipline 
(B/D), Dominance and submission (B/s), and Sadism and Masochism (S/M), 
collectively known as BDSM, as mentioned in Chapter 1. This has become 
popularized and normalized, but in a clichéd way, as in the Fifty Shades 
of Grey trilogy by novelist E.L. James. Censorship has worsened. There is 
no clear line of progress historically, and history itself is just a selection of 
events, edited by the writer from their own perspective. Evidence needs 
sifting, and the writer must admit where there have been elements omitted. 
As reporters say to Trump when he shouts them down as fake news reporters 
what he really should be saying is that he disagrees with their opinions. The 
positive side to rolling news media is that people get easily bored. Diverse 
people, from writer Steven King to George Bush, have criticized Trump’s 
divisive approach, the former calling him a snake oil seller. Globally, many 
non-Americans can see this clearly, but being caught in the bubble of the 
American experience this is less obvious.
Ultimately, this comes down to values. Do we need leaders who bring 
everything back to themselves, who set out a pathway that concerns pro-
ducing a mirror image of themselves everything, and behind the image is 
nothing of substance, like the emperor’s new clothes, although is that what 
is desired? If it is, then let us just admit that we do not really need leaders 
of substance. Even today, Hitler is often portrayed as the innocent victim 
of those around him, a puppet. Trump is frequently discussed in the same 
manner. This comes down to our belief in free will. For those who flirted 
with fascism, like D.H. Lawrence, it is the so-called ‘inferior’ races that 
operate on fate, that goes all the way back to the beginning of time. True 
fascism also draws on this historical emphasis, but highlights the notion of 
the great will of the people encapsulates in the leader. The leader must be 
followed always; any dissent is anathema. Even in the Brexit vote we see a 
reflection of this: the people have spoken, and the will of the people is then 
used to implement any extreme policy.
Despite fascism often being concerned with the leader, we can see the 
weight of the group and society. This is a complex, as each area defines each 
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group differently. The ‘in group’ teams up against the outside group. In the 
UK, immigrants voted to leave the EU to def ine themselves as part of the 
group of ‘indigenous’ people. This phenomenon of defining oneself through 
difference and similarity continues. Ultimately, we need to consider what 
has been addressed. The essence of neo-Nazism might be to rewrite or deny 
history but in Germany the history of the Holocaust is an ever-present 
mediated reality. Switch on the television most nights and there will be a 
documentary or discussion on the subject. Publicly it is debated continually, 
with issues over war memorials (for example; should people be allowed to 
explore memorials or should they be respected as sacred objects?).
The sacredness of space and place is important, especially when certain 
places, such as cemeteries, are defaced. This relates to hooliganism discussed 
in Chapter 1. For example, is there violence endemic in youth culture that 
concerns the expression of discontent to any other? This is a violence that is 
omnidirectional, and might involve attacking Jewish graves, Muslim shops 
and so on. There is no core ideology, and it reflects more on the tenuous 
nature of youth identity in a period of austerity. We need to be careful 
when we discuss any act of neo-Nazism as neo-Nazi behaviour because 
the media may have bracketed an event as such just to make a headline 
and to bring it to the attention of their readers. This framing of the debate 
is one way the media lead the creation of neo-Nazi discourse, bracketing 
together what could be random events under the same banner. With the 
use of social media, there is a nebulous global network. With hooliganism, 
even prior to social media, there was a network of right-wing activity. From 
this perspective, it needs to be emphasized that while the media can create, 
def ine and lead the manufacture of neo-Nazism, it exists as an identity.
The strength of the left wing to rebut the right in the UK throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s suggests that the threat of the right wing is a monster 
that has and can be contained. Whatever people think of Jeremy Corbyn 
as the leader of the left in Britain in 2016 and 2017, he has a large number of 
supporters who are vehemently anti-fascist. Marine Le Pen in France may 
have supporters, but how active these are is debatable. Headlines are floated 
about politicians dabbling with neo-Nazi politics, from Dutch politicians, to 
Austrian, and Australian. They have not had definitive success, the popu-
lace not prepared to go that far. The popularity of Trump is under question 
globally, while the referendum success of Erdoğan in Turkey in April 2017 
is under question. In Germany, Merkel is primarily a conservative, but she 
has had the ability to be flexible and shift her position over major issues, 
such as energy. Eric Hobsbawm famously called the current age the age of 
insanity, and he may be right.20 Merkel is the alternative voice of reason. 
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David Cameron gambled and lost everything, and it was Cameron who 
claimed that Merkel’s welcoming attitude to immigrants would mean she 
would be gone in six months. Despite a variety of incidents, the right-wing 
hysteria that followed Brexit has not fully taken hold.
In a theatrical sense, Nigel Farage and Donald Trump are comedy figures, 
a sideshow in the Punch and Judy game. The UK’s Foreign Secretary Boris 
Johnson also f its this paradigm. Despite being attacked by the mainstream 
press, which is dominated by right-wing ownership, Corbyn had always 
been known as a moderate while being a backbencher. Unless you engage 
the press in an entertaining way you will be condemned forever, like 
Corbyn. In February 2017 Labour lost a seat in Cumbria they had held for 
83 years to a political novice. Corbyn, unlike any other British politician 
previously, would not claim any responsibility for this. In this respect, 
he can be compared to Trump. The UK was moving towards a one-party 
state; with no opposition, any policy could get passed, and rights removed. 
Whether this was fascist or not, it is unhealthy. Without difference there is 
no accountability, but prefer this to a state that has numerous parties at war, 
with nothing achieved. The wave of right-wing successes witnessed around 
the world is not comprehensive. In Austria this was not a total victory for 
the right. People were now realizing they need to take control.
There is a context beyond party political politics. In small and large 
organizations the question is, Why do we need leadership at all? The 
suggestion is that people need orders to be organized, that the human 
is ultimately not to be trusted. In 2016 Spain appeared to function well 
without a government for over a year until the left compromised. This needs 
recognizing. We need to offer a way forward where people feel empowered. 
Venerating strong leaders does not offer empowerment. The deif ication of 
the leader is one element of neo-Nazism. For the media and headline writing 
this is how the discourse is framed. Farage was given an inordinate amount 
of airtime, as is Trump. But do people really support these f igures, or are 
they more kicking against a system? In this sense, anything is better if you 
feel you have nothing. The support for the right should not be misread as 
popular support, although the emphasis of the media means this mistake 
is made. Similarly, even if millions of people have viewed or liked a certain 
neo-Nazi event on social media, it does not mean there is real support. The 
tangential and often tenuous nature of support needs highlighting. Voter 
turnout is often poor. This suggests that the population believe there is little 
chance things will be changed.
As with football ‘f irms’ of the 1980s, right-wing support is not linked 
to class. Football supporters, who may have had racist sympathies, often 
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came from wealthy backgrounds. The tribe of football offered an identity 
where transgressive activity could take place, such as violence. The manner 
in which Nazi and neo-Nazi groups have been constructed in and by the 
media has offered them an enormous amount of power that is beyond their 
real signif icance. Farage claimed that he had achieved his aim of Brexit, 
‘without one shot being f ired’. He forgot the killing of Jo Cox, murdered by 
a man who was considered to be a neo-Nazi sympathizer. But violence can 
be non-physical. Every day immigrants and refugees live under the threat 
of all forms of violence and terror. This terrorism is far wider and endemic 
than any threat from fundamentalism. War at any level from Trotsky on 
the left, to Mussolini on the right, is viewed as the locomotive of history, 
and there is fatalism. What is necessary is to challenge any form of fatalism. 
The left believe the right will die away, and the right that they have divine 
right to rule. Both of these positions are false. The media has added to this 
sense of fatalism.
The role of the media here is signif icant. Instead of changing the world, 
citizens are more likely to photograph and record it, or watch other broad-
casts. This may work to change reality, but it might also just mean a false 
sense of activity that is narcissistic. The way the media colluded with the 
FBI over Hillary Clinton’s emails is of note. Pollsters claim that this attention 
was the f inal reason Trump gained victory over Clinton. Clinton had broken 
protocol and used her personal email account for communications. During 
the campaign Trump said he would work to put her in jail for this. On this, he 
relented. Julian Assange was part of this campaign against Clinton, releasing 
batches of emails. Globally, the media reported on this event instantane-
ously, as you would expect. With the FBI commenting on this event right up 
to the election this can be said to be a major influence. The security forces, 
with underground media movements, along with mainstream movements, 
enabled the victory of a president who was backed by many white separatists 
and some neo-Nazis.
This is where the media’s responsibility comes into play, operating in a 
24/7 climate, where breaking the story is more important than anything 
else. A surface-level approach to understanding distorts meaning. If this 
is going to be the only source of information informing opinion, includ-
ing positions on how to vote, then this is dangerous. With more guerrilla 
journalism and freelance journalism and independent media outlets, it is 
hoped that there will be a shift and change in emphasis. Local stories and 
more different stories might be picked up, with greater depth. However 
much Nazism and neo-Nazism is rebranded, the worship of the Volk appears 
atavistic, a stepping back to a period that never existed. Brexit was part of 
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this, and led people to question what exactly is English or British culture; 
Morris dancing, f ish and chips; is that it? The archetypal British writer 
Iris Murdoch mocks this framework and as early as the 1950s saw this as a 
fantasy, but one that tempted rational beings.21 The media has fuelled this 
fantasy. In psychoanalytic terms, these are aimed at removing anxieties 
but create more anxiety by removing the thought required to tackle the 
anxiety.22
Tied into developments concerning a backlash over Trump and right-wing 
politics is the issue of freedom of speech. In Holland in March 2017 there 
was an active campaign to promote the rights of those who want to speak 
right-wing views. The ethical and moral question concerns whether people 
should have the right to state that others do not have rights, and how far 
should a society promote this right? Should liberal values be used to promote 
illiberal values? This is not to say that allowing people like Nick Griff in to 
speak in various settings is wrong. It is felt that giving people this permission 
lends their views some veracity. Within capitalist systems conflict, not just 
physically through war but through debate, is felt to be the way to gain a 
good result for everyone concerned. The reasoning is if we allow such beliefs 
to be aired they then can be challenged. What is concerning is the manner 
in which groups, such as white supremacists or extreme right-wing groups, 
then claim that they are the victim. Holocaust deniers have constructed 
themselves as victims. Donald Trump and his administration have claimed 
they are victimized, with any investigation by the media into him or his 
administration condemned as a witch hunt. The media continually shifts 
the power balance towards those who sympathize with such beliefs. This 
is not to suggest the media overtly backs such beliefs, given these beliefs 
are often overblown by the media. This is part of a strategy not merely to 
create headlines. Creating a culture of fear means people may pay more 
attention to the media, as they believe they need to know information 
about important events to formulate their opinions and behaviour, quickly.
Writers have explored this culture of fear.23 Waves of panic are con-
structed, some stemming from valid stories concerning incidents, such as 
child abuse. In this context, it is unlikely that many people will encounter 
neo-Nazi violence. Racism is part of a wider problem. The specif ic elements 
of neo-Nazism are not as popular as media reporting accounts for. Bracket-
ing events and people within this framework is a way of formulating a type 
of story which f its a certain brand of news. Contexts and specif ics are often 
overlooked. Those engaging with the media are left to deduce the veracity 
of these stories and whether they are linked to neo-Nazism or a form of 
construction. The more extreme right-wing politics becomes mainstream 
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the more its power dissolves. The political right obviously still exists, its 
voice is strong, but it has absorbed and watered down some of the extreme 
right; the left and centre are still resisting the extreme right’s demands.
Trump’s administration, swamped in scandal by March 2017, may turn 
out to be even more ineffectual than Obama’s, after all the bombastic 
rhetoric concerning getting things done. As a distraction, in April 2017 
Trump decided to create a high level of tension with North Korea and China 
which continued into August with threats of a North Korean war. Celebrity 
culture, with the focus on the individual, has allowed a form of phony 
politics, where someone is seen as a good leader just because they are well 
known. The weakness of Nazism and neo-Nazism is, amongst other things, 
an overreliance on the ‘truth’ of the leader, however fake it may be. The 
desperate attempts to have a strong leader, who is always right, means 
there will always be gaps, in that it is very nature of humans to have flaws. 
Paradoxically, the strength of the human is in the gaps, given creativity 
comes in the gaps. This is not the case for the perfect Nazi ‘overman’ who 
is not merely human.
Why people think they need to be led is an interesting question, as if 
they have been nurtured from birth to view the opinions of the central 
leader as superior. This level of subjugation, or a chosen desire for it, in the 
twenty-first century appears anomalous. In times of global insecurity these 
needs may become more paramount, hence the desire. Those who want 
to foster this allegiance are creating this form of insecurity. There is then 
dependency and conformity, people not challenging the social order. All 
dictators begin by claiming they are giving power back to the people. This 
is a process of propaganda that is overt. There is a condemnation of one 
establishment by the outsider, such as Trump, and then the enforcement 
of their system of power. In this sense it is voting for someone who claims 
they will shake everything up. This form of shock therapy is supposed to jolt 
the system, the social order, and the economic system. It can be perceived 
to be a form of punishment, aggression and regression. To define progress 
is a diff icult task, and it seems the neo-Nazi system wants to delete history, 
bypassing globalization and multiculturalism. How this can be achieved is 
diff icult to tell, other than by creating a whole new version of reality based 
on fantasy, which is what The Turner Diaries does.
Richard Spencer’s alt-right did not come about through lack of education. 
There is form of attractiveness, a sense of power and an assurance, that 
can appeal to a certain personality that is too weak to allow the ‘other’ to 
challenge its beliefs. This exists in organizations, cultures, societies and 
countries, where any form of mistake or unethical edict can go unchecked. 
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In Nazism there was often guesswork by those following Hitler. A question 
arose over whether there was a sanctioning or not. Predicting approval 
is one way of functioning without free will; it is a form of slavery, but it 
offers a level of freedom through removing free will. The need for a tribe is 
important for identity formation. Often media discourse is formed through 
accentuating the differences between tribes. Conflict creates drama, and 
this creates a story. In this regard, the threat of being an outsider is so great 
people will do anything to be absorbed into the tribe.
Surveillance culture is an important component, given Nazism and neo-
Nazism can only thrive via surveillance, where people feel threatened and 
under observation. Identity is removed in the herd. There is the notion of 
becoming one with the masses, but this can lead to an absorption into 
transcendence, the link between Nazi and neo-Nazi belief systems and 
quasi-religious experiences strong. With so many ‘lone wolves’, such as 
Dylan Roof and John Mair who claim to have acted individually, the wider 
network of neo-Nazism fed their sense of identity even if it was imagined. 
They were metaphysically at one with the pack through their allegiance, 
despite being physically alone. The British media framed the killing of 
Jo Cox as the killing by a mad man. John Humphrys on Radio 4’s Today 
programme refused to permit John Mair to be called a terrorist, saying it 
was murder by someone mentally ill. Cox had praised immigration in her 
maiden speech in parliament, making references to Irish Catholics and 
Muslims from Gujarat in India or from Pakistan, principally Kashmir. In her 
speech she had emphasized what united people. Mair apparently shouted 
‘This is for Britain!’ before attacking. During his trial it became clear he 
was a white separatist.
With other white terrorists, it is harder to say. Timothy McVeigh’s case is 
more complex. The authorities wanted McVeigh to take responsibility for 
the Oklahoma bombing, but he could not have acted alone. While this act 
of terrorism may have inspired other acts of terrorism it is diff icult to just 
brand this neo-Nazism. Belief systems have variances within them, and can 
change rapidly, depending on external events. The media can brand and 
rebrand any of these events as neo-Nazi related, creating an aura around 
them. This lends them a certain power, often in a paranormal sense, given 
the mystique initiated through the repeated reporting, lending them deeper 
signif icance. The weight the media gives to events indicates it operates as a 
multiplier, not merely to the signif ier, but to the signif ied, manufacturing 
meaning beyond meaning. Andy Warhol elevated reduplication of the image 
to an art form, offering a religious signif icance. The process works in a 
similar fashion here.
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Whether we wish to frame right-wing attacks as terrorism or not, we need 
to be careful branding these killers mentally ill. Doing so excuses them of 
any culpability, and if we look at how methodically many of these incidents 
are carried out it would be wrong to claim this is all linked to mental illness. 
Definitions of mental illness alter from place to place and time to time, so 
we also need to be aware of the cultural construction of the sanity/insanity 
binary. The same could go for terrorism. With Islamic terrorist groups the 
term ‘brainwashed’ is used, so people are not exactly mentally ill, but are 
being used as tools of a certain ideology. The question in all these incidents 
concerns culpability and choice. This is about identity formation, of giving 
up the self to a wider cause. While narrowing a person’s outlook, this offers 
a greater sense of identity.
Any causal relationship between the media’s framing of these debates 
and the actions of individuals is only conjecture but it is clear that indirect 
elements can be extrapolated. For example, in the case of the killer of Jo 
Cox, seeing John Mair’s case framed as that of just a lonely man having had 
a psychotic episode, the public will be unlikely to attach any strong belief 
system to the perpetrator. Repeated often enough, there is no way this will 
then be interpreted as a form of white separatist terrorism. The cause of the 
attack is positioned as the act of a mentally disturbed state of mind, brought 
about via isolation not linked to ideology. Mair then becomes a victim and 
a man society should have reached out to, vulnerable and in need of help, 
rather than a dedicated murderer with a sense of purpose and ideology 
gained from years of following a form of neo-Nazism with international 
contacts. This is often how such attacks are often framed, especially mass 
shootings in America.
As these attacks are framed as moments of madness, despite evidence 
that individuals may have been rationally planning them, political 
motivations are diluted and become non-existent. The cliché of a mad 
man opening f ire in a shopping mall, a school, or a cinema, is framed as a 
random event, not linked to gun control, belief systems, ideology, or the 
system that legitimizes violence. Randomness and chaos become key to 
this media framing, which is a signif icant paradox given formulating a 
narrative around these events is key to news reporting. Nothing is learnt 
from these attacks, as they are constructed as existing virtually outside 
time and space in a non-rational zone. They are promoted as part of the 
unconscious death wish of society just being acted out. In reality, or in 
f iction, such as the work of J.G. Ballard, these acts of violence become part 
of the normality of daily life. As with Nazi and neo-Nazi discourse, what 
is by nature extreme enters the mainstream.
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We can directly contrast the way these killings are reported with the 
way killings by Muslim groups are reported, where they are immediately 
linked back to the apparent training zones of ISIS, which are supposed to be 
undermining Western democracy. It is not capitalism that is undermining 
society, but ISIS. The latter is then positioned as part of a war, but then this 
war and the events surrounding it are normalized as part of the random 
nature of day-to-day life. The complexity of this is that the war itself has 
now become normalized. This is nothing new. Prior to World War II, British 
newspapers were full of accounts of disastrous campaigns by the British 
army in Afghanistan, an eternal war. Despite Donald Trump claiming 
throughout February 2017 that acts of terrorism were going underreported 
in Europe, for what he stated were political purposes, one could argue the 
opposite is the truth. Capitalism thrives on fear, and as we enter a post-
capitalism era given there is a greater awareness of the limits of capitalism, 
this further thrives frenetically on stories concerning terrorism and disaster. 
This legitimizes sanctions and crackdowns, and military sales, gaining 
government support from the groups they need to support their power base.
This media discourse is not journalism but state-sponsored propaganda. 
To paraphrase George Orwell again, journalism is printing what someone 
else does not want printed; everything else is public relations. We should 
realize by now that the mainstream media is ultimately concerned with 
protecting the establishment, and the interests of its major shareholders, 
and this war on terror legitimizes everything and anything. In stories con-
cerning attacks made by right-wing terrorists there is a loss of the signif ied 
in the construction of the story. Unlike Islamic terrorism, it is not repeated 
as part of a pattern connected to a geographical heartland, or territory. It 
is not constructed as part of a war. This is despite the militarization of the 
right, covertly and overtly, even in their obvious appearance, with skinheads 
and army boots and jackets, and names, such as Combat 18.
While the various right-wing groups attempt to project an image of them-
selves as organized units, with various divisions, as did the Nazis, the media 
is too busy in rehashing stories concerning Islamic terrorism to really take 
notice. For Martin Bell, Al Jazeera UK is the most legitimate news organiza-
tion, offering the most objective news. Media outlets like Russia Today are 
entertaining, if we acknowledge they are often propaganda outlets that 
give one side to the story. And it would be farfetched to assume every side 
to every story could be given. Importantly, during a period when in Britain 
Enoch Powell was making his ‘rivers of blood’ speech in Birmingham, 
claiming the UK was being over taken by immigration, there was actually 
net emigration. In his Radio 4 series ‘Neither There Not Here’, broadcast 
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in March 2017, David Dabydeen revealed how for many the way they were 
treated in England when they f irst arrived from different countries was 
actually better than the situation today. We could be sceptical and suggest 
people are looking at the past through the eyes of nostalgia, but when we 
consider that at this period there was a certain level of objectivity towards 
strangers, this is signif icant. With the global media focusing continually 
on ISIS, and the threat of terrorism, and the British police saying an attack 
is imminent, the incidences of racist attacks against groups, especially 
Muslims, is predictable. Manufacturing such attacks then detracts from 
real inequality, and the establishment can continue to move wealth into 
the hands of the few. This is of real concern in Trump’s America.
The police promote the idea that acts of terrorism by Islamic fundamen-
talists are inevitable, and in this sense unpreventable. Acts of right-wing 
neo-Nazi terrorism are seldom framed as terrorist acts, and are bracketed 
as isolated incidents, beyond rationality. This latter device then places these 
acts as beyond comprehension for any real consideration. Neo-Nazi acts of 
violence are framed as manifestations of nationalism, after certain groups 
claim they have become the marginalized voiced and the victim, following 
mass immigration. This legitimizes certain forms of violence. In Britain, 
there are numerous inquiries being conducted by the IPCC into racist 
violence carried out by the police, including many deaths in custody. The 
UK police was termed institutionally racist. Given the extent and number of 
the IPCC investigations it seems unlikely that the correct level of resources 
will be offered to these inquiries. Inevitably, cases will be overlooked and 
not investigated thoroughly.
The desire to construct an identity around an aff iliated tribe can be 
so strong any level of violence will be utilized to prove membership. This 
we have seen portrayed in f ilms offering a moral outcome where a shift 
occurs towards a hopeful ending, suggesting change is possible. Sometimes 
f ilms do not offer such an ending, as with the popular American History X; 
despite the older white brother reforming in prison, the younger brother 
shoots a black student. The senselessness of this is emphasized, as is the 
inevitability. The resistance of groups like the Anti-Nazis League in the UK 
is well known, and there is a global f ight against fascism. Despite the victory 
of f igures like Donald Trump, backed by white separatists, there is a global 
movement to resist the rise of fascism. This is linked to areas of resistance, 
but the incidences of neo-Nazi attacks have risen.
While there has been a drift in politics, making neo-Nazism part of 
the mainstream, the law has actually changed to counter hate crime. For 
example, the Cult Education Institute (CEI) reported on their website that 
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on 22 November 2014 a neo-Nazi received seventeen years for email threats. 
The magazine Rolling Stone on 23 June 2014 had the headline ‘Heil Hipster’, 
for an article concerning Germany’s only neo-Nazi Internet TV show, but 
this was satirically mocked. In Britain, there were various cases reported 
by CEI, including a neo-Nazi plot to kill a Spanish judge. In Europe, the CEI 
reported a rise in neo-Nazi attacks of 16 per cent, the period unspecif ied, 
in countries such as France, Germany, Denmark, Poland, Italy, Belgium, 
Hungary and more widely in Russia. But has anti-Semitism ever gone away, 
given anti-Semitism is not linked to a time and place, such as Germany in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Michael Laitman asks, ‘Can there now be Nazism in 
America?’24 There have been 70 recent incidents of bomb threats aimed at 
Jewish community centres in America, two graveyards have been attacked 
(one in St Louis, and one in Philadelphia), plus numerous other incidents.25 
As a society becomes more selfish and divided it becomes more anti-Semitic.
For some this hatred is a form of pleasure, and is an innate part of the 
human condition, as Slavoj Žižek has claimed throughout his work. With 
reference to Rattansi, this view has been questioned in this book. It is in 
many ways egoism, not just today but throughout history that has allowed 
this hatred to advance. As history moves forward the level of altruism does 
not necessarily move forward. Laitman makes a good comparison with 
the Spanish empire. When the Spanish monarchy was at its height in the 
f ifteenth century it moved in for the kill. There was a sanctioning of the 
Inquisition under Torquemada, who was of Jewish descent, in an attempt to 
destroy Judaism. Laitman points out that saying the Nazis were a one-time 
event is inaccurate. For example, it was not the Germans who invented the 
badge Jews wore, but the British in 1218. In this view, it was because other 
countries did not take the Jews that Hitler exterminated them, but this was 
not an intrinsic part of his essential policy. This is still a contested point, 
given the eradication of all Jews is considered the essence of Nazism.26
George Orwell ends his book 1984 with an image of fascism, blending 
with the sci-f i mechanized dystopia: the future is a boot, stamping on a face 
forever. Following Levinas, while there are still people alive to recognize 
the value in each face, and the importance of difference, this boot can be 
resisted. Regardless of how the media construct, collude, or resist Nazism 
and neo-Nazism, it is important to stress engaging is the key. In the Western 
world in particular, where many have forgotten the f ight that went on to 
win democracy, politics is often frowned upon and frequently ignored. By 
ignoring politics, extreme right-wing politicians can do their work more 
easily, claiming they are one of the people. Donald Trump may claim the 
media is full of fake news and lies, and the establishment is out to get him, 
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but as of January 2018 it is hard to believe he has any credibility. Looked at 
optimistically and philosophically this does not need exposing, because 
their behaviour is doing such a good job on its own of bringing about their 
own downfall. This is an overly optimistic conclusion.
When these belief systems become blurred within the mainstream, 
exposing, condemning and challenging them because extremely diff icult. 
The suggestion has been made that people benef it from these neo-Nazi 
beliefs, so why would they challenge them? We have reached a point in his-
tory where objectivity is not especially valued, and even the media images 
people live by are not valued. Those in charge of the main economies of the 
world have the loudest voice, with the media often being nothing more than 
public relations. Despite the power of Twitter and Facebook, well thought 
out and argued journalism is key to resistance. To argue against voices of 
power, through the media or otherwise, is an important way in which the 
spectres of Nazism and neo-Nazism are kept at bay. Keeping them at bay 
will not mean pockets of Nazism and neo-Nazism will not resurface, but 
it will mean that these voices are not normalized, or accepted totally. No 
matter how much media spin Britain First has done via Facebook, it is still 
an ostracized group, on the fringes. This does not mean the arguments of 
this book are invalid. What we have traced is a trajectory of acceptance. 
What now is proposed is an attempt to challenge this acceptance.
We do not have to believe in the central destructive power of human 
nature to accept this urge to attack the other needs challenging. Exposing 
all levels of inequality is central to combatting Nazism and neo-Nazism, 
which functions as a quick f ix solution: get rid of that group and you will 
be f ine. There might not be as yet any true def inition of what it is to be 
human, but it is easy to acknowledge what it means to be humane. Nazism 
and neo-Nazi thrive on the degradation of the other, on dehumanizing the 
other. Paradoxically, an attack on the other does not boost the self, but the 
opposite. Any magical panacea to the problems of society needs question-
ing. Figures such as D.H. Lawrence believed that a form of blood lust was 
within the other, specif ically in non-Western races. This could then be 
used to declare the other needed wiping out. We see this myth perpetually 
reworked in fantasy genres, such as the vampire story, which frequently 
bring in a subtext related to the Nazis. There is a deep need to deal with the 
shadow part of human nature, as analytical psychology describes it. If it is 
not acknowledged it comes out in many ways, which may not be controlled.
For Pythagoras and numerous thinkers after him no one is free if they 
cannot command themselves. The savagery of neo-Nazi belief and the 
violence that can be manifested from this belief leads to the conclusion that 
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some wish to give up their freedom. It may appear easier in the short term 
to relinquish one’s freedom, to go beyond existential doubt. A certain form 
of clarity comes with following the pack, believing in the herd mentally, 
and avoiding the pain of existence. But this is becoming a beast. By doing 
so, there is then the inf liction of pain on others. The trouble with this 
either or binary scenario is that it removes all levels of freedom, until both 
sides are trapped. People are then positioned in cages of their own making. 
Those living in Nazi Germany had to conform, otherwise they too were the 
enemy, and paranoia was rampant. We see this in contemporary political 
movements, right and left, which focus on fighting to get the group to adhere 
to f ixed tenants. The question is: Do people want to be free and, if so, what 
are the costs of this freedom? Enslavement and the degradation of the other?
In the f ilm I.D. (Philip Davis, 1995) where an undercover police off icer 
played by Reece Dinsdale joins a racist football gang, the police force can be 
conceived to be just as racist. A harder and more contentious question we 
have to ask is: Does he have a choice here? To move away from the animal 
to the human may be criticized as speciesism, but cooperation, which is 
inclusivity, is surely one of the important elements of a high functioning 
human. Nazism and neo-Nazism from this perspective is low functioning, 
based on a level of tribalism that denies this grander concept of the human. 
This may seem obvious, but there is a branch of politics that declares greed 
is good, that self ishness, at all costs, is good. Once this is accepted, anything 
is acceptable, and all manner of atrocities conducted, and then ignored.
The media can speak out against these atrocities, which may cause them 
to be stopped, but combating these atrocities needs more than the media on 
side. Paradoxically, it needs our mainstream politicians and their supporters 
to realize they are often thriving from inequality. Their silence is complicit 
with the wider crimes discussed here. This level of complicity is deep and 
part of a silence concerning austerity and cuts to welfare globally. To resist 
the status quo, and to be outside the herd is diff icult, given the weight 
in the West to proving one’s value through competition, acquisition and 
consumption. There is, however, a level of self-chosen ignorance. All that is 
recognized is the self that is warped by an immersion in all forms of media. 
In such a climate everyone is still culpable, and a choice is still to be had.
Europe’s New Far Right and Conclusions
In 2017, a country known for its liberal and progressive politics was at the 
heart of the immigration debate, with the Dutch party of Geert Wilders 
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having enormous influence. Despite Brexit and Trump’s victory, no one 
was predicting Wilders’ victory, but in many ways he had already won. 
Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of Holland, had a letter printed in every main 
newspaper saying people must accept Dutch values. Much of the rhetoric in 
Holland was even stronger than in America. There was the basic view held 
by Wilders’ supporters that the criminal element in Holland was made up of 
foreigners, and if you removed foreigners you would remove crime. Wilders 
used nostalgia to appeal to voters, a tactic employed by other parties such 
as UKIP. He had already been found guilty of inciting to racial hatred by 
calling one group scum but continued being contentious which made him 
a gift for the media.
The parallels between the UK and Holland are obvious. In both cases, 
mainstream parties felt they had to shift to the right, and use right-wing 
rhetoric. The fact that the neo-Nazi agenda was now dictating policy should 
be concerning. The dream of a multicultural Holland seemed to be disap-
pearing. Even though this is just one example, it is a good case study for a 
global trend, given the once accepting nature of Holland within popular 
mythology at least. While supporters of a right-wing agenda were airing 
their views, the media also produced programmes constantly reminding 
people of Jewish history. In Germany there is a constant reminder of the 
history of the extermination of the Jews, but support for neo-Nazi groups 
still remain. In times of austerity this is bound to be the case. What is 
phenomenal is how the general public is often in full unquestioning agree-
ment with the policies of government.
In the UK, for example, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer Phil 
Hammond in charge, there were tax breaks in 2016 and 2017, but austerity 
was emphasized. There was an increase in racist and neo-Nazi violence 
in the UK post-Brexit, and an increase in those below the poverty line. 
Blaming this on immigrants was a simple solution, and this was a policy 
Donald Trump wholeheartedly approved, diverting attention from his 
own activities. Trump began implementing policies concerning who had 
entry into America. This was not part of any extreme white separatist 
movement, but was constructed as a purely rational move. In its second 
format, after the initial edict banning people failed, by March 2017 this 
was supported by mainstream Republicans. Trump appeared to have 
success, even if this was all about media manipulation. The fact that the 
president of the United States would spend so much time in point-scoring 
activities with celebrities and media outlets indicated he had the wrong 
priorities. What was not so clear was where his policies were stemming 
from exactly.
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Bannon had already gained a following through his media outlets. Taking 
a backseat to Trump, but still leading on policies and manipulating mes-
sages, gave him even greater power. When he stepped down in August 2017, 
he claimed he was going to war for Trump and would have more influence 
outside the White House. Trump was able to circumvent all criticism by just 
carrying on regardless, but appeared to be doing more to win the support 
of his own military. To never admit your mistake was part of his mantra, 
initially, with the blame always being placed elsewhere, such as: on Obama, 
the media, the judiciary, China, Mexico, Germany, France, climate change 
scientists, everyone and anyone else. This tactic was so unlike anything 
anyone had ever seen before it was genuinely working, although in August 
2017 he admitted his policy on Afghanistan had been wrong, and America 
was not withdrawing. In Holland, Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the centrist 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) absorbed some of the 
anti-Islam beliefs of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert 
Wilders. Similarly, in the UK Jeremy Corbyn did not explicitly ever claim 
to be pro-Remain. Despite being praised as a politician with true values, 
Corbyn was shifting within the political landscape, and most insiders saw 
him as anti-Europe.
Despite the rising strength of his party, political analysts believed it 
would be diff icult for Wilders to seize power, as no one from the 25 other 
parties standing would work for him. This was unlike during the period of 
Hitler’s rise to power. At least in Holland this showed a clear level of support 
for the anti-Islam agenda. What complicated things in Holland further was 
the strength of the left. Previously, a right-wing politician had been shot 
dead, and Wilders was given top-level security protection. The strength 
of feeling was tangible in Holland. Channel 4 News in the UK reported on 
7 March 2017 that there was a battle in Holland between those Dutch people 
who felt threatened by immigrants, and the immigrants themselves who 
felt threatened by the racist local people. Whatever the reality of the situa-
tion, Channel 4 was attempting to offer a window into the Dutch elections 
happening the following week, as a subtle warning on Europe as a whole. 
The truth was that the position in Holland had shifted. All politicians had 
to take the position of the right seriously. Unlike in America, they were not 
forced to work with them.
Writing in The Daily Express in March 2017, Alice Foster asked whether 
Geert Wilders could cause Europe’s next right-wing political earthquake, 
predicting he was leading in the polls and might win.27 The media has a 
vested interest from a number of perspectives for writing such headlines, 
and even for implying there is a certain inevitability to this. The Daily 
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Express had not been fully reporting the Wilders trial, ignoring the fact that 
Wilders had stated Moroccans were ‘scum’, something covered by Channel 4 
News on the 7 March 2017. Like Trump, Wilders claimed the judges hated his 
party. Wilders wants to ban the Koran, the burqa, and Muslim immigration 
in general, calling the Koran ‘the Mein Kampf of today’. Like Trump calling 
Mexicans rapists when Americans were using Mexico for its cheap sex, 
Morocco was a zone for sexual exploitation by northern Europeans and 
the West in general. The level of hypocrisy was extreme, Wilders’ followers 
reversing this reality.
As with Trump, and Farage, Wilders is anti-Europe, and believes 
holding a referendum on membership in the European Union is key. An 
anti-international stance is a policy all right-wing parties and neo-Nazism 
shares. Wilders produced a f ilm in 2008, Fitna, splicing passages of the 
Koran with images of terrorist attacks, and was banned from entering the 
UK. Since then this ban has been lifted, as he was found not guilty of inciting 
hatred towards Muslims with this f ilm. The constant message that certain 
Muslims are being trained in camps, radicalized, and then returning to the 
West, is promoted without question. Wilders spent two years in Israel. While 
it is not being suggested this experience was part of his own radicalization 
to become so anti-Islam, his own history needs addressing.
The UK police in March 2017 claimed over the previous four years they 
had thwarted thirteen serious terrorist attacks, and at any one time f ive 
potential terrorist threats were being dealt with. No details of course were 
given. The radicalization of right-wing f igures, like Bannon, Farage, Trump, 
Wilders, and Le Pen, needs addressing, but it is beyond the scope of this 
book. What is of interest is the way these right-wing f igures are constructed, 
as opposed to Muslim radicals. The war in Iraq cost approximately half a 
million lives. No terrorist act by a Muslim group has caused such extensive 
loss of life. Such comparisons may not appear on the surface to be in any 
way reasonable, due to the complexities of each situation. But as the work 
of Adam Curtis, such as his 2015 documentary Bitter Lake, indicates, govern-
ments and the media have simplif ied the issues, especially with Islamic 
terrorism which in its current form stemmed from agreements in the 1970s. 
This early agreement between America and Saudi Arabia allowed for result-
ant forms of terrorism, such as Al-Qaeda and IS. It would be wrong to claim 
that Western foreign policy was not the primary cause of Islamic terrorism. 
Nazism and neo-Nazism may be anti-government, anti-international, and 
anti-Jew and Muslim, but it fails to engage with any historical detail, such 
as this. Certain tales are taken as the truth, and with a limited view of 
history and politics, the narrative of the past is rewritten. Wilders calls 
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Moroccans ‘scum’, Hitler called Jews ‘vermin’. Wilders shouts loudly, and 
those who feel anger tap into his style, seeing it as offering a voice to the 
people of Holland, against the ‘inf idel’.
In America, the alt-right movement has tapped into support from the 
wealthy. This has resonances with the British football f irms of the 1980s. 
These groups, such as the Chelsea Head Hunters, dabbled in racist violence, 
but were often made up of high earners, people from rich backgrounds 
using this as a form of release. American f ilms, such as Fight Club (David 
Fincher, 1999) have covered the theme of the American man oppressed by 
the system attempting to break free. Ed Norton is the star of both Fight Club 
and American History X, previously mentioned, which directly tackles this 
subject of neo-Nazism, both f ilms revealing how violence can dominate 
our lives. The former does so, in part, through offering a comic approach 
to violence. With the History Channel and any number of documentaries 
covering the topic today, watching the moments in German when they 
turned on the Jews, we can see echoes today of this moment. There is a 
certain obvious glee from the local population that is revealed by these 
documentaries, when we view the Germans destroying Jewish property 
in the 1930s. People can be seen taking pleasure in this destruction just as 
today in Holland people condemn Moroccans with a high-spirited virulence.
Riot police clashed with demonstrates in Holland in March 2017, as 
the Netherlands barred Turkish ministers. This was due to the ministers 
using the visits as campaigning tools for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
Ironically, he then branded his fellow NATO member a ‘Nazi’, after his 
own government had been cracking down on all dissent, rounding up and 
imprisoning tens of thousands of academics and journalists who did not 
support his regime. The Dutch government needed to look tough, to prevent 
even more support going to Geert Wilders’ party. The demonstrator wanted 
to meet family minister Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya at the consulate in Rot-
terdam, but she was escorted back to Germany, while demonstrators were 
beaten with batons and the police used armoured vans, dogs and water 
cannon, while some were on horseback. The vote in Turkey concerned 
turning a parliamentary democracy into a presidential system, plus in-
crease the number of election cycles the president can stand in, meaning 
Erdoğan could be in power until 2029. He is seeking support across Europe 
from Turkish émigrés. Elsewhere in Europe tension was high, leading up 
to the referendum in Turkey in April 2017, with four rallies cancelled in 
Austria, and one cancelled in Switzerland, with the German chancellor 
Angela Merkel taking a strong line, saying she would not let the tensions 
spill over into Germany. Turkey is a prime example of how a country had 
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moved towards democracy but one leader was now trying to seize supreme 
authority, claiming this would make the country safer. As with Trump and 
Putin, the threat of terrorism was being used as a smokescreen to hold on to 
power. Any change like this in Turkey would be possibly the most significant 
change since 1923, when the Turkish Republic began.
Turkey then threatened Holland with sanctions, with Wilders in a tweet 
on 11 March calling on the Turkish people who supported Erdoğan to leave 
Holland and never come back. Interestingly, this threat from right-wing 
Turks actually bought all Dutch parties together. With Turkey making these 
threats in the run up to the Dutch elections they were seeking to threaten 
the democracy of another country. Holland in March 2017, comparatively 
speaking, was doing well economically, and resurging from the global eco-
nomic crisis; unemployment was at a f ive-year low, and economic growth 
standing at 2.3 per cent. The main emphasis in the election was immigration 
and integration. Outside the major towns and cities in Holland there is a 
certain worship of the past, where immigration is not part of an acceptable 
form of society. In this respect, it is understandable how Wilders has a 
broad-based audience, and a strong level of support. Like Trump, Wilders 
has cultivated a larger-than-life persona, and courting controversy through 
outrageous statements has been central to his success. The nostalgia that 
is sweeping the world is linked to this rise of the right, and has come at a 
moment when the impact of the progressive politics of the 1960s may have 
been felt the strongest.
Wilders uses windmills frequently in his propaganda, and anything that 
speaks of traditional values in Holland. Nigel Farage in the UK cultivates 
the image of a traditionalist, through his carefully manufactured projected 
behaviour, and even his dress sense. He creates an image of a man who 
enjoys nothing more than a pint of bitter, in his traditional English pub, but 
any further culture promoted by the UK that has his approval is diff icult 
to ascertain. There is the false idea that in the past things were simpler, 
and values were clear, and foreigners have just corrupted the natives. As 
with Steve Bannon, the progressive politics of the 1960s are condemned 
outright as encouraging immigration, which has threatened the foundations 
of society, and this myth is continually repeated until many have believed 
it. Interestingly, in America while Charles Manson was constructed as 
the fall of the 1960s, a living embodiment of all that was wrong with the 
counterculture, Manson was actually a white supremacist. In his cult, he 
condemned any relationships between white women and black men, and 
predicted an apocalypse in society caused by such miscegenation. In this 
regard activities by the Manson family should be branded as terrorism. The 
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training ground of the family was American soil. Homegrown terrorism like 
this might be branded as satanic, cultish, racist, or merely an extreme ver-
sion of the patriarchal system gone wrong, but it is still terrorism. Discourse 
over apocalypse appears to prevail in each era. Writers such as Norman 
Cohn have examined such a phenomenon, and it is relevant for neo-Nazism 
and white supremacy. On the one hand, there is the fear of the end of the 
world that is being caused by miscegenation, and on the other there is a 
celebration of this as it leads to an attempt to bring about what is perceived 
to be a purer world.
The influential text The Turner Diaries has been explored as being sig-
nif icant in many forms of media, from the television series NSU German 
History X, to documentaries covering white separatist movements, such 
as those involving Cobb. All racist movements, from the BNP to the Nazis, 
have re-interpreted history in a way that constructs the past through a 
certain narrow lens. Representing the BNP on Question Time, Nick Griff in 
completely rewrote history, emphasizing a mythical purity of the Anglo-
Saxon ‘race’. Drawing on aspects of Hegelian philosophy, which believes 
in the spirit of history transcending the human, racist groups concur 
with the view that there is essentially a predetermined element to racial 
purity. This view holds destiny and fate to be central to the belief system. 
In this manner, there is no choice in ‘real’ behaviour, because destiny will 
prevail. The weak deserve to be eliminated because they are weak. Even a 
cursory reflection on this can lead us to see how this view is often part of 
mainstream discourse. Going all the way back to Abrahamic law, there is 
the central notion in the West that those who work hard will achieve and 
prosper, and those who are not prospering are not working hard. In the 
latter’s case, their lack of success is often portrayed as a sign of weakness.
The tabloid press frequently constructed those on welfare and benefits 
as actually parasites, lesser beings, relying on the overgenerous system. In 
this sense, some of the core values that can be seen at the heart of Nazism 
and neo-Nazism are also at the heart of mainstream societies. The fact that 
this is the case should be cause for concern. People are taught from birth 
ideologies that connect to these beliefs, so they eventually are not even 
considered to be beliefs but part of who we are. There is no real agreement 
on what it means to be human, but it is appropriate to use the term ‘humane’. 
In this regard being human is not a state of being, but an ongoing process. 
We are not truly human unless we behave in a humane way, but who decides 
this? Any behaviour that denigrates the other in any form lowers humanity, 
bringing us closer to animals, who frequently do not have a choice in the 
way they behave. We possess language and are possessed by language. 
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Geert Wilders may use derogatory language to describe Moroccans, but 
this actually reflects on his own humanity. It means he has a lower level of 
humanity himself. To go with the herd, and seek aggrandizement through 
group hate, appears to be a position people today in Austria, Holland, the 
UK, America, and many other countries are in. This self-dehumanization 
through dehumanizing others, often done unconsciously, reveals people are 
not fully realizing their potentials as human beings. The fascination that the 
media has with this whole area of dehumanization, in all its forms, has been 
the subject of this book. None of this will change unless humans can actively 
promote knowledge of the concept that humanity is to be searched for and 
depends on each decision taken every day, over the course of a lifetime.
In March 2017 Les Républicains were accused of anti-Semitism against 
their centrist opponent Emmanuel Macron, the party’s secretary Bernard 
Accoyer apologizing, saying it had been wrongly interpreted. The right-wing 
candidate François Fillon condemned the caricature of Macron as a hooked-
nosed capitalist, who was not Jewish but had worked for the Rothschild 
investment bank. The caricature of a hooked nose banker did evoke images 
from the 1930s that were used by the Nazis to condemn the Jews as part 
of a wider conspiracy. Like Geert Wilders in Holland, the far-right Front 
National’s Marine Le Pen was gaining support in France. Trump’s victory in 
America can be read as a global move towards the right, although in France 
support for the Front National has always been strong. In Britain far-right 
politics, as exemplified by the BNP, EDL, and then UKIP, have been absorbed 
into the mainstreams, shifting the agenda of the mainstream right even 
further to the right. Political parties have used digital technologies to reach 
out to voters, altering their messages, depending on the demographic. Tim 
Berners-Lee, known as the founder of the World Wide Web, in March 2017 
condemned the manner in which the Internet was being used to threaten 
freedoms. This was a long way away from the utopian rhetoric used in the 
early days of the Internet.
Political parties were tracking potential voters through the monitor-
ing of their choices. The same party was giving out different messages to 
different types of voter, altering the message to visit the audience. The 
audience’s preferences were gained from their social media choices. While 
Berners-Lee f inds this problematic, we can see this is just the nature of 
politics. For decades the Labour Party attempted to court business interests 
in the UK, for fear of being anti-business, while at the same time giving 
the impression it was on the side of the working class. It would be naïve 
to believe the Internet was a private zone, where monitoring did not take 
place. The harvesting of data on a huge scale is a fear the experts might 
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have, but most users ignore this aspect of the Internet. There were 50,000 
variations of political messages each day on Facebook during the 2016 US 
election.28 For Berners-Lee the problem was when users were redirected to 
fake news sites or messaging discouraging people from voting. This worked 
against Clinton and it was the demonization of Hillary Clinton that swung 
the election. Wikileaks and Julian Assange played a part in this, Assange 
meeting UKIP’s Nigel Farage for discussions in March 2017.
Divisions between left and right were breaking down, and social media 
played a large part in this. Trump was globally renowned for his personal 
unpredictable use of Twitter, which was often aggressive. Owen Jones, in 
The Independent ’s top ten list of the most influential left-wing f igures in 
Britain, had also been a prolif ic user of social media. The public display 
of animosity between f igures across the political spectrum became even 
more a form of theatre. In 2016 Jones has been known specif ically in Spain 
for his support of the left-wing political party Podemos, where the left gave 
up their entrenched position to collaborate with other parties. Jones was 
interested in f inding a position where different sides could collaborate. 
The fact that he was not f ixated on an ideology often meant he was on the 
receiving end of hatred, especially from those who believed Jeremy Corbyn 
could do no wrong.
Despite the impact he was creating globally, as a writer and journalist 
and political f igure, Jones announced in March 2017 that he was moving off 
social media, other than to use it for the sharing of events and news. This 
was down to the hatred of his enemies, who were using these platforms to 
target him. Tim Berners-Lee had been speaking as a technologist when he 
warned of the dangerous situation the Internet was in by 2017. The space 
had become usurped by those who wanted to drown out the voices of those, 
like Jones, who believed in equality. In this sense, the neo-Nazis had won. 
Jones was driven from the debate, and up to this point he was one of the 
most articulate people of the left. This abuse included people telling him 
how they were going to murder and torturer him. This censoring was not 
just in social media but occurred in television interviews, GMTV host Piers 
Morgan, a known Trump sympathizer, shouting Jones down. This hatred 
was nothing new and had been building for some time and was explicitly 
related to neo-Nazism. This indicated how the phrase and accusation ‘Nazi’ 
can be used by both the left and the right.
In November 2016 David Duke, a well-known white separatist, Holocaust 
denier, and former Grand Wizard of the KKK, took to Twitter to attack 
Owen Jones directly. While later being a member of the Republican Party, 
Duke in the 1970s was a known member of the self-declared American 
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Nazi Party. The level of conspiracy theory and beliefs propounded by Duke 
is comprehensive, but not unusual for American white separatists. Duke 
believes Jews are in control of the Federal Reserve Bank, the US federal 
government, Hollywood, and the media. He uses a variety of platforms 
such as his own website to promote the notion that homosexuality is also 
part of a Jewish conspiracy. A tweet sent 2:34 am, on 22 November 216 
read, ‘What’s up with these homosexuals, like Owen Jones – pushing for 
Muslim immigration?’ A loyal supporter of Trump and the latter’s policy 
of ‘taking America back’, Duke had taken offence to Jones calling Trump 
a ‘monster’ listing all of Trump’s faults, including racism and misogyny. 
As with Trump, it seems Duke was looking for a battle to create a theatre 
that attracted attention, but Jones did not take the bait. He then had a very 
low-key response, ‘Oh look, I’m being dissed by a leading American Nazi. 
How very 2016.’ This tweet was apt, summing up the current state of the 
world. Accused of being anti-Semitic because of his support for Palestine, 
Jones made a point of rejecting comparisons between Nazi Germany and the 
State of Israel. Even in that debate he has proven himself to be reasonable, 
and that was part of the problem for his detractors. Much of the hatred 
directed towards Jones came from those claiming to be from his own party. 
In this position, it was no wonder Jones left social media, as voices from all 
sides were attacking him.
Allegations and accusations of Nazism and neo-Nazism can be f lung 
and are flung by all sides. While this attracts attention to certain f igures, 
creating a theatre, the emphasis on personalities detracts from policies. By 
late March 2017 the Trump administration was floundering, then Trump ac-
cused Obama of wire-tapping. The debate moved into the strange Orwellian 
zone of what was actually meant by this comment, Trump declaring he 
did not mean Obama personally. At least, from Trump’s perspective, these 
debates detracted from what Trump was doing on the ground, such as trying 
to remove ObamaCare, with 15 million people eligible for medical treatment 
in danger. Whether Trump personally believed in any of the policies or 
beliefs promoted by white separatists or neo-Nazis did not matter. He was 
still controlling the narrative. Globally, Trump attracted the most attention 
but his views were not the most extreme. In Holland, Geert Wilders had the 
stated policy of shutting down mosques, going one step further than Trump. 
This did have some similarity to the Nazi tactic of closing down synagogues.
The resurrection of the ideology that a strong man (or, in France’s 
case, a woman) was necessary became the global direction politics was 
taking. From Turkey, to China, to America, to Spain, to name just a few 
countries, a sizeable part of the population believed that, for the sake of 
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security and growth, personal freedom was not as important as a strong 
man in charge. In Germany some believed Angela Merkel was an ineffectual 
leader because she was flexible, especially in her approach to immigration. 
Despite the death of Franco in the 1970s, many believed having a leader 
like Franco was what Spain was missing. The older generation yearned 
for this form of leadership, nostalgically believing this offered clarity. As 
with the propaganda peddled by Steve Bannon concerning America in the 
1960s, it was mainstream to believe, following the death of Franco, Spain 
went through a period of decay due to liberalization. Progress, especially 
regarding the rights of women and homosexuals, was not felt to be of benefit 
to the country by many of those looking for a strong leader. This relates to 
the view in Latin America of the benign dictator.
In Britain in 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May was criticized for not 
being strong enough, calling a snap election. From an early age the need 
for a strong leader is instilled in the population, through families, schools, 
universities, and then work and governments. Globally, there has been 
the view that groups of people, in any circumstance, need a strong person 
to f ight their cause. This leads not to cooperation and collaboration, and 
long-term resilience, a position advocated by Owen Jones. An emphasis on 
single f igureheads, driving blinkered ideologies, often flirting with fascism, 
drives a global economy that is the antithesis of stability. In Germany, the 
establishment saw Hitler initially as no more than a joke, and refused to 
collaborate. Once he started gaining support, using ruthless force, there 
was little choice. Parallels between the 1930s and our current period are 
not absolute, but practicalities triumph over ethics. Dutch parties claim 
they will never collaborate with Geert Wilders’ party, but they might have 
to change their position. This sets a dangerous precedent. Theresa May has 
so far resisted working with Nigel Farage. In France, there have been claims 
that Marine Le Pen is not as right wing as people believe. Her brand of 
politics is the antithesis of Trump’s, with her strong belief in state ownership 
of certain services.
Media headlines in March 2017 were claiming Russia’s President Putin 
was the most powerful man in the world. Through the wars in Syria, the 
Crimea, and elsewhere, plus Russia’s suspected intervention in the Ameri-
can elections and UK referendum on Europe, and certain policies, such 
as the removing of laws protecting women from domestic violence, Putin 
epitomizes the proto-fascist leader. As we saw in Chapter 1, there were 
suggestions that, even when it came down to something as trivial as football 
matches, Russia had sent trained hooligans to attack opposition supporters, 
especially English football fans. The British media enjoyed reporting this, 
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and the Russian media denied this. Regardless of the truth, each related 
activity by Russia concerned projecting the image of a strong Russia. As with 
Brexit, it appears when given a choice people will often choose to remove 
their ability to choose. This suggests a herd mentality that is self-destructive. 
Neo-Nazism has this trait, f lirting with apocalyptic rhetoric, rehashing old 
arguments concerning threats to the ‘pure’ race.
The notion of purity draws us to the conceptualizing of sex and it would 
be wrong to assume there is nothing outside of sexual misconduct. But it is 
also spurious to attack Deleuze and Guattari for illustrating sexuality is both 
physically and socially polymorphous, and that Nazism ‘got fascists sexually 
aroused’.29 Culture and the media exponentially ref lect on the debates 
explored here, indicating issues over Nazism and neo-Nazism and f ilm and 
media are central to the way we understand ourselves in the contemporary 
world. These extreme beliefs have become part of the mainstream. This 
book has explained briefly how they always have been. They are intrinsic to 
the way we define ourselves through framing our group ontology, whether 
in versions of alignment to, or opposition from. Len Deighton’s novel SS-GB is 
just one example of a cultural product drawing media attention, dramatized 
for television by the BBC, and broadcast in 2017. This explores a world, like 
The Man in the High Castle, where Germany has won the war. Of course, 
these f ictions reflect on the present. In the f irst series of The Man in the 
High Castle the majority of the accents are American not German, and 
the German victory is celebrated like Thanksgiving. Fundamentally, good 
dystopian drama functions as a warning.
With a swift change of outf its and geography, could the Nazis be the evil 
empire, as in Star Wars or vice versa? Even the outfits in Star Wars, arguably 
the most globally recognized and popular franchise of all time, are drawn 
explicitly from Nazi iconography. Bifurcated ideological systems make the 
best drama only when moral dilemmas are drawn out via blurring clear 
divisions, and offering protagonists choices. Star Wars can also be ‘read’ 
as a commentary on radicalization. In SS-GB, Germans are holding the 
King of England captive but certain Nazis want to protect and free him. 
Deighton gets behind the divisions within the Nazi Party itself, with the 
SS at war with the army and various factions, and reveals how the British 
resistance utilizes these divisions. The moral dilemma of the protagonist, 
Archer of the Yard (Sam Riley), is emphasized in the fourth episode. Archer 
is a valued senior policeman, assisting the Nazis with their investigations 
of unexplained deaths. He has won the trust of his senior Nazi boss, who 
does not have an interest in politics, but does believe in the Nazi ideology 
of ‘winners’, and sees Archer as a ‘winner’.
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This ideology is identical to the rhetoric spun out by business schools 
today, part of the winners–and-losers philosophy central to Donald Trump’s 
propaganda. Ignoring all his business failures, commentators and voters 
believed a man supposedly good at business, and an apparent ‘winner’, 
would be good in the White House. What we mean by ‘good’ here is open to 
question. When given the chance to become a German, and therefore be a 
full Nazi Party member and save his family completely, Archer comments, 
‘Do I have a choice?’ but he still says no. Archer’s seemingly rhetorical 
question could be put to those dealing with Trump, Wilders, Putin, and the 
rest. Do we have a choice? There is a simple choice if we want to remain 
human. One debatable difference between an animal and a human is the 
latter’s ability to make more deliberate self-reflective choices. This ability is 
not necessarily always an ability people choose to progress and maintain, 
abdicating their humanity. This suggests being human is not innate but a 
process that needs development, or least being humane can be described in 
this way. This human behaviour to not ultimately be free, and to abdicate 
responsibility, might paradoxically be a self-preservation device. But it 
lacks a wider humanity. Philosophers for centuries have contemplated the 
notion of free will, but when it comes down to it Archer of the Yard chooses 
to keep his humanity, even if this threatens his life and his family’s life. If 
he loses his humanity what exactly does he achieve through this collusion 
with the Nazis. Would we do the same?
With the polarization of the left and the right there is an opportunity 
for neo-Nazis in all of their guises to further align themselves to the centre 
ground. This has not been something on the fringes, historically. If fascism 
normalizes itself the media has helped by shifting the focus away from how 
fascist policies have been mainstreamed. Identity is now the image. For 
postmodern thinkers this horror is celebrated as a reoccurring reality, as 
with Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same. For Nietzsche this eternal 
recurrence is overcome by willing its return. Part of the complexities can 
be summarized within Hegel’s approach, where ‘transcendence is inf inity, 
that is, the impossibility of encompassing or totalizing alterity’.30 This is 
far removed from the homogeneity and binary positions advocated by the 
popular press and media, neo-Nazis, and politicians. Nazism and neo-
Nazism have become ways in which we def ine ourselves, ontologically. 
Our central question has been whether this has always been in culture 
and societies, often remaining dormant, or whether it is only due to recent 
changes that this has come to the forefront. Globalization has been central 
to this. While some of these events are ubiquitously called terrorism, others 
are called nationalist activity linked to pride.
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Following murder at a ‘Unite the Right’ rally in August 2017, Trump 
refused to explicitly condemn white supremacists who had protested in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, due to the removal of a statue of Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee. Those fearing Trump’s allegiance to the far right 
felt they had been proven correct when he also blamed so-called left-wing 
protestors, preaching to the press that there was always two sides to a story 
and anything else was fake news. As 2012 nominee Mitt Romney tweeted 
at 1:14 am, 16 August 2017, ‘No, not the same. One side is racist, bigoted, 
Nazi. The other opposes racism and bigotry. Morally different universes.’ 
After a 32-year-old woman was killed and nineteen others injured, 20-year-
old James Alex Fields Jr of Maumee, Ohio, was arrested and charged with 
second-degree murder, malicious wounding and failure to stop for an ac-
cident involving death. Three people died on 12 August, including two state 
troopers monitoring the protest from a helicopter, plus 35 people had been 
injured in various confrontations during the rally. This was considered to 
be the largest white nationalist rally in a decade, but Trump’s supporters 
stood by him, despite him being forced to disband the so-called American 
Manufacturing Council. His response overall was viewed by CNN as being 
a way for Trump to make political gain, taking America back, undoing 
‘decades worth of progress towards a freer and better country for all people’.31 
White supremacy is part of the fabric of American life, racial terror and 
violence central to its history and comparing footage from racial attacks 
of 2017 and the 1960s the only real difference is the latter was f ilmed in 
black and white.32
Having commenced the initial work on this book eight years prior to 
Trump’s presidentially victory, it was never my attention to give such an 
emphasis to Trump and the media. Clearly, it should be obvious now why 
this has been necessary. Trump’s playing with the truth continues to be of 
relevance for the overall argument of this book, that Nazism and neo-Nazism 
is not at the fringes of media, culture and society, and never has been. For 
example, Trump’s arguments, backed by the neo-Nazi David Duke, consist 
of claiming the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee will lead to the removal 
of statues of Abraham Lincoln. There is no logic in this, and no connection 
between Lee and Lincoln. Despite this, it has been my argument throughout 
that postmodernism’s assault on the one truth has been of benefit. This does 
not give strength to neo-Nazis who might deny the Holocaust. There is a 
more diff icult question concerning what the Holocaust means.
As is recognized by historian John Lukacs, the pursuit of truth changes 
across time, including its conditions, circumstances, and practices.33 
Through references to Bernard Schlink, Jacques Derrida, and William 
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Burroughs, amongst others, the signif icance of language has been em-
phasized throughout this work, as has the use of apocalyptic rhetoric by 
politicians and theorists. Discussing American literature since 9/11, Richard 
Gray has stressed the ‘strange dematerialization of the material’. In such 
a zone, the difference between the actual and artif icial is wiped clean, 
and the real returns as artif icial. Quoting Herbert Marcuse’s notion of the 
return of the repressed, making up the ‘tabooed and subterranean history 
of civilisation’, there is the notion that this is a way to interpret the world 
after 9/11. Silence reigns and speech is confounded, but Gray ties this into 
a movement since Romanticism concerning writing about loss.34 Taking 
this a step further, the loss is part of a deif ication of a prelapsarian world, 
where difference was unthinkable. In such a zone thinking itself does not 
and cannot take place as a separate act.
Writing about Ray Bradbury, whose book Fahrenheit 451 was adapted by 
François Truffaut and alluded to Nazism, Margaret Atwood notes he was 
descended from Mary Bradbury. She was a convicted witch in 1692 during 
the notorious Salem trials, a seminal trope in American history. Bradbury 
gets to the ‘deep, dark, gothic core of America’. At the heart of the trials is 
the idea of the double. You are not who you are, but more signif icantly your 
neighbours are not who you think they are. Paranoia runs rampant. In the 
seventeenth century they are witches; in the eighteenth century they are 
traitors in the time of the revolution; in the twentieth they are communists; 
and in the twenty-first they are terrorists.35 Atwood forgets to add they have 
always been the Jews. For the Nazis, the Jews were part of the demonic 
powers conspiring against their ascension to a state of semi-divine immortal 
harmony.36 According to Fox News, neo-Nazis in the Charlottesville rally of 
August 2017 were chanting ‘Jews will not replace us!’37 From 2007 to 2017 
right-wing terror groups have accounted for 74 per cent of domestic terror 
incidents in America, with one credible analyst claiming the chance of a 
civil war breaking out in America in the next ten to f ifteen years was as high 
as 60 per cent.38 An emphasis on borders and territorial control arises, with 
right-wing politicians gaining support by asserting the paramount status 
of the ethno-national state. As recently as 2007 the reverse trajectory was 
predicted, with the prediction that the ethno-national state was in decline.39 
This reinstalling of the ethno-national state’s importance can be viewed as 
a reaction to its threatened demise.
Throughout this book it is recognized the term ‘Nazi’ is a contested 
one, as is fascism. America has its own traditions, from the Klu Klux Klan 
established in the mid-nineteenth century, to the investigations into racial 
cleansing that inspired the Nazis, and even the term ‘neo-Nazi’ was in 
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use in the 1940s.40 The American emphasis may be misleading, but with 
neo-Nazi groups in American gaining ground and media publicity this is 
appropriate. We have seen that even in remote places, with no real Jewish 
presence, neo-Nazi groups are also growing. The Jewish diaspora globally 
has to reconcile its own status of going beyond borders, breaking down 
the ethno-national state, with the weight given to the Jewish state of Israel 
which is the classic ethno-national state.41 Despite the alarm over the right-
wing agenda of Trump and his connection to white separatists, it has been 
explained how this frequently functions as a smoke screen. Support from 
the extreme right is gained through airing extreme potential policies whilst 
getting into power. Then, once they have achieved power, their right-wing 
policies, which are still extreme, are then felt to be acceptable. In such 
a climate journalism and politics are transformed and often redundant, 
and the media struggles to hold politicians to account. As with history, in 
our struggle to understand Nazism and neo-Nazism in f ilm and media we 
might f ind examples by which we consider our future actions, but there 
are no definitive templates.42
Our lack of an agreed understanding over Nazism and neo-Nazism may 
come down to our collective approach to any attempt at understanding 
collective and individual morality. Writing just three years before the new 
salaried employees who populated the cities of Weimar Germany fully 
embraced Hitler, Siegfried Kracauer showed how the National Board for 
Economic Viability in Weimar Germany had no place for the term ‘human 
beings’.43 In this world, salaried office works were the new proletariat slaves, 
as he put it, fully embracing the notion of rationalization. The word ration-
alization has a contemporary ring to it, but was at the heart of Germany 
leading up to the Nazis taking control. There is a nurturing of uniformity 
and false consciousness in this period, along with the combined spurious 
claim that difference is allowed and promoted but fundamentally inertness 
reigns.44 Kracauer was writing in the 1920s, but could be commenting on the 
contemporary period, which similarly has fostered a thirst for neo-Nazism. 
There has been no claim here of offering a deep insight into the human 
condition. Others have highlighted in a positive way the signif icance of 
postmodernism in the context of the Holocaust.45 Here our focus has been 
on Nazism and neo-Nazism in f ilm and media, and popular culture by its 
very nature is postmodern. Teasing out some of the essential paradoxes of 
this has been within the scope of this book, but examining in detail the 
impact of certain thinkers is not.
As is now known, Martin Heidegger’s Nazism was not a marginal affair, 
but his influence on theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel 
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Foucault, and all their disciples, is immense.46 The opening section to this 
book used a quotation from Homi Bhabha, who is in turn referencing Hei-
degger. This in itself could be conceived of as problematic, although using a 
Nazi to understand Nazism and neo-Nazism has some logic. René Girard has 
explained three core mechanisms governing social interaction: mimesis, 
with imitation being at the heart of all human behaviour; scapegoating, 
where collective guilt is placed onto victims then purged; and violence.47 
This framework might explain some of the behaviour of neo-Nazi groups 
today, but it does not explain their global reach to cultures that are so differ-
ent. In 1933 Wilhelm Reich claimed that fascism is the politically organized 
expression of the average human character structure and has nothing to do 
with race, nation or party but is ‘general and international’.48 The problem 
with this approach is that the patriarchal family structure is singularly 
blamed, sexual repression functioning not for moral edification (religion), or 
culture (Freud), but in Reich’s view for the preservation of an authoritarian 
social regime. Attractive in its simplicity, this is too absolutist and universal, 
and ignores local variations. Even now some scholars maintain Nazism was 
sexually repressive, plus f ilm, literature, journalism, and popular culture 
have emphasized Nazism’s perversity.49 We saw in the previous chapter how 
local neo-Nazi groups in Asia gained strength from appearing to defend 
local interests against what is perceived to be the colonial oppression, such 
as that from China. This included sexual activity.
From an interview I had in 1996 with Margot Male, a former member of 
the Hitler Youth, it was clear to me she had seen herself as a victim when 
forced to work in an ammunitions factory. The status of the right-wing 
white victim has been explicated, along with exposing the underlying 
myth that now it is a justif iable time for them to rise up. When myths 
are demythologized, they can be understood not cosmologically, or even 
anthropologically, but existentially.50 The manner in which the extreme left 
and right coalesce over the notion of authenticity has been outlined. With 
neo-Nazism frequently being at the heart of culture and society it is diff icult 
to separate out its traits. Both sides utilize terminology such as cleansing 
in the pursuit of their aims. This may involve ridding the earth of Nazis 
and neo-Nazis as part of a hunt narrative, or removing the ‘other’. Aspects 
of how our current myths concerning identity and race stem from media 
discourse have been outlined. Writers for f ilm, television and video games 
have incorporated Nazi themes but this often deadens understanding.
The media has at times constructed neo-Nazism from an ontological 
crisis. Despite or because of the reworking of Nazism, neo-Nazism and the 
death camps in f ilm and media, often they appear even more unintelligible. 
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But it has been argued this does not mean attempts at understanding should 
be relinquished. The need to understand these beliefs and associated events 
has not dissipated but only grown stronger. The media can function to 
replace any event with any other, offering the myths we live by and danger-
ously delineating moral boundaries. The threat from Holocaust denial is 
real, despite being exposed. Neo-Nazis have used the media, but deniers 
have often fallen because documentary footage is then used as evidence 
against them. This book has offered an approach suggesting that our forever 
ambiguous humanity is tied to certain choices. We can renounce our ability 
to choose, for reasons such as animalistic self-protection. This is a dehuman-
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